


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FITZHUGH LEE.

A COMPLETE HISTORY
OF THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
OF 1898

BY
PROF. W. R. COPELAND



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INTRODUCTION.

It has been said that no country's public policy is actuated by unselfishness or the dictates of humanity. To a certain extent this is true, since mutual jealousy and distrust among nations render such a course difficult and well-nigh impossible.

But the United States, which struck the blow for liberty in 1776, and for unity in 1861, next smote in the sacred name of humanity. The cries of the dead and dying on her doorsteps fell no longer on deaf ears. Disavowing all intention of adding the island of Cuba to our domain, we made war upon the wickedest nation that claims to be civilized, and we waged it in behalf of a weak but gallant people who needed our help. Not since the world began has a more righteous war been prosecuted bravely to a triumphant conclusion.

It is important that all the features of this struggle should be understood. Accordingly, in the following pages are given a brief

authentic history of ancient and modern Spain; the historical facts concerning Cuba, from its first visit by the Spaniards to the present time; the perfidy that has marked every attempt of Spain to plant colonies in the New World, and the events that finally brought about the armed intervention of the United States in behalf of Cuba, and its freedom from the Spanish yoke.

This work is not made up of padding taken from the newspaper files, but has been carefully prepared from authentic data by an accomplished historian and written in a graphic and entertaining manner. Supplemented by the numerous artistic illustrations, it forms a volume not only of present interest, but of permanent and lasting value.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898.

CHAPTER I.

“The Crime of the Century”—The Blowing up of the Battleship *Maine*—Self-Restraint of the American People—Verdict of the Board of Inquiry—The Just Resentment against Spain—Messages of Condolence from All Quarters of the Civilized Globe.

THE United States battleship *Maine* was riding peacefully at anchor in the harbor of Havana, February 15, 1898, in the position to which she had been assigned by the harbor master, and all on board were in high spirits, for there are no happier and more contented men than the crews and officers of a man-of-war. The gallant sailors, ready and eager at all times to face death in defense of their flag, are in many respects like so many schoolboys. They overflow with animal spirits, are well clothed and provided for, and their pride in their country's welfare at times approaches idolatry.

The magnificent battleship, being in the waters of a friendly nation, should have been in no more danger than in the harbor of New York. The *Maine* was a twin screw, commissioned September 17, 1895. Her length was 318 feet, breadth 57 feet, draft 21 feet 6 inches, with a displacement of 6682 tons and a speed of $17\frac{1}{2}$ knots. Her main battery consisted of four 10-inch rifles and six 6-inch breech-loading rifles; her secondary battery, seven 6-pounder and eight 1-pounder rapid-fire guns and four Gatlings, with an armor 12-inches thick, and a crew of 370 men and 34 officers. This splendid second-class battle-ship was made at a cost of \$2,500,000.

It lacked a few minutes to ten o'clock when a thunderous explosion shook the whole city, followed in a moment by a second outburst. Windows were shattered, lights extinguished, and the whole heavens were illuminated by a crimson glare, as if the crater of some vast volcano had exploded upward through the calm waters that were churned into foam and waves.

Such in truth may be said to have been the fact, for the great battleship had been

blown up. Two hundred and sixty-six as brave men and officers as ever trod the deck were either dead or dying. Some were killed so quickly that they "never knew what hurt them"; others were shockingly wounded, lingering for days and weeks before they succumbed to their agony. Many were mangled beyond recognition, while still others were so literally blown to fragments that no trace of them was ever found. Nothing in the history of the navies of civilized nations ever equaled the awful completeness of the destruction of the *Maine*.

For a brief while the people of Havana were dazed by the frightful calamity. Then they flocked to the shores of the bay, which was lit up as if at noonday by the flames of the burning ship. One mast had been prostrated by the explosion, while the second was wreathed with fire, still pointing toward heaven, as if appealing to the one Source that could help the stricken patriots. The cries of strong men in agony came from the fiery mass which was already partly sunk, while sailors with shattered arms and broken limbs were swimming frantically away from

the furnace heat in their wild effort to escape.

A significant fact spoke eloquently of the terror of the scene. The Havana harbor swarms with ferocious sharks, which ordinarily give a swimmer slight chance for his life. Every one of these creatures sped out of the bay, terrified by the explosion, and did not return for a long time. So it was that one additional horror was averted.

The sight was so monstrously pathetic that the hearts of many of the Spaniards were touched. Two of the boats of the *Maine*, with a few officers and men, were rowing about and working desperately to rescue those that were not already beyond help. The *Alfonso XII.* lay a short distance away and hastily lowered several boats that helped in the work. The dripping sufferers were aided into these craft and taken to the *Alfonso XII.*, to the *City of Washington*, to the *Rejia*, the steamship *Colon*, and to the wharf of the *Machina*, where the sanitary corps of the Fire Department, as well as of the Spanish marine corps, stationed themselves and gave medical attention to the men as they were brought in.

When all had been done of that nature that was possible the sufferers were carried in litters and ambulances to the hospital of San Ambrosio or to the *Alfonso XII*.

Meantime the *Maine* was burning fiercely. Every minute or two a shell would burst, scattering the blazing débris in every direction, despite which boats of the *Maine* continued rowing around the flaming wreck, looking for sailors who might still be in the water. Several were thus rescued.

Impressive was the fact that, though it was known that two hundred men were still on the ship, not one could be seen, nor did a sound betray their presence. One of the small boats rowed up close beside the wreck, and the officer called in a loud voice:

"If there is anyone alive on board, for God's sake let him speak!"

The only answer was the roaring conflagration and the vicious bursting of an occasional shell. Those not already dead were beyond the power of making their extremity known. The grand battleship was become a vast, blazing coffin.

When the people had partly rallied from the shock of the horrible event, the Ameri-

cans and their friends in the city began asking themselves as to the cause of the blowing up of the *Maine*. The first natural supposition was that it was one of those rare but fearful accidents against which it would seem that no human precaution is secure. In one sense a battleship is a slumbering volcano, and yet, with the care and discipline that prevail in the American navy, it would seem that such an occurrence as the one described should be impossible. Nothing of the kind had ever occurred before; that is to say, in which the fault lay within the ship. How could it have been so with the *Maine*?

Captain Sigsbee, the captain of the battleship, painfully burned himself, had been taken to the *City of Washington*, where the smart from his wounds was forgotten in his anguish over the loss of his brave men.

"I cannot tell what caused it," he exclaimed; "everything was right on board; the men had just retired; the keys of the magazine were all in my room."

The question, having been asked in a hundred different quarters, was soon asked in a thousand. While the poor fellows were writhing in agony at the hospital, there were multi-

tudes who gleefully contemplated the terrible wreck in the harbor.

"Viva España!" "Mueran los Americanos!" "Mañana tendremos buena pesca en la bahia!" ("We shall have good fishing in the bay to-morrow!") and similar remarks came from the Spanish rabble, who, as they swarmed about the wharves, could not conceal their delight over the misfortune that had befallen the Americans. Among those higher in station the expressions were more guarded, but few felt any real sympathy for the victims of what has been well called "the crime of the century."

Since the authorities knew that the calamity would stir the wrath of the American nation to its profoundest depth, and that there must be a stern accounting for the crime, they were quickly ready with a theory: this was that an accidental explosion from within the *Maine* had communicated with the magazine and caused its wreck, with the attendant loss of life. They insisted that this was the cause, and would listen to no other explanation.

As Captain Sigsbee had said from the first, he was wholly unable to account for

the explosion, though the thought of treachery must have presented itself to him ; but, with that eminent sense of justice which is so characteristic of him, he added to his telegram to President McKinley the request for his countrymen to withhold judgment until a rigid investigation should establish the truth. The request was so fair that the President echoed it and the nation granted it.

The crime was too appalling to be charged against any man or group of men, or any nation, until the evidence pointed unmistakably in that direction. When the blow that smites is resistless it must make no error.

One of the grandest attributes of the American people is their self-restraint, under what to others would be an intolerable provocation. Their wrath on that account is the more to be feared. When Jove holds back his thunderbolts for a time, they gather in power. We are slow to anger ; but, being fairly roused, it is a thousand times more to be dreaded than the wrath of a volatile people. We could afford to wait, even though that waiting was prolonged until our patience was stretched almost to the breaking point.

No time was lost in selecting a Board of Inquiry. It was composed of Captain William T. Sampson, commanding the *Iowa*; Captain French E. Chadwick, commanding the *New York*; with Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix of the receiving ship *Vermont* as Judge-Advocate.

No better selection could have been made. Captain Sampson, soon to be made rear admiral, was chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for several years, was familiar with the use of torpedoes, and was a man of positive convictions, who had in an eminent degree the courage of his convictions. He could be depended upon to tell the truth, no matter whom it hit or hurt. Captain Chadwick until a short time before was chief of the Bureau of Equipment, and knew everything about the possibilities of spontaneous combustion in coal bunkers and the character of the coal used on the *Maine*. Lieutenant-Commander Marix had been executive officer of the *Maine*, and perfectly familiar with her construction from stem to stern. Everyone who wanted the truth and nothing else was willing to await the result of their investigation.

The Board did its work thoroughly. Nothing that could throw the least light on the problem was neglected. The survivors of the *Maine* were closely questioned, expert divers were kept busy for days in examining the wreck, and every article brought to the surface was inspected with microscopic closeness, for science is often able to read with unerring certainty the solution of a problem by what seem trifling clues, to which most men would attach no importance. No person, no incident, no object that offered an atom of evidence was slighted. Finally, the deliberate judgment was made up and delivered to the President.

Our reader needs scarcely to be reminded what it was. The Board of Inquiry gave it as their unanimous verdict that the *Maine* was blown up from the outside, and such judgment would not have been rendered had it not been justified by the evidence, gathered with painstaking thoroughness. The voluminous testimony was submitted, and, when examined, left no other conclusion possible for sensible men.

It may be said that this conclusion was discounted by the American people, for while

willing to await its announcement, they were certain what it would be. In one respect there was keen disappointment: the Board was unable to say who the unspeakable criminals were.

It seems remarkable that the identity of the atrocious miscreants could not be determined, but the conclusion warranted is this: The government of Spain had nothing to do with the blowing up of the *Maine*, nor was General Blanco, the captain-general of Cuba, directly concerned. The deed was done by one or more of the officers connected with the government in Havana, who possessed the means of carrying out their intentions, and who thus far have been able to keep their fearful secret. There were abundant opportunities for the sinking of a submarine mine at night, without its being discovered by the watch of the battleship, and that most likely was what was done.

No one could be better aware of the atrocious nature of her servants, with their inextinguishable hatred of all Americans, than Spain. Foreseeing the probable result of the investigation by the American Board of Inquiry, the Havana authorities instituted

an investigation of their own. They sent down a few divers, who made a superficial investigation of the shattered hulk of the battleship and then reported that proof had been found that it was blown up by an explosion from within. This report as a matter of course was officially accepted, and the charge that the calamity was the work of outsiders was repelled with assumed horror. Spain refused to listen to our decision and the most that she would do was to consent to arbitration based upon another investigation by a mixed board. Seemingly this was fair, and had there been a possibility of mistake in the conclusions reached by our own board, the request could hardly have been refused, but there was no mistake.

The announcement of the verdict, as may well be supposed, intensified the resentment of the American people. They felt that they had used a degree of self-restraint that no other nation would have displayed under the unexampled provocation. Had it been England whose battleship was destroyed in this treacherous manner, her answer would have been a hostile fleet, who would have given Spain the choice between an instant

reparation, so far as that was possible, or the laying of Havana in ashes.

The United States now found itself confronted by two of the most perplexing problems conceivable. President McKinley had been elected on a platform which was outspoken in its sympathy for Cuba, which had fought so long for freedom and which was ground under the heel of the most tyrannous government on earth. The gallant patriots had sympathizers all through our country, for we are a people who can never look with indifference upon a brave and oppressed community striving and risking all for what our forefathers strove and risked all in the Revolution.

The destruction of the *Maine* intensified this feeling, and yet it was a question by itself. Two distinct issues were presented to our government, and it was the wish of the President and his advisers to keep them distinct, but the nation itself would not have it so. There was reason in this feeling. The resentment against Spain was first aroused by her horrible outrages in Cuba. We pitied the Cubans and were anxious to strike an effective blow in their behalf. The blowing

up of the battleship was a cruel outrage, directed not against the Cubans but against us; therefore they and we had now a common cause for resentment.

There could be but one, inevitable result of this situation. Of that we shall speak in its proper place. Meanwhile, since Spain and Cuba have now become so prominent in our national affairs and must remain so for an indefinite time to come, it is important that we should be informed concerning both. Spain has acted a prominent part in the world's history during the centuries that have come and gone. There was a time when she towered above all other nations, and her decay has been due to causes that will sap the life of any people. Heaven deals justly and sternly with nations as well as with individuals, and who soweth the wind must reap the whirlwind.

"Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small;
Though with patience He stands waiting,
With exactness grinds He all."

Reference has been made to the universal shock caused throughout the civilized world

by the blowing up of the *Maine*. In no way was this more strikingly shown than by the messages of condolence sent from the representatives of different nations, some coming from the antipodes.

It was two o'clock on the morning of February 16, that Captain Sigsbee's first telegram was sent to the President in the following words :

"*Maine* blown up in Havana harbor, 9:40, and destroyed. Many wounded, and doubtless more killed and drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward line steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for crew and few pieces of equipment still above water. No one had other clothes than those upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, now with me and express sympathy."

This was delivered to Secretary Long, who replied :

“Deepest sympathy and anxiety. We await particulars and cause. Advise fully. Spare no efforts to relieve sufferers and learn facts.”

This was followed soon after by another telegram to Captain Sigsbee :

“The President directs me to express for himself and the people of the United States his profound sympathy with the officers and crew of the *Maine*, and desires that no expense be spared in providing for survivors and caring for the dead.”

The following semi-official note was issued in the evening of February 16, at the Spanish Capital :

“The news of the disaster to the American warship *Maine* has produced a painful impression in Madrid. It was at first feared that the catastrophe might be attributable to some rash act. Afterward, as the details were received, these fears were dissipated and transformed into feelings of sympathy and sorrow for the misfortune.

“The Government has expressed to United States Minister Woodford its regret for the catastrophe, especially in view of the fact that it occurred in waters within Spain’s jurisdiction.

“An Admiral, in full uniform, has called upon Minister Woodford in behalf of the Minister of Marine and the Cabinet.

“The Government has telegraphed to the authorities in Cuba to do everything possible to relieve the distress of the wounded and to give the *Maine’s* officers and men everything they require.

“Prime Minister Sagasta went to the palace and informed the Queen Regent of the catastrophe as soon as the news was received. Minister Woodford first learned of it from the Admiral who visited him to express the sympathy of the Ministry.”

Consul-General Lee’s telegram to the Secretary of State was :

“Profound sorrow expressed by Government and municipal authorities, Consuls of foreign nations, organized bodies of all sorts, and citizens generally. Flags are at half-

mast on Governor-General's palace, on shipping in harbor, and in city. Business suspended and theaters closed. Dead number about 260. Officers' quarters being in rear and seamen's forward, where explosion took place, accounts for the greater proportionate loss of sailors. Funeral to-morrow at 3 P. M. Officers Merritt and Jenkins still missing. Suppose naval court of inquiry will be held to ascertain cause of explosion. Should it be possible, will repress excitement and calmly await decision."

The following are the principal messages of condolence addressed to the President of the United States. They form a noteworthy record, coming, as has been stated, from every quarter of the civilized globe, and are a more eloquent commentary upon the horror caused by the calamity than any mere description of our own could be.

MELBOURNE, February 18.

The Premiers of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, and Western Australia, at present attending the Federal Convention in Melbourne, have just

received intelligence of the total destruction of the United States ship of war *Maine* and of many of her crew in the harbor of Havana. We desire to convey through you to the people of the American nation, and especially to the relatives of those stricken down by this calamity, a fraternal message of condolence and sympathy from the people of our colonies.

G. H. READ,
Premier of New South Wales.

LONDON, February 18.

A large and representative meeting of Irish Nationalists assembled at St. James's Hall, London, has heard with deep grief of the disaster which has befallen the United States warship *Maine* at Havana, and begs the President to convey to the American nation its deep and sincere sympathy. America's sorrows will appeal always to Irish hearts.

JAMES O'KELLY, Chairman.

JOHN DILLON,

MICHAEL DAVITT,

J. HARRINGTON,

T. P. O'CONNOR,

WILLIAM O'BRIEN,

WILLIAM REDMOND.

LONDON, February 18.

We beg to be allowed to express to you, sir, our most deep-felt sympathy in respect of the *Maine* calamity, a feeling which is likewise shared by the whole country.

N. L. ROTHSCHILD & SONS,
London.

The following were addressed to the Secretary of State:

SOUTHAMPTON, February 18.

I beg your Excellency to accept the deepest expressions of my condolence for the disaster which mourns the American nation.

GARCIA MERON.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

I hereby desire to express on behalf of his Majesty the Emperor and the Government of Corea sympathy with the United States in the loss of the battleship *Maine*, and so many brave officers and men.

CHIN POM YE,
Corean Minister.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

The Government and people of Chili sincerely take part in the sentiments of profound grief which have been aroused in the Govern-

ment and people of the United States by the news of the tragic and calamitous destruction of the war vessel *Maine* and by the loss of so many valuable lives. In having the honor to convey to your Excellency the expression of the sympathy felt by my Government I beg to be allowed respectfully to add that of my own.

DOMINGO GANA,

Minister of Chili.

MADRID, February 18.

The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent Señor Aquera, Sub-Secretary of the Spanish Foreign Office, and Señor Polo y Bernabe, Chief of the Commercial Bureau of the same Ministry, to express the sincere sympathy of the Spanish Government with the Government, the Navy, and the people of the United States in the sad misfortune which has befallen the United States steamer *Maine*, its officers, and crew in the harbor of Havana.

WOODFORD.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

Being deeply touched by the terrible news of the destruction of the United States war steamer *Maine*, with the loss of many lives and the injury of a considerable number of

persons belonging to the crew of said steamer, I desire to express to your Excellency, faithfully interpreting the sentiments of my Government, the deepest and most sincere sympathy on account of this occurrence, which was as dreadful as it was unexpected. Joining the expression of my own personal sentiments to this official manifestation of condolence, I reiterate, etc.,

J. B. CALVO,
Minister of Costa Rica.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

I perform the duty of expressing to the United States Government the sentiments of condolence and sympathy of the Government of Peru, together with my own, on account of the catastrophe which has befallen the war steamer *Maine*, and the loss of the lives of so many citizens of the United States. Peru, which considers all the republics of this continent as her sisters, laments their misfortunes and feels them as she does her own. The grief, therefore, which now afflicts the great republic is also ours.

VICTOR EGUIGUREN,
Minister of Peru.

CAPETOWN, February 17.

American citizens here deeply sympathize disaster to *Maine* and men.

ROBERTS,
Consul.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

I have the honor to express the sincere sympathy of my Government with the Government and people of the United States on account of the deplorable disaster which has befallen the *Maine*. I may add that I was shocked to hear of the terrible catastrophe, and I deeply sympathize with the families of the unfortunate victims.

WU TING-FANG,
Minister of China.

PETROPOLIS, Brazil, February 17.

President Moraes telegraphs expression sympathy *Maine* disaster.

DAWSON,
Chargé d’Affaires.

HALIFAX, N. S., February 18.

The following note just received. I have replied expressing thanks and appreciation;

"HEADQUARTERS OFFICE, HALIFAX.—I beg to offer on behalf of myself and the officers of the imperial troops in Canada our sincere sympathy and condolence in the sad disaster which has befallen the American Navy. I beg that you will convey this expression of our feeling to the department which you represent.

"MONTGOMERY MOORE,

"General Commanding in Canada."

JOHN G. FOSTER, Consul-General.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

His Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, by a telegram which reached me this evening, has instructed me to convey to the United States Government an expression of deep horror and heartfelt sympathy on account of the terrible catastrophe that has befallen the *Maine*. I have the honor to be the interpreter near your Excellency of these sentiments of my Government.

G. C. VINCI,

Chargé d'Affaires of Italy.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

I have the honor to inform you that I received express instructions from my Gov-

ernment to convey to the President of the United States of America, as I hereby do through your Excellency, an expression of the very sincere and deep pain with which the Government of Colombia has learned of the lamentable disaster which has befallen the United States warship *Maine*, together with the expression of its sincere condolence.

JULIO RENGIFO,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Colombia.

NEW YORK, February 18.

This legation having been informed of the terrible catastrophe which has occurred at Havana, resulting in the destruction by an explosion of the American war vessel *Maine*, and the consequent loss of so many valuable lives that were devoted to the service and defense of their country, the undersigned presents to the American Government and people, through you, an expression of the deepest and most sincere sympathy on account of this irreparable disaster, which has filled the entire world with horror. Ecuador, being a loyal friend of the United States of America, cannot do otherwise than be among the first to deplore this unfortu-

nate occurrence, and I therefore beg you to inform the President of the republic that both the President of Ecuador and the Ecuadorian people join with all their hearts in this official expression of condolence, for they consider this lamentable occurrence as a veritable family misfortune to the nations of this hemisphere.

L. F. CARBO,
Minister of Ecuador.

WASHINGTON, February 18.

The news of the disaster to the war vessel *Maine* in the bay of Havana, and of the destruction of life among the seamen belonging to the American Navy, has caused profound grief to my Government, and, in its name, I have the honor to so inform your Excellency, and to beg you to be pleased to convey to his Excellency President McKinley this expression of sympathy on account of this deplorable occurrence.

ANTO LAZO ARRIAGA,
Minister of Guatemala.

These messages, from Captain McCormick of the battleship *Oregon* and Captain Chester

of the cruiser *Cincinnati*, were received at the Navy Department on the same day and telegraphed to Captain Sigsbee :

"Officers and crew of *Oregon* express through me their profound sympathy with you, your officers and crew, in the disaster that has befallen your ship, and with the families of those who were lost.

"Officers and men of *Cincinnati* and *Castine* express deep sorrow for those lost with the *Maine*, and sympathize with bereaved families."

The Lord Commissioners of the British Admiralty sent the following cablegram to the Secretary of the Navy :

"The Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty desire to convey to you, from the officers and men of her Majesty's navy, an expression of their sympathy on the occasion of the disaster to the *Maine*, involving such great loss of life."

To this message Secretary Long sent this reply :

"I have honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram, conveying sympathy from the officers and men of her Majesty's navy, and to thank you in the name of the navy of the United States for this expression of condolence and sympathy."

Señor Du Bosc, *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Spanish Legation, visited President McKinley to bear in person from the Queen Regent of Spain an expression of her profound sympathy on account of the *Maine* disaster. Señor De Bosc was accompanied by Judge Day, the First Assistant Secretary of State.

CHAPTER II.

Ancient Spain—Her Rise to Greatness—Her Decline and Its Causes—The Infamous Duke of Alva.

WHAT was the origin of Spain?

The Spaniards have sprung from a more mixed stock than any other nation in Europe. The early Greeks and Romans knew the country as *Spania*, *Hispania*, and *Iberia*. The earliest race of which history speaks was the Iberians. A host of Celts descended upon them from the Pyrenees and, coalescing, formed the mixed nation of the Celtiberians, who were massed chiefly on the center of the peninsula, in the western districts of Lusitania and on the northern coasts, while in the Pyrenees and along the eastern coast were the pure Iberian tribes, and unmixed Celtic tribes occupied the northwest. In *Bætica* (Andalusia) there was a large admixture of the Phœnician element, and on the south and east coasts

numerous Phœnician, Carthaginian, Rhodian, and other colonies.

The Bible contains references to the "ships of Tarshish." This section was a portion of the southern coast called Tartessus by the Greeks. It was rich in minerals, and therefore much sought by the merchantmen.

Civil wars and strife continued for centuries and were numerous and varied in their results. In the year 206 B. C., after the Romans had driven the Carthaginians from the peninsula, the country was erected into a Roman province, consisting of two political divisions Hispania Citerior (Hither Spain), including the eastern and northern districts, or those nearest to the center of the Roman Empire; and Hispania Ulterior (Further Spain), including the southern and western districts, which were the furthest from Rome. It was nearly two centuries later, however, that the Cantabri and Astures in the extreme north laid down their arms to Augustus.

From the time of the full supremacy of the Romans until the death of Constantine the Great, Spain was very prosperous. Rome ruled with an iron hand, stopped the

devastating internal wars and forced her language, laws, and customs upon the people. Many towns of a purely Roman character sprang up (among them being Merida, Beja, and Zaragoza) and the ruins of the ancient aqueducts, bridges, and amphitheaters are still the wonder of the modern traveler.

Rome had to pay dear in treasure and human life for Spain, but for three centuries she was the richest province of the Roman Empire. Then, at the opening of the fifth century, the barbarian hordes of Alans, Vandals, and Suevi swarmed over the Pyrenees and, sweeping across the peninsula, desolated it. Most of the Vandals settled in Andalusia, the Alans in Lusitania, and the Suevi in Leon and Castile. Three years later (412) the Visigoths invaded the country, and their king, Athaulf, established the Gothic monarchy in Catalonia, acknowledging at the same time a nominal dependence on the Roman emperor.

The Visigoths conquered the Suevi, expelled the Vandals and Alans, and annexed large portions of Gaul. The Arabs or Moors now invaded Spain and, until 717, the country was governed by emirs appointed

by the caliph of Damascus. The wars against the Moors continued for centuries, but their power was not broken until nearly the middle of the thirteenth century. Ferdinand II. was the last sovereign of Aragon, who by marriage with Isabella, Queen of Castile in 1469, the conquest of Granada in 1492, and that of Navarre in 1512, united the whole of Spain and French Navarre under one rule.

Now came the golden days of Spain. She had become consolidated into one empire from the Pyrenees to the Strait of Gibraltar; civil wars ceased and a magnificent continent, teeming with riches, had been opened by the discovery of America to Spanish enterprise. Spain could truly claim at that time that the sun never set upon her dominions; but the drain upon the country caused by the exodus to the New World, the expulsion of the Jews and Moors, and the character of the people itself, hastened the decline that soon set in.

Mexico and Peru were added to the possessions of Spain, but the stupendous expenditures of Philip II. and his ill administration made the ruin of the country rapid

and sure. Commerce and agriculture were extinguished by the expulsion of the Moors, and the descent of the country was hastened by the wars of Spain with the Dutch and with the German Protestants in the Thirty Years' War, the wars with France and the rebellion in Portugal (1640), which had been joined to Spain by Philip II. This dry rot continued with the brief intermission during the reign of Charles III. (1759-88), and the decline of Spain has known no interruption to the present day, until she is bankrupt, shorn of most of her possessions, with nothing left to recall her once overshadowing greatness but her pride, her avarice, her treachery, her tyranny, and her hatred of everything that is good and noble.

In 1868 Isabella, a coarse, ignorant, and vicious queen, was driven from her throne by a general revolt, she having become more than even a Spaniard could stand, though there had been plenty like her in the past. In 1870 the Cortes elected Prince Amadeo of Italy king. Three years later he gave up his task in disgust, and the form of government was changed to a republic—that is in name.

Now followed genuine Spanish times. For nearly two years anarchy and bloodshed ruled, because of the mutual hatred of the Carlists and republicans. Finally, on the last day of 1874, Alphonso, son of the banished queen Isabella, was declared king of Spain. He died November 25, 1885, and Queen Christina became regent for their infant son, the prospective ruler of Spain.

The history of that country would be of little interest to us, so far as it is confined to the eastern continent. It is enough to say that from the earliest times the people acquired the reputation which they have since maintained for treachery and love of blood. One instance will suffice.

Alba or Alva was duke, prime minister, and general of the Spanish armies under Charles V. and Philip II., and was born in 1508, and died at the age of seventy-four. He was given the congenial task of suppressing the revolt of the Netherlands in 1567. His first step was to establish the "Bloody Council," over which he presided for a time. Its rule was to kill every man who was suspected of holding slightly different views from those of their oppressors and whose

wealth was coveted. Those present and those absent, the living and the dead, were tried, convicted, and their property confiscated. More than one hundred thousand fled from their native country to save their lives. The Duke of Alva's executioners shed more blood than his armies. He boasted that he had executed 18,000 men, and the war which he kindled burned for 68 years with a cost to Spain of \$800,000,000, her finest troops, and the loss of seven of the richest provinces of the Netherlands.

CHAPTER III.

Spain's Part in the Discovery of the New World—Americus Vespuccius—Verrazani—The Spanish Thirst for Gold—Balboa—Ponce de Leon—Gomez—De Narvaez—De Soto.

THE popular glamour thrown about the part taken by Spain in the discovery of America was never justified by the facts themselves. Columbus, as is well known, was an Italian by birth, and in a certain sense was the most monumental crank that figures in history. However, it takes a crank or one-idea man to make a pronounced success in the affairs of this world, just as it did centuries ago. Had the immortal navigator possessed less persistency, had he been discouraged by rebuffs a tenth of which would have disheartened any other person, he never would have discovered a New World.

Columbus spent seven years begging at the royal court and was snubbed again and again, until he became prematurely old and gave it up. He was well started on his way out of Spain when he was brought back by

the assurance that the king had decided to help him in his great enterprise. Queen Isabella offered to pawn her jewels, but she never did so. Some friends advanced a part of the funds to Columbus; the royal treasury furnished the remainder, because the penurious king had been led to believe there was a good chance of virtually obtaining a big fortune with the smallest possible risk. Who of us would not be glad to accept a similar risk with the prospect of such enormous gains? It is done thousands of times every year in Wall Street, where the risk is not only tenfold greater but the returns a hundred times more uncertain.

The reader of history who recalls the particulars of that wonderful voyage will recollect that a reward was promised to the first man who sighted land. It was fairly won by one of the crew, but Columbus trumped up a claim by which he appropriated the reward to himself. This small business was doubtless due to the effect of the seven years he had spent in Spain.

The next most famous of those early navigators was Americus Vespuccius, who was shrewd enough to make a good many

believe he was the real discoverer of America, thus securing the naming of the continent in his honor. Suffice it to say, it has never been established whether he was a fraud or whether he was all he claimed to be. Be that as it may, he secured fame and eternal remembrance, yet he was not a Spaniard, but, like Columbus, a native of Italy.

Of the same nationality was Verrazani, the first explorer sent out by France (1523). The real discoverer of North America was the Italian John Cabot, in the employ of England, who was more than a year ahead of Columbus in seeing the continent itself, though of course behind him in discovering the islands that make up a portion of the Western hemisphere.

Having thus briefly shown a number of the important things that Spain did not do, let us refer to a few that she did do. She was always a curse to America, and wherever her miscreants went, they left a trail of fire, crime, blood, and death that marked them as true countrymen of the Duke of Alba and the persecutors of the reconcentrados of Cuba.

What sent the first Spanish navigators

across the Atlantic was the belief that immeasurable riches were only waiting to be garnered. It was known that the Indians wore abundance of golden ornaments, and it seemed reasonable to believe that there must be millions of pesetas' worth to be gathered by those who first reached the favored country; hence the general scramble for plunder.

Among the first of these wretches was Vasco Nuñez de Balboa. His profligacy so involved him in debt in Spain that he had the choice of going to prison or fleeing secretly from the country. He managed to hide himself on board a vessel bound for Darien, where he had once been, and was not discovered by the captain until well out to sea. The skipper was angered, but could not well help himself, and refrained from pitching the scamp overboard, though much inclined that way.

It turned out to be a lucky thing for the captain, for his vessel was wrecked on the coast of Darien, and, having some knowledge of the country, Balboa led the miserable sailors through the woods to an Indian village, where the kind natives saved them from

starvation. Balboa's services made him chief of the party, whom he amused by leading upon raids against the neighboring native villages, and by maltreating and killing the Indians themselves.

This sort of warfare was safe for the Spaniards, whose coats of mail and firearms saved them from running any personal risk. However, they were dissatisfied, for they saw nothing of the gold, except as it occasionally appeared on the persons of some of the natives, who were instantly given the choice of handing over everything of that nature or surrendering their lives.

One day Balboa learned from an Indian who could speak broken Spanish that there was a great sea six days' travel to the westward, and that on its shores the pieces of gold were too plentiful to be gathered. Balboa and his companions were all eager excitement, and engaged several of the natives to guide them through the wilderness to the wonderful body of water.

It was a hard journey and there was a good deal of fighting, but that gave the adventurers little concern since, for reasons already named, the fatal results were invaria-

bly on the side of the natives themselves. At last they came in sight of a high precipitous elevation, from whose crest, as Balboa was informed, he could see the unknown body of water.

Impressed by the belief that he was close upon a momentous discovery, Balboa made his companions remain behind while he climbed the mountain for a sight of the expanse of ocean. They watched him curiously, until he paused on the top and stood for several minutes looking to the westward, as if overcome by his feelings. Then he sank upon his knees and thanked God. Those wretches had a habit of alternating their hideous crimes with thanks to Heaven for its mercies.

The excited Balboa now beckoned for his companions to join him, and they made haste to do so. No wonder all were filled with emotion, for on that day in September, 1513, they were the first white men to look upon the Pacific Ocean. After this, when the body of water had been taken possession of in the name of their king, there were more thanks to God, and Balboa ordered his men to rob every Indian whom they met, unless he paid gold for his life, and, if he was unfortu-

nate enough to have no gold about his person, he was to be killed anyway.

The result of this discovery of the Pacific was the colonization of the section. Peru and Mexico were conquered and occupied, and to-day there are hundreds of evidences in those sections of the early occupancy of the country by the Spanish.

Juan Ponce de Leon about this time sailed from Porto Rico, where he had been governor, and set forth to explore Florida in quest of the Fountain of Youth. He was at the head of a large expedition, including three ships. Having made a landing, the old idiot started out to find the marvelous pool that was to make him young again. He filled himself to the bursting point from numerous streams and crystalline springs, but there is no evidence that he ever felt any younger therefor. The probabilities point the other way, since his search was laborious and protracted.

De Leon was the discoverer of Florida, and he was made governor in 1521. Like all his countrymen, he dearly loved to torture the Indians. Hundreds of them were slain in pure wantonness; but once the grizzled

ruffian went just too far, and paid the penalty by receiving an arrow in the breast, speedily followed by his death.

It was early in 1525 that Stephen Gomez, a true-blue Spaniard, sailed along the Atlantic coast almost as far as New York. The climate was too cold to please him, and though the poor Indians were not to blame for that, he captured over fifty and took them to Spain, where they were made slaves, finally perishing miserably. Doubtless Gomez, like the other devout Spaniards, thanked God for delivering the natives into his hands.

About three years later, De Narvaez, with four hundred men and a hundred horses, landed near Tampa Bay and set out to explore the interior. This would have been safe and comparatively easy, had he shown one grain of common sense and half a grain of mercy. Near the landing place was a little Indian village, where a number of their dead had been preserved in a mummified condition. The Spaniards, in a spirit of pure deviltry, burned all the bodies. Nothing could possibly have been done to rouse the natives to so intense hostility.

However, the explorers pushed into the

interior, suffering much from the swampy nature of the country, the pestiferous insects, and the lack of food. When in a famishing condition they were approached by an Indian warrior, who made friendly signs, and no doubt wished to act the Good Samaritan toward them. He was made prisoner and brutally treated. This idiotic, as well as cruel, conduct was continued, as opportunity offered, until finally the natives swarmed around them in such overwhelming numbers that they were compelled to turn about and make a despairing effort to get back to their ships on the coast.

It is impossible to feel sympathy for those miscreants, whose fate was brought upon their heads by their own conduct, but the woeful time at last arrived when there were only four survivors left. The Indians made prisoners of them, and held them in captivity for six years.

It would have been passing strange if these men had not learned something from their experience. Their lives were spared because, like Captain John Smith in the following century at Jamestown, they impressed their captors as being possessed with super-

natural wisdom. Several simple cures, effected by the means of herbs, added to the veneration with which they were regarded; but the men had never given up the hope of reaching their native land again. Gradually, and by slow stages, they worked their way across the Continent until they joined their countrymen on the Gulf of California. There they received good care, eventually reached Spain, and one of them published an account of the ill-fated expedition and their own wanderings.

We refrain from giving a history of the atrocities of Pizarro and others further south, but one of the Spaniards who helped him to conquer Peru was Hernando de Soto. This man entered Florida with the best equipped expedition that had yet gone thither. It numbered about a thousand, including a number of priests and mechanics; all were well armed, and, with the horses, hogs, and bloodhounds, occupied nine vessels. In order to give De Soto every facility in the way of obtaining supplies, he was appointed governor of Cuba. His landing at Tampa Bay was made in the spring of 1539.

De Soto knew all about the disastrous ex-

peditions that had preceded him. Indeed, one of the four survivors of the De Narvaez party was with him. The ships were sent back to Cuba for supplies, and almost the same route was followed as had been taken by De Narvaez. Incredible as it may seem, De Soto made precisely the same inexcusable blunders, too. The Indians were treated like so many rabid dogs, every conceivable outrage being perpetrated upon them. In a battle near the present site of Mobile, it is said, nearly two thousand Indians perished from the sword, fire, and suffocation.

There is no accurate knowledge of De Soto's wanderings, but it is known his course was such that, in the year 1541, he discovered the Mississippi River. Finally, worn out, and with the greater portion of his men dead and the others famishing, he began his return to the Gulf. While on the way he succumbed to fever, and, in order to keep the knowledge of his death from the Indians, his body was sunk secretly at night in the great stream which he had discovered. Deprived of its leader, the expedition crumbled to pieces. It did not take the Indians long to learn that De Soto, whom they had looked

upon as possessing supernatural power and being beyond the reach of death, had succumbed and gone the way of all flesh. Then they assailed the explorers who had treated them so ill, and, for nearly three weeks, gave them no rest day or night. Less than one-half of the original expedition reached the Gulf and finally arrived at Panuco, where their countrymen gave them the relief of which they stood in sore need.

Sixteen years after this disastrous venture, Don Tristan de Luna with a still larger force left Vera Cruz, Mexico, for the conquest of Florida. His experience was so similar to that of his predecessors that the particulars need not be given.

During the years that followed, France made many attempts at colonization in the New World. Early in 1562 Lord Admiral Coligny, leader of the Huguenots, crossed the ocean in quest of a refuge for his persecuted countrymen. He sent out two ships under the command of Captain John Ribaut, who entered the mouth of the St. John's River in Florida. The Indians treated them hospitably and they in turn were kind to them. Proceeding northward, Ribaut left

thirty men to form a settlement on an island about six miles from the present town of Beaufort, N. C. They, however, became home-sick and fitted up a crazy boat in which they started for home. When on the point of perishing from thirst and starvation they were picked up by an English trader, who took the weakest to France and carried the rest as prisoners of war to England.

Civil war in France prevented Admiral Coligny from sending help to the colonists until April, 1564, and then misfortune followed. The settlers quarreled, and most of them stole two of the smaller vessels and set off on a piratical expedition. When matters were in the worst conceivable condition a fleet from home arrived, and a large number of delighted friends joined the distressed settlers.

A few nights afterward several bulky ships silently entered the river. In answer to the hail they replied that they were from Spain and were under the command of Pedro Menendez, who had been sent out by his king with orders to burn and destroy the Lutheran French, wherever found in his

dominions. Claiming that the colonists were intruders upon Spanish territory, Menendez announced his intention of beginning his terrible work with them.

Three of the French ships were up the river and the remaining four were too weak to engage the Spaniards, who intended to attack in the morning. The four, therefore, quietly slipped their cables and, putting to sea, escaped. They did not mean to desert their friends, however, and turned about to give help, but were scattered by a violent tempest.

Menendez marched overland through a driving rainstorm to the French fort, whose garrison had no thought of danger. They were surprised, and in a frightful massacre that followed the Spaniard spared neither women nor children. One hundred and forty-two of those who fled were captured and hanged from the limbs of the trees, with an inscription, written by Menendez, nailed over their heads: "I do this, not as to Frenchmen, but as to Lutherans."

Soon afterward Menendez learned that some of the Frenchmen had been shipwrecked on an island near at hand. When he ap-

peared before them with an armed force they begged piteously for their lives, promising to give him a large sum of money, if he would grant their prayer. He pledged himself to do so and received their surrender. Several of the prisoners, who, he thought, could be useful as laborers, were spared: the remainder were murdered in cold blood. Another force of French, numbering two hundred, were treated in the same shameful manner. The body of Ribaut was subjected to indignities; his flowing beard being cut off and sent to Spain as a trophy, while his head was divided into quarters and displayed on lances at the corners of the captured fort.

France took no measures to avenge this unspeakable outrage, but one of her subjects sent a secret expedition across the ocean, which did its work so thoroughly that only a few Spaniards were left. Upon the same trees where Menendez three years before had hanged the unhappy Frenchmen, the Spanish prisoners were strung up with the inscription above the bodies: "I do not this as unto Spaniards, nor as unto Moors, but as unto traitors, robbers, and murderers."

Unfortunately Menendez himself was not among the victims. In 1565 he founded St. Augustine, which is the oldest permanent European settlement planted within the present limits of the United States.

CHAPTER IV.

The Size of Cuba—Its Surface—The Cultivated Portion—The Climate—The Productions—The Tobacco—The Sugar—Other Productions—The Animal Life.

A NATURAL and common error is the general impression as to the size of an island. This is probably due to the definition learned in childhood, "an island is a portion of land entirely surrounded by water." We think of a tract of only a few miles in extent, the whole of which can be measured by a single sweep of the eye, whereas many islands have an area of thousands of square miles.

Now, as to the size of Cuba there is a widespread mistake, which we shall try to correct by several simple illustrations.

By entering one of the swiftest express passenger trains running between New York and Washington, we can reach Philadelphia in two hours. Suppose, upon doing so, we immediately return by a similar train. When we arrive at Jersey City again, having been carried at a high rate of speed for four

hours, the distance passed is about a fourth more than the greatest width of Cuba.

Assume now that we pass back and forth over the road eight times, occupying sixteen hours in the transit. The distance covered will be not quite the length of Cuba. Again, if we board the Limited Express at New York for Chicago, we shall find when about three-fourths of the distance is passed, that we have ridden far enough to traverse the length of the island; so it will be seen that it is a pretty good-sized piece of land.

Pennsylvania is one of our large States, but its area is about the same as that of Cuba, which is twenty-eight times the size of Long Island and slightly greater than Ireland. It has more than two hundred rivers, though very few are navigable. Some of the falls on the river Ay are higher than those of Niagara. The Sierra Maestra Mountains, extending along the southern coast, attain in some places an elevation of 8000 feet, while in the central part of the island are rugged, hilly districts between Santa Clara and Puerto Principe, and also northwest of Trinidad. The remaining portion of the country is undulating, consisting mainly of well-watered

plains, which support a luxuriant vegetation. Two-thirds of the coast are bordered by rocky reefs and muddy shallows, but in other places the sea is deep to the very shore, thus offering many excellent havens.

Probably one-third of Cuba has been brought under cultivation, one-half of the island being covered with primeval forests. The lowlands along the coast are inundated in the wet season, or turned into impassable swamps of black, sticky mud; there are immense reaches of trackless forest, choked with dense undergrowth, while most of the dry plains are a jungle, abounding with high bushes and thick grasses, the whole forming a condition that shows how difficult it is to push decisive military operations in the interior of the country.

The climate of the coast lands is tropical, that of the elevated portions suggesting the warmer regions of the temperate zone. It is so equable that Havana has long been a favorite resort for those suffering from pulmonary and lung troubles. The miserable sanitation of Havana and of other seaports makes them subject to yellow fever, which is often very fatal. During the rainy

season, Cuba is so unhealthful that its climate is far more destructive to the unacclimated Spaniards than the machetes of the insurgents. Rarely are important military movements undertaken at that time, and our government has been wise in deciding to leave the principal operations during the days of intervention to the Cubans themselves, while our own soldiers await more favorable weather before striking their resistless blows.

The rainy season begins in May or June and ends in November. Dews are abundant during the dry season, and thunderstorms are violent from June to September. Earthquakes frequently occur on the eastern side. One of them in October, 1870, caused the loss of two thousand lives.

The sugar, tobacco, coffee, and fruit crops of Cuba have long been celebrated throughout the world. Nowhere else is such fine tobacco grown. When transplanted to Key West or any other place, it becomes coarse and loses its fragrance and silky texture, just as the Merino sheep's wool loses its fineness of texture when the animal is moved from its native district. Doubtless there are

favorable spots in other countries where the Cuban tobacco, if transplanted, will retain its wonderful excellence, but they remain to be found.

The tobacco crop of Cuba was worth ten million dollars, annually, not to mention the immense quantities of cigars brought into this and other countries without paying duty. The tobacco crop has been almost destroyed by the revolution, the tobacco raisers as a rule favoring the revolt against Spain.

The most important industry of the island, however, has always been sugar. The soil and climatic conditions are perfect for its production. When peace reigns, Cuba produces one million tons of sugar annually, while with proper energy and enterprise this could be increased fivefold. The average value of the crop has been fifty million dollars, and of molasses, nine million dollars, the greater portion of which is sold to the United States.

The production of coffee at one time ranked next to sugar, but the output has been greatly reduced by that of Brazil, though the coffee estates may still be found scattered through-

out the island. The fruits are so abundant that vast quantities are eaten by the wandering hogs or allowed to rot on the ground without being gathered. There are no wild animals in Cuba worth mentioning, the wild dog being the most important. Birds of prey are almost unknown, but there two hundred species of indigenous birds, some of which display brilliant plumage.

Fortunately the snakes in Cuba are not numerous and few are venomous. The insects include the tarantula, the scorpion, the sand-fly, a dozen varieties of mosquito, an ant which destroys all living vegetable matter, three hundred varieties of butterfly, and as many more of flies. In Cuba the children of foreigners of whatever color are called creoles, between whom and the Spaniards there is an unsurmountable feeling of caste.

CHAPTER V.

The Discovery of Cuba—Cruelty and Rapacity of the Spaniards—Extinction of the Aborigines—Capture of Havana by the British—Its Restoration to Spain—The General Revolt in Spanish America—A Brief Period of Prosperity for Cuba.

It was on the first memorable voyage of Columbus, in 1492, that he discovered Cuba. He and his crews were vividly impressed by the fertility, richness, and wonderful beauty of the island, afterward poetically named the "Pearl of the Antilles," though the title of "Queen" has become more common of late years.

The reader does not need to be reminded that the great navigator believed the island, like all others seen by him, was part of the mainland of India, for which reason the natives were called "Indians." No pen can picture the amazement of those simple-minded people at sight of the ships, which they believed to be great birds that had descended from the skies, and when the sails were

lowered supposed that it was the folding of their immense wings.

The Spaniards with their bearded faces, their strange costumes, and sallow complexion were a source of still greater astonishment. When they pointed their guns at a bird or animal and killed it by means of a flash and loud noise, it was only another proof of the miraculous nature of the visitors.

But one object was always uppermost in the minds of the adventurers. The sight of the golden ornaments worn by the Indians roused their ravening greed, and their eagerness to secure all they could of the precious metal compelled Columbus to interfere, with the reminder that it belonged to the sovereigns of their country.

A few years later the Spaniards began swarming across the Atlantic, inspired by their wild avarice. We have already referred to their hideous outrages in Mexico, Peru, Florida, and the southern portions of our own country. The leading chieftain in Cuba heard of the terrible doings of the white men, and he sent spies to learn whether there was truth in the reports. His messengers returned with word that nothing

could surpass the wickedness of the pale faces, who robbed, outraged, and murdered by the wholesale for the sake of gold.

There was a vein of wisdom in the chieftain, who called his leading men in council. Holding up a piece of gold, he said:

"This yellow stuff is the god of the Spaniards," he said; "let us propitiate it with songs and dances and pray it to turn the minds of those people from coming to Cuba."

Never were religious ceremonies performed more fervently. They danced and sang until ready to drop with weariness, when the chieftain said:

"We must not let this god remain above ground, for the Spaniards may see it and be inspired to wickedness."

Accordingly the yellow idol was flung far out into the river, where no one could possibly find it. But, all the same, the despoilers came. In 1511 Diego Velasquez, a typical Spanish freebooter, and a horde of his miscreants pounced upon the natives, who were powerless to repel them. The chieftain who had prayed that they might be kept away was seized, bound to the stake, and the fagots

piled around him were set ablaze. A priest held a crucifix in front of him and begged him to repent of his sins and thus secure entrance to heaven.

"Where is heaven?" asked the poor Indian.

The priest pointed upward.

"Are there any Spaniards there?"

"Yes; a very great many."

"Then," said the chieftain, "let me go somewhere else," and so he died.

Cuba was overrun by the cruel adventurers who made slaves of the Indians and compelled them to drudge out their lives in the mines and canefields. While the Spaniards fattened and grew rich on the unpaid labor, the natives died by scores and hundreds. Las Casas, the Roman Catholic apostle to the Indians, was filled with pity by the sufferings of the wretched natives. At the way matters were going, every one in the island would be exterminated in a few years. The prospect so wrung his heart that he protested to the home government and begged it to take steps to check the cruelties of the Spaniards. The exalted character of Las Casas commanded the attention of the authorities and Cardinal

Ximenes, the Spanish regent, sent three monks to Cuba to correct the dreadful abuses. Doubtless the monks meant well, but they lacked the energy and vigor to make headway against the horde of adventurers, who knew not the meaning of pity and justice.

Seeing the uselessness of their efforts, Las Casas procured the appointment of himself as "universal protector of the Indians." He threw his soul into the merciful work, and strove night and day to save the natives from impending destruction and to rouse his countrymen to a sense of their evil conduct. But it was one good man against thousands of conscienceless wretches.

Las Casas, however, was worldly wise. He saw that he could attain success only by appealing to the selfishness of his countrymen. In the neighboring island of San Domingo, the negroes had proven themselves a much sturdier race than the Indians, and were capable of greater endurance. He proposed to the Spaniards that the negro men and women should be imported to take the place of the Indians in the mines and cane-fields. As soon as he convinced the slave-

owners that the change would be profitable to them, they followed the suggestion. Men and women were brought over from San Domingo and in this manner negro slavery, by sanction of religious authority, obtained a foothold in the Western world.

The motive of Las Casas was commendable, but it did not accomplish its purpose. The Indians rapidly succumbed under the cruelties that were continued, while the more rugged negroes were treated with such brutal harshness that they, too, would have disappeared in time, had not the Spaniards resorted to the importation of slaves from Africa.

Meanwhile, the frightful tyranny of Spain toward her dependencies began bearing fruit. Venezuela and New Granada were the first to feel the throbbing of the new life imbibed from the French and West Indies. The revolution began in Venezuela in 1810 and spread to the Argentine States, thence to Chili, until in 1824 it made Peru free. Mexico won its independence, and the Central American States speedily followed along the path thus blazed to freedom. Florida was purchased by the United States, until finally all the Spanish possessions that remained in the

Western Hemisphere were Cuba and Porto Rico.

The surpassing richness of the soil and the exuberant vegetable and mineral wealth of the island had long attracted the admiring envy of other nations. It has been shown that its capacity to produce the finest quality of sugar was almost unlimited, while nowhere else on the globe could such excellent tobacco be grown as in the Vuelta Abajo district. The coffee, maize, rice, yams, bananas, and all species of tropical fruits were exhaustless. A small piece of land was so productive that it supported an ordinary family in comfort.

From Cuba a golden river streamed to the mother country, and she in her ravening greed and ferocious avarice clamored for a widening and deepening of the stream, which could have been secured by a wise and considerate treatment of her dependency—but such a course is incompatible with the nature of a Spaniard.

In 1762 Spain joined the coalition of France, Austria, and Russia in their stupendous but unsuccessful war against Great Britain and Prussia. In the same year, a

British fleet bombarded Havana and compelled its surrender. What a blessing it would have been to humanity had Great Britain retained possession of the island! All the hundred years of horror would have been saved and the present war undreamed of, for no possible necessity for it could have arisen.

It is worthy of note that the British capture of Havana was accomplished by the timely re-enforcement of General Israel Putnam and other American allies. Under the brief English rule the sanitary condition of the city was greatly improved, while a liberal policy gave a decisive impulse to trade and commerce.

Rarely, however, does anything in the nature of sentiment appear in the public acts of nations. The treaty of 1763 restored Cuba to Spain, which promptly re-established the old order of things.

At the opening of the present century, the population of the island was about 400,000, of whom not quite one-half were negro slaves. The Indians had been exterminated long before. The ports in one respect were as closely sealed as were those of Japan down

to the middle of the century. The Cubans were strictly forbidden to trade with any nation except Spain. It followed inevitably that the people thus cooped up were densely ignorant, but the majority believed in their mother country and remained so steadfastly loyal to her that she called Cuba the "ever faithful isle."

One reason for this loyalty, down to a certain period, lay in the fact that thousands of Spaniards who had been driven out of the adjoining colonies by the revolutions which brought those colonies their independence, found shelter in Cuba. Naturally they carried their mediæval ideas with them, and clung to the mother that had used them so harshly. Besides, they could not forget the dreadful outrages that had followed the revolt of San Domingo, where Toussaint L'Ouverture, born a slave, proved himself the equal in natural ability of the white generals who sought to conquer him and only secured his arrest by treachery.

It was like a distressing surgical operation for a few modern ideas to percolate into the brain of Spain. Revolt had spread through Spanish America with the loss, as has been

shown, of most of her colonies; and inasmuch as Cuba had remained faithful, it was decided to reward her by a more liberal policy. Consequently, in 1813, the ports of the island were thrown open to commerce and, two years later, the government monopoly of tobacco was abolished. Still further (as will be explained in another place) the Cubans were permitted to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes or law-making power, but the favor was quickly made a nullity.

The result of this spasm of common sense on the part of Spain was astounding. In a short time the sugar and tobacco crop increased fourfold, and before the outbreak of the last war it had grown a hundred-fold. Three-fourths of the crops named were sold in the United States, hardly a fiftieth going to Spain. The population grew to a million and a half, and the ratio of the negroes to the white population became about one-fourth. A career of unexampled prosperity was before Cuba, if Spain should show consideration toward her subjects in the island, and give them only a portion even of the opportunities which they craved and demanded.

CHAPTER VI.

American Attempts to Secure Cuba—The Lopez Expedition—
The “ Ostend Manifesto ”—The Ten Years’ War—The
Virginius Affair—How the Ten Years’ War was Ended.

It has been said that the enormous value of Cuba caused it to be looked upon with longing eyes by more than one nation. Before our Civil War, when slavery was a recognized institution, the South was strongly in favor of its annexation, either by purchase or by forcible means. Numerous filibustering expeditions were set on foot, but they came to naught, and Spain resolutely refused to consider any proposition for its purchase.

In 1848 President Polk, through the American minister at Madrid, offered that country one hundred million dollars for the island. This offer was made without any constitutional authority and was promptly rejected, whereupon our government notified Spain that she would never permit the transfer of the island to any nation except our own. One reason for this

was that if Cuba fell into the possession of England or France, the slaves would undoubtedly be emancipated, and the island would therefore become a center of anti-slavery influences inimical to the United States, in which, at that time, the political power of slavery was dominant.

Narcisso Lopez was a military adventurer and refugee from Havana, who formed the first military expedition for the capture and annexation of Cuba. This was in 1849, and he received the valuable aid of a number of leading Southerners, among them John A. Quitman, governor of Mississippi. The latter had a brilliant military record, having commanded a brigade at Monterey, led the assault at Vera Cruz, commanded at Alvarado, and stormed Chapultepec; being afterward appointed by General Scott governor of the City of Mexico. Although he died in 1858 he was a pronounced secessionist, and suggested the formation of a Southern Confederacy.

The first expedition of Lopez was frustrated by President Tyler, but the second, which included three hundred men, landed at Cardenas and captured the town. The

Spanish troops rallied and quickly drove out the filibusters. Lopez escaped, but was arrested and brought to trial in Savannah, Ga. He was among friends there, and, as might be supposed, was discharged for want of evidence.

The third and last expedition landed at Las Pazas in 1851. Lopez had counted confidently upon the inhabitants flocking to his aid, but, instead of doing so they fled, and he was left to meet the overwhelming forces of the government. His men were dispersed, and Lopez and several of his officers fled to the mountains. While asleep in a cabin, they were surrounded, captured, and taken to Havana, where they were executed, September 1, 1851.

Shortly after this, England and France asked the United States to join with them in guaranteeing the possession of the island to Spain, but very properly our government refused to tie its hands in that manner, the motive of the proposers to this tripartite agreement being transparently selfish.

While Franklin Pierce was President, October 9, 1854, James Buchanan, our minister to England; John Y. Mason, minister to

France ; and Pierre Soulé, minister to Spain, met at Ostend, Belgium, and drew up the Ostend "Circular" or "Manifesto," which declared that the sale of Cuba to the United States would be advantageous to both governments ; but, if Spain refused to sell, it was incumbent upon the Union to "wrest it from her," rather than see it Africanized like San Domingo. The slavery question quickly became so prominent in our own politics that no steps were ever taken to carry out this semi-official threat. This act of American diplomacy was discreditable on our part, for the incentive for seizing Cuba was without a shadow of justification in international law or common justice.

There had been outbreaks in Cuba previous to this date, but they were quickly suppressed. Secret societies were formed with the purpose of bringing about revolution, the principal of which were the "Soles de Bolivar," and the "Black Eagle," but they lacked coherence and organization. The fires, however, continued to smolder and were never wholly extinguished.

The opportunity came in 1868, when the revolt in Spain drove Isabella II. from her

throne. On October 10 of that year, Carlos de Cespedes proclaimed the independence of Cuba, and several thousand patriots rallied to his support. In April following, a congress convened at Guaymaro, adopted a republican constitution, and elected Cespedes president. Mexico and several South American States made haste to show their sympathy by recognizing the Cubans as belligerents, and soon after Peru recognized them as an independent power.

We cannot withhold our admiration of the practical expression of their good wishes by the countries named, but it must be conceded that it had no warrant in international law, since the insurgents could make only the most shadowy claim to a government of their own. The United States sympathized with the insurgents, but were not justified in making a formal recognition of them.

More than one cause contributed to the failure of the war thus inaugurated, which lasted until 1878, and is known as the Ten Years' War. In the first place, the "Junta," as constituted, was composed of too many members. They were urgent in pressing their conflicting views, and much friction

resulted. Where absolute unity was necessary, there was discord, and it was impossible to bridge over the differences.

A member of the Junta told the writer that, despite the statement widely made, that fifteen thousand men rallied to their standard, there never was more than half that number arrayed on their side. Worse still, all the firearms they could muster were about two thousand five hundred, and many of them were of poor quality. Ammunition was scarce, and, although several filibustering expeditions managed to dodge in among the inlets and land their cargoes, the assistance thus given was trifling.

In 1873 Cespedes was deposed by Congress, and Salvador Cisneros elected in his place. Cespedes, while hiding at a ranch the following year, was betrayed to the Spanish soldiers, who surrounded the dwelling. When summoned to surrender he came forth with a pistol in his hand, and was riddled with bullets.

It was about this time that the *Virginus* affair caused great excitement throughout the country. The *Virginus* was an American merchant vessel which was

captured on the high seas near Jamaica by the Spanish man-of-war *Tornado*, October 31, 1873, on the ground that she intended landing men to assist in the Cuban rebellion then under way. Among the prisoners were four Cubans, who, with Captain Fry and a number of others, were executed. Spain lost no time in making ample reparation, and the filibustering spirit was encouraged to new efforts.

Necessarily the fighting, which continued for nearly ten years, was of a guerrilla nature. There is no war as cruel as a civil one, and some of the acts by both parties were of unexampled ferocity. Knowing that cruelty and treachery were to be expected from the Spaniards, the Cubans retaliated in kind. Suffice it to say, that Weyler took a leading part against the insurgents: we all know what was to be expected from *him*.

Marshal Martinez de Campos, the Spanish commander, was the best officer in his country's service, although not popular, because he believed in conducting hostilities on civilized principles. He finally brought the war to a close by the treaty or capitulation of El Zanjón in 1878, one cause being the promise

of the government to grant most of the reforms and rights for which the insurgents were fighting. How these pledges were kept will be found fully told in the succeeding chapter.

The Ten Years' War proved a tremendous drain upon the troops and resources of Spain. Almost one hundred thousand soldiers found their graves in the "ever faithful isle," and the cost in money amounted to many million dollars.

The insurgents disbanded and accepted the proffer of their conquerors in good faith. All that Spain had to do to retain their obedience and support was to keep her promise of giving justice to those who had striven so long and hard for their rights; but, with that blind fatuity to her own interests which has marked her policy for centuries, she turned to hate the loyalty of the Cubans and invited the final revolution that was to result in their complete independence.

CHAPTER VII.

Shall Cuba be Free?—The Intolerable Oppression and Injustice of Spain toward the Cubans—The Causes of the Revolt of 1895.

THE natural inquiry that presents itself to an intelligent person upon learning that any dependency or community has broken into revolt is as to the reason for such revolt. It has happened more than once that the causes were not such as to awaken sympathy. Not always is an insurrection or revolution prompted by worthy motives. Lawlessness, ingratitude, and a longing for greater license have sometimes been the motive for rebellion against authority that erred perhaps on the side of too great freedom.

It is well, therefore, to learn the exact causes of the revolution in Cuba of 1895, though the previous similar attempts that have been referred to, or the infamous rule of Spain, seem of themselves to be all-sufficient provocation for rebellion. Mr. Clarence King, however, in the *Forum* for September, 1895,

has framed such a powerful, eloquent, and historically accurate indictment of the "assassin among nations" that it deserves careful perusal and study.

"On October 28, 1492, Columbus discovered Cuba. His son Diego, in 1511, fitted out an expedition consisting of 300 men, and dispatched it under command of Diego Velasquez to take possession of the island and begin its colonization. According to all early writers, the Siboney Indians, who possessed this noblest of the Antilles, were amiable, innocent, hospitable, and graceful. Velasquez lost no time in despoiling them of their possessions, trampling on their natural rights, and butchering those who resented his brutal domination. The Chief Hatuei, who saw his people so cruelly enslaved, struck back, and Velasquez burned him at the stake. Between the savage conceptions of immortality which Columbus declares these gentle savages to have possessed, and the new doctrines of salvation which Spanish conquerors never failed to confide to those whom they were about to roast, Hatuei must have experienced a certain confusion of ideas; but his primi-

tive soul so revolted at the cruelty of his tormentors that he said: "If there are Spaniards in heaven, I prefer to go to hell." For about four hundred years Spain has owned Cuba, and she has governed it, with certain honorable exceptions, on the lines of oppression and exhaustion laid down by Diego Velasquez.

"Slaughter and deportation for the slave markets of Spain within fifty years so reduced the Indian population—variously estimated from 500,000 to 1,000,000—that importation of African slaves was authorized, and thereafter continued, either openly or clandestinely, until within forty years of the present date. Coarse greed underlay the enslaving of both Indians and Africans, and the oppression born of that greed, and practiced on peoples whom it was safe to maltreat, became so ingrained in the class that governed Cuba, that to-day in this late year of our Lord, after the last Siboney sleeps in his grave, and Spain has been forced to abolish her African slavery, she must needs hold over her own flesh and blood in Cuba the same old iron rod of oppression. So exasperating is that rod, so cruel its strokes, that

Cuba is again in the throes of a bloody insurrection.

"Hatuei in 1511 preferred hell to a heaven with Spaniards. The Cubans of 1895 had rather die the death of battle than live under Spanish rule. I propose briefly to explain how it is that a people living in Paradise, with every gift of nature to insure human content and cherish social joy, have been stung and tormented into flinging their lives into the vortex of war, with scarcely more than a heroic courage to oppose to the fearful odds against them. Most great wrongs have their tap-roots deep in the past. To trace these roots from their origin upwards into the bitter fruitage of Cuba will require a patience which I am forced to ask of the reader.

"Somewhat after the middle of the sixteenth century the administration of Cuba, previously under colonizing chiefs, was formally handed over to the military arm in the person of a Captain General, to whom was given despotic power; and it so continued until within very recent years, when the office has been changed in title to Governor General; but as he is always a general of the Spanish army, and commander-in-chief of all the

Spanish forces in Cuba, in one or the other of his capacities he still wields the same old absolute power.

“Until the first decade of the present century, Cuba shared the varying fate of the other members of the Spanish empire; according to the personal characters of the sovereigns, viceroys, and captains general, she was governed well or ill as it happened. But she was part and parcel of the commonweal of Spain, not a province singled out to be held down beneath the military heel, and plundered at will, as she now is. Early Spanish laws and ordinances had formally announced that the *Indias* were to be governed under the same principles as Leon and Castile. Ordenanza 14, of the Council of Philip II., and 13 of Philip IV., I translate literally as follows :

““Because the kingdoms of Castile and of the *Indias* belong to one crown, the laws and mode of government of both should be the most similar and consistent that is possible. Those of our council, in the laws and ordinances which they institute for these states, seek to accommodate their form and manner



ACTING REAR ADMIRAL WM. T. SAMPSON.

of government to the custom and order into which the kingdoms of Leon and Castile are ruled and governed, so far as the diversity and difference of countries and nations permit.'

"But this unity, of course, was always under the sway of an absolutism of the Spanish monarchy, and that absolutism, embodied in captains general, had reduced Cuba to insolvency and bitterness so long ago as the middle of the last century. In this despair the liberal spirits of Cuba, like those of Spain, clung to a single hope—that of escape from personal tyranny into modern constitutional freedom. The seeds of chartered liberty, that had matured in such definite and even modern shape in the days of the mediæval Aragonian kings, had never really died, but retained their power of vital germination during all the dreary decline of Spanish greatness, through the whole Hapsburg dynasty and earlier Bourbôn reigns. But it was not until Napoleon overran Spain, and the last relics of national independence under the Junta Central had gathered in convention in Cadiz, that those seeds bore living fruit.

There, in 1812, the Spanish Constitution was formed and adopted. That instrument, drawn closely after the lines of the Constituent Assembly of France, in terms extended its jurisdiction to the 'Indias,' including, of course, Cuba. It embodied the broad ideas of Charles and Philip as to Spanish unity, and even went so far as to make formal declaration that 'the Spanish nation is the reunion of the Spaniards of both hemispheres.' Article after article prescribed the steps to be taken by the people of Ultramar (under which designation were included the Americas) to avail themselves of their new rights. Article 10 declared the whole of Spanish America, including the Antilles, to be an integral part of Spanish territory. Article 30, in providing for the basis of representation for the Ultramarine provinces, gave one deputy for each 60,000 people. Articles 37, 61, 80, and 101 prescribed the mode and conditions for the election of these Ultramar deputies. Article 107 established a 'permanent deputation' of the Cortes, a sort of executive committee, to be chosen from its own members and to consist of seven persons, three from the European Spanish provinces and three

from Ultramar; the seventh, and presiding officer, to be the President of the Council of the Indias. Finally, Article 232 required that of the Council of State, to be composed of forty individuals, not less than twelve should be natives of the provinces of Ultramar. Thus this Constitution stretched its arm over Cuba, and would, if honestly administered, have lifted the island into brilliant prosperity and content; but in 1814, before the new machinery could be started, that false and brutish Bourbon, Ferdinand VII., recovered the family throne, tossed the Constitution into his waste basket, and took a plunge back as far toward the Dark Ages as was possible in a world that had just witnessed the French Revolution. Cuba, with the rest, sank into the old routine of personal rule, and went on in sadness and decline under the captains general. The subsequent story of Ferdinand's cowardice only matches that of his folly. In doing away with the Constitution he had meant to throw liberty with it, but sturdy Cadiz, within whose walls the Constitution had been drawn, arose in 1820 and scared the poor king into a new acceptance. But, alas! backed by a hundred thousand French

bayonets and the moral support of the Holy Alliance in 1823, Ferdinand felt himself master again and tore up the instrument that stood between free Spain and Bourbonism.

"In 1836, Ferdinand having died, the Constitution was again made the living basis of Spanish government; this time accepted by Christina, then regent for her daughter Isabella. In these vicissitudes of the thrice-adopted document, Cuba had a critical interest. The hearts of her people fell and rose, as the barometer sags and surges up again when a hurricane tears across the island. After the final acceptance of the Constitution, and before the organization of the Cortes, which occurred on October 24, 1836, intrigue and agitation began over the status to be arranged for Ultramar. Tyranny and exactions had lately led to the revolts of Chili, Peru, Mexico, and the other Continental provinces; they had already successfully thrown off the yoke, and were in that strange state of liberty and chaos which is familiar to the world. Spain, always callous to the sufferings of her provinces, regarded their loss purely from the point of view of

revenue. The torrent of money that since the Conquest had poured like a great golden gulf stream across the Atlantic, bathing Spain in a climate of wealth, now shrank to a feeble flow, and she felt the chill.

“Although Cuba by refusing to follow the example of the Continental American provinces, had gained the title of ‘ever faithful,’ Spain knew well enough that her oppressions might wear out even the patience of an unqualified loyalty, and she found herself confronted with the problem of how she could forever keep for her own the revenue which in time must flow from so rich a country as Cuba. Under the liberty of her Constitution, impartially extended to Cuba, she saw a vision of growing resources and of uprising power, but towering above all stood the distant specter of Independence. She had political sagacity enough to know that liberty for Cuba meant power and autonomy, and autonomy the loss of that as yet far off but inevitably coming wealth. To be just and impartial involved for Spain the moral energy of a new departure and the ultimate loss of Cuba. The reign of oppression and plunder was in full force, and, if let alone, would go

on with all the momentum already given to it by centuries of cupidity.

“The instrument of her greed in Cuba was just then General Tacon, a soldier of violence and ignorance, who came to the captain-generalcy embittered from a failure to encompass Spanish ends in South America. Tacon was a true type of the Spanish oppressor, born with a contempt for all other than force, and hardened by the omnipotence of his Spanish commission. The following royal order, addressed to a predecessor, conveys an idea of the powers of the captain-generalcy to which Tacon succeeded when he arrived in Cuba. This is not the credential of a Persian satrap under Cambyses, nor of a Roman proconsul under Caligula, but is an ordinary commission in the nineteenth century to the Cuban Captain-General, issued by his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII. It reads as follows:

“His Majesty, the King, our Lord, desiring to obviate the inconveniences which might result in extraordinary cases from a division of command, and from the interference of

powers and prerogatives of the respective officers; for the important end of preserving in that precious island [Cuba] his legitimate sovereign authority and public tranquillity through proper means,—has resolved in accordance with the opinion of his Council of Ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest authority, bestowing upon you all the powers which by the royal ordinances are granted to the governors of besieged cities. In consequence of this His Majesty gives to your Excellency the most complete and unbounded power, not only to send away from the island any persons in office, whatever be their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein your Excellency may deem injurious, or whose conduct, public or private, may alarm you, replacing them with persons faithful to His Majesty, and deserving of all the confidence of your Excellency; but also to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever, or any general provision made concerning any branch of the administration, as your Excellency may think most suitable to the royal service.' (Royal decree, March 28, 1825.)

“Under precisely similar faculties Tacon was governing in Cuba when constitutional light dawned over Spain. Like all despots, he was quick to catch the meaning of a new portent, and flung himself hotly into the struggle to prevent the extension of the new Constitution to Cuba. On the 27th of September, 1836, the barkentine *Guadalupe* brought to Santiago de Cuba news of the promulgation in Spain of the Constitution; and the Liberals under General Lorenzo, the military governor of the province, thinking the millennium had come, gathered all Santiagan authorities and proclaimed it for Cuba. Tacon instantly stamped his heel on Santiago, ordering that ‘in that province not the slightest change in the order of things should be made, unless preceded by his express and final order as Captain General of the island.’

“When, on the 24th of October of the same year, the Cortes organized for the first time in Madrid, it immediately appeared that a struggle was inevitable over the Antilles. In January there arrived in Madrid three deputies, elected, in spite of Tacon’s order, from Santiago. They pre-

sented their credentials with a forcible memorial, but were met with silence and delay. Meanwhile enemies of Cuba within the Cortes secured in secret session the appointment of a committee which in the month of February, 1837, presented a report recommending in substance that (I translate the essential words) 'the Spanish provinces of America and Asia be hereafter ruled and administered by special laws, and that their deputies are not to take seats in the present Cortes.' This *Informe* became the subject of a memorable debate, which lasted from the 7th of March until April 16. There was abundant time for the full expression of opinion, for reason and consideration; the action of the body was therefore as deliberate as it was final. When the parliamentary division was taken, there were 155 deputies present; *but only two voted for the extension of the privileges of the Constitution to Ultramar.* Reports of this debate show that the two reasons which determined the action of the Cortes were a resolution to wring revenue out of Cuba and to guard against her achieving independence. This action of the Cortes found official expression two days

later in the promulgation of the following law, which I translate:

“‘The Cortes, using the power which is conceded to them by the Constitution, have decreed: not being in position to apply the Constitution which has been adopted for the Peninsula and adjacent islands to the Ultramarine provinces of America and Asia, these shall be ruled and administered by special laws appropriate to their respective situations and circumstances, and proper to cause their happiness; consequently, the deputies for the designated provinces are not to take their seats in the present Cortes.’

“Thus Spain disinherited Cuba and withheld her birthplace. Thus she crushed her noblest hopes, and broke the heart of her fairest province. This was the moment when Cuban loyalty turned into hate.

“While this act of disinheritance turned the great body of liberal-minded Cubans forever against Spain, there has always remained a conservative party of natives who realized that genuine reforms of policy and administration might secure the condi-

tion of 'happiness,' to which the law of 1837 ironically alluded, without severing the link with the mother country. The hope and aim of this deluded group has been to secure representation in the Cortes, where, although in powerless minority, they might carry on a campaign of education which should finally persuade Spain to see the mutual advantage of a qualified autonomy. Madrid remained deaf to forty years of this sort of pleading. However, in 1878, Martinez Campos negotiated a peace with the unconquered and apparently unconquerable Cuban insurgents who had fought heroically for ten years, which peace was paid for in promises.

"Slavery had been practically killed by the war; Campos only bound Spain to publish the death notice. The main concession for which the insurgents accepted peace was the promise of constitutional reform. As a matter of fact, there promptly followed four royal decrees as follows: June 9, entitling Cuba to elect deputies to the Cortes, one for each forty thousand people; June 9, dividing the island into the present six provinces; June 21, instituting a system of provincial and municipal government, followed on

August 16 by the necessary electoral regulations. But the system was immediately seen to be the shadow without the substance of self-government. The Provincial Assembly could nominate only three candidates for presiding officer. It was the inevitable Governor General who had the power to appoint, not necessarily one of the three nominees, but any member of the Assembly he chose. But all this provincial machinery is in reality an empty form, since expressly by law the Governor General was given the power to prorogue the assemblies at will. The deputies have never been able to accomplish anything in the Cortes. Moreover, the crux of the whole financial oppression—the tariff, taxes, and absolute control and expenditure of the revenue—remained with Spain. Her cynical apathy was momentarily jarred by the Ten Years' War, and under fear she yielded so far as to grant reforms which reformed nothing, privileges which carried no benefit, nominal changes which in no essential particular disturbed the absolutely despotic power of the Spanish proconsul. A century of hope and of struggle ended without progress. Cubans are under

no illusions; they know that they are exactly where they have been from the beginning,—under the heel of military force,—

“ ‘ Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose ! ’ ”

“ The result, from an economical point of view, has been the continued enforcement of a financial system frankly contrived to enrich Spain at the expense of Cuba, but practically extinguishing the healthy industrial progress of the island. That system comprises: 1. A tariff which, by differential duties, forces Cuba to buy to Spanish advantage and her own disadvantage, and sell (with an export duty for Spain’s benefit) where she can. 2. A scheme of internal taxation, laid in crushing weight on every phase of industrial life. 3. A complete system of control and espionage over the details of business, with countless fees and explanations. The body of officers who execute this universal system of great and petty interference are too generally blackmailers, who adroitly temper their exactions to the little wool left on the oft-shorn lamb. 4. The distribution and expenditure of practically

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the total collected revenues remain with Spain.

“The general result of this policy, besides embittering the Cubans, has been to strain and drain every industry, and by idiotic administrative meddling to discourage new projects and embarrass old ones.

“With the exception of a few modern sugar estates, largely of foreign ownership, and some almost comic railways, Cuban industry is back in the period of the Roman empire. The island has long ceased to pay a legal, above-board profit to Spain, but yearly piles up a mountain of deficit. To merchants in Spain, from whom Cuba is by the tariff forced to buy, there is profit; to the Spanish tradesman in Cuba there is fortune; to the army of blackmailers there is wealth. All profit and all advantage go to Spain. Cuba only suffers and grows poor. She has, moreover, the bitterness of seeing that the host of almost hostile Spaniards in the island, both official and commercial, are there only to despoil her. She sees her revenues imposed and spent by Spain, and the private gains of the army of aliens carried off when greed is glutted.

"Nowhere within the limits of western civilization is there a more favorable spot for the swift, almost boundless, development of vast popular wealth. Rich beyond description, beautiful as Eden, Cuba, with only a tenth of its area occupied, and its resources as yet hardly touched, lies bankrupt under the coarse heel of a despot too blind to see even his own advantage.

"Half a century ago, by a liberal fiscal policy and decently good administration, even denying constitutional rights and by means of her 'special laws,' Spain with supreme ease could have placed Cuba in opulence and turned the old golden gulf stream again toward her shores. But with that towering vanity which has replaced her just national pride, she scoffed at the appeals of Cuba, and went on in that career of conceited folly which has reduced her from the loftiest position in modern European history to the pitiable insignificance of to-day, and left for Cuba only ruin and rage. It is now too late. Spain can never win back the heart of Cuba. She can never again make a lasting peace. It is war till Cubans are free or dead. Flung from the continent of

America for her intolerable oppression, Spain lags in this hemisphere as the mere embodiment of tyrannical-greed. From a historic distance there is a kind of picturesque Roman grandeur in her armed and bannered conquerors, trampling down barbarians and putting them to the sword and cross; but no haze of time or distance will ever soften the miserable spectacle of her last days in Cuba, oppressing and blackmailing her fairest daughter.

“The dilemma forced upon Spain in 1836 was this: on the one hand constitutional liberty for Cuba, with a future of greatness and prosperity, but with inevitable final independence; on the other, a continuance of the old military and financial despotism, which had always meant sacrificing real industrial progress for to-day’s plunder, and a future of insurrections with probable independence at the end. Although Spain apparently never saw it, both roads lead to independence. We have seen how she chose the latter course, and its logical result of bankruptcy and rebellion. Prior to the present insurrection four others have occurred in this century. The conspiracy of

the Black Eagle in 1829, the Lopez conspiracy in 1848-51, the Pinto conspiracy in 1855, and the bitter Ten Years' War, 1868-78.

"Having seen how her financial shortsightedness has brought about ruin, it is worth while to advert now to the manner in which Spain, in maintaining her military government, has treated the persons and personal rights of Cubans. For example: the alleged slave conspiracy of 1844 was met by the immediate placing of a court-martial at Matanzas, the scene of the trouble. No incriminating evidence was obtainable under ordinary examination, so the court went back to the fine old methods of the Inquisition, and followed the example of Torquemada. Slaves, colored freedmen, and whites were stretched face down on ladders, and their naked backs lashed till they satisfied their torturers. As a result, 1846 people were sentenced, some to death, others to banishment, others to hard labor for various periods. Any Cuban patriot may find himself under a tacit ban. Let us suppose that he is a suspected person: he is watched, and if suspicion rises to a sufficient degree of cer-

tainty he is arrested; and now comes one of the neatest and most effective methods of disposing of a suspect among the extraordinary wealth of expedients known to Spanish military law. Evidence being slight, the prisoner may be ordered removed under guard to some other place of safe-keeping, and is liable to be shot by his soldier guard if he attempts to escape. So common has this been that a wink of his superior to the guard is as good as a nod. When the prisoner stumbles, or sneezes, or looks out of one eye—he is killed and a report is rendered, ‘Shot while attempting to escape.’

“In the 1868–78 war, the insurgents were never accorded belligerent rights by any power strong enough to take Spain by the throat and force her to conduct operations under the reasonable humanities of modern war. The peculiar form of Cuba renders the control of every port easy to the Spanish navy; and although battles were won and campaigns steadily conducted by the insurgents, the United States Government chose to close its eyes to the truth. The real facts were, not that a state of war was not fully demonstrated, but the Alabama claims were in the

air, and we were ready first to turn our backs on Cuba in order not to prejudice our money case against England, and after the payment of the award, the precedent was still too fresh. The South American republics which recognized Cuban belligerency were powerless, and Europe remained indifferent. Thus Spain, left unrestrained by foreign powers, worked her will with a cynical frankness that laid bare her full savagery. The war having begun, General Count Valmaseda published the following proclamation :

“‘Inhabitants of the country ! The re-enforcements of troops that I have been waiting for have arrived ; with them I shall give protection to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the government of the metropolis.

“‘You know that I have pardoned those who have fought us with arms ; that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the unexpected protection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those we have pardoned have turned against us again.

“‘Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it

is not possible for me to be the man that I have been ; there is no longer a place for a falsified neutrality ; *he that is not for me is against me* ; and that my soldiers may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry :

“ ‘ 1st. Every man, from the age of fifteen years upward, found away from his habitation (*finca*), and who does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot.

“ ‘ 2d. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops.

“ ‘ 3d. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.

“ ‘ Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the houses of their relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly.

“ The foregoing determinations will commence to take effect on the 14th of the present month.

“ ‘ EL CONDE DE VALMASEDA.’

“ ‘ BAYAMO, *April* 4, 1869.

“Spanish tyrants are always deeply Christian, so that it can hardly be supposed that Valmaseda, in using solemn words of the Saviour, did so unconscious that the source of his phrase is the source of divine compassion to men.

“A month later, Mr. Fish, then Secretary of State, correctly branded this proclamation as ‘infamous,’ and wrote in a letter to Señor Lopez Roberts (Spanish minister to the United States) :

“‘In the interest of Christian civilization and common humanity, I hope that this document is a forgery. If it indeed be genuine, the President instructs me in the most forcible manner to protest against such mode of warfare.’

“We have not forgotten the wanton butchery of Americans in the *Virginius* affair. It remains of value as a proved example without which we should be slow to believe that Spanish generals habitually shot insurgents captured in battle, as in fact they did. A published record of the Spanish barbarities of the war gives in detail a list of

2927 ‘Martyrs to Liberty,’—political prisoners executed during the war,—and of 4672 captured insurgents whose fate has never been made known. There were 13,000 confiscations of estates, 1000 being those of ladies whose only crime was the love of Cuban liberty.

“The experience of American newspaper correspondents, like O’Kelly, in rebel camps and Spanish prisons, confirms the revolting character of the Spanish conduct of the war; and there are extant letters of Spanish officers which throw gleams of light into the darkness of the period. A specimen or two are enough.

“Jesus Rivocoba, under date of September 4, 1869, writes :

“‘We captured seventeen, thirteen of whom were shot outright; on dying they shouted, ‘Hurrah for Free Cuba, hurrah for Independence.’ A mulatto said, ‘Hurrah for Cespedes.’ On the following day we killed a Cuban officer and another man. Among the thirteen that we shot the first day were found three sons and their father; the father witnessed the execution of his

sons without even changing color, and when his turn came he said he died for the independence of his country. On coming back we brought along with us three carts filled with women and children, the families of those we had shot; and they asked us to shoot them, because they would rather die than live among Spaniards.'

"Pedro Fardon, another officer, who entered perfectly into the spirit of the service he honored, writes on September 22, 1869 :

" 'Not a single Cuban will remain in this island, because we shoot all those we find in the fields, on the farms, and in every hovel.'

"And again, on the same day, the same officer sends the following good news to his old father :

" 'We do not leave a creature alive where we pass, be it man or animal. If we find cows, we kill them; if horses, ditto; if hogs, ditto; men, women, or children, ditto; as to the houses, we burn them; so everyone receives his due,—the men in balls, the

animals in bayonet-thrusts. The island will remain a desert.'

"Valmaseda himself paid a visit to the plantation home of the Mora family, and, there being no male patriots on whom to wreak his lust for blood, butchered and burned the sisters Mora and left their home in ashes. A mere enumeration of authentic cases of Spanish inhumanity in the last insurrection would fill volumes and exhibit one of the blackest episodes of history.

"There is reason to hope that Campos will make war as a civilized soldier. In his termination of the last insurrection he showed a comprehension of modern methods, and there are symptoms that he is conscious of the general barbarism of Spain's Cuban policy. It is not clear that he was not sincere in his programme of reform which induced the peace of 1878. For the despicable falseness of Spain as to her promised reforms, perhaps Campos was in no way responsible.

"In Spanish character survives a continuous trait of the pagan cruelty of Rome, re-enforced and raised to fiendish intensity by the teachings of the Inquisition. Had the

United States, by one stroke of her pen, recognized Cuban belligerency, as was her moral duty, all the Caligula-Torquemada atrocities would have been stopped, and the war for freedom gone on to victory, unstained by the blood of women and children. President Grant lost this noblest opportunity of his civil career by miserable anxiety about the Alabama claims.

“Cubans are under no delusion as to the fateful step they have taken. The men who survived the scourge of the Ten-Years’ War, in rushing to arms again, act in full consciousness of what they are doing, and willingly face the cruel odds. If this were a first effort to acquire freedom, it might be attributed to the over-confident enthusiasm of a brave people inexperienced in war and its train of suffering and grief, and ignorant of the combination of money, material, and men their enemy can hurl against her. But these are the very people who half a generation ago fought ten years, and felt the shock of 200,000 Spanish soldiers, and suffered as no modern combatants have done. They enter this war as bravely as before, but with eyes open and with memory loaded down with vis-

ions of agony and blood. Of that adoration of liberty which is the only sure foundation of modern representative government, this insurrection is as pure and lofty an example as the course of human history can show.

“That all the material advantages of war are against them can easily be seen. In the first place, Cuba is a long, narrow island about seven hundred miles in east-and-west extent, by a north-and-south breadth of twenty-one to one hundred and twenty miles. It possesses a truly remarkable series of great and small harbors: the more important ones roomy and landlocked, like those of Havana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and others of the type; and the small, but often admirable ones, strung at short intervals along the whole two thousand miles of seacoast. The greater harbors are fortified. Spain has a respectable navy, and has, in fact, occupied all the chief and several of the small harbors with fifteen vessels of war. She has, besides, a fleet of light-draught gunboats, partly in use, and partly under contract on the Clyde, and soon to be available for cruising perpetually along the short intervals of shore between the various harbors which are occupied by larger war

vessels. In her centuries of neglect of useful public works in Cuba she has built practically no wagon roads so that, if the insurgents possessed artillery, which they cannot obtain, they could not, save by an almost superhuman effort, move it to concentration for the capture of one of the ports. Spain, on the other hand, holds the few rudimentary roads within the theater of war, and whatever use of field guns is possible is, therefore, for Spain alone. Not only is every important harbor under effective blockade against insurgent people and freight, but it is a secure base of supplies. Practically seventy miles would be a maximum distance for any considerable operation from a safely maintained—even an unthreatened—base, and the average cannot be above fifty miles. Spain, therefore, begins her campaign to quell the Cubans with a cordon of impregnable bases, to which at all times she has unrestricted access by a sea on which not a single Cuban flag floats, except on some hovering unarmed sea tug or timid blockade runner, which avoids the ports and creeps in under cover of darkness to bring a handful of patriots or some boxes of arms. By means of this complete chain

of fortified and occupied harbors, Spain can pour in the whole resources of the nation in men, supplies, and munitions, without a moment's interruption or a shadow of danger. These resources are a Peninsular population of 17,000,000 to draw from, and a standing army which on a peace basis carries 115,735 men, and reaches in nominal war resource something more than 1,000,000. Financial advantage is also wholly with Spain. Although bent under a debt of over a thousand millions of dollars, and her fiscal affairs in such wretched condition that there has been no parliamentary indorsement of expenditures since 1865-67, and the Tribunal of Accounts has not dared to publish the national books since 1869—nevertheless, Spain is a nation still possessing the shattered remnants of a public credit. She can vote bonds, and there is even yet a price at which they can be sold. Her soldiery face death with courage, in spite of Napier's epigram that 'Spaniards are brave behind walls, cowards in the field, and robbers always'—their conduct in action in Cuba disproving the middle term of an otherwise correct characterization.

“The Spanish *Military Gazette* gives the

figures of the national forces in Cuba as follows: Sixty thousand regulars, the chief part of which are infantry, but including cavalry, 2596; artillery, 621; engineers, 415; public-order officers, 676; civil guards, 4400; marines, 2700; guerrillás, 1152; the whole under one Captain General, seven division generals, one auditor, one military intendant, one sanitary inspector, and the usual complement of staff and line officers. Besides this, there are about 40,000 Cuban militia recruited from the loyal classes and used chiefly for garrison purposes. There are 15 warships and 19 vessels in purchase.

“All Cuba has a population of about 1,600,000, of which more than half are in garrison cities and regions so overawed by the power of Spain that they cannot successfully rise until the national forces are shattered in the field. Of the portion in revolt (about two-thirds of the area and one-third of the population) it is probable that the total number of a sex, age, and physical condition to bear arms, the figure would not exceed the actual peace force of the Spanish army, to say nothing of the 17,000,000 which the enemy have to draw upon.

“Impoverished by centuries of financial oppression, the Cuban patriots are poor; their slender resources are the sum of innumerable small contributions. Few in number, empty of purse, they stand within this tight-drawn ring of Spanish fire. Cut off from any but dangerous and clandestine introduction of arms and medicines; lacking supplies to form a base; with not a cent to pay a single soldier or officer of their little army; with only a skeleton medical corps,—in short, almost nothing to make war with,—these brave souls are facing, not death only, but Spanish death. The region under revolution is one great graveyard of those fallen in the Ten Years’ Revolt, yet Cubans are undaunted by the numbers or resources of their foe. Beside this far-reaching patience of valor a single act of heroism like Thermopylæ is pastime; compared with the raggedness, hunger, and privations which Cubans bravely choose to accept, Valley Forge was a garden party. For ten years these same men, with the same slender resources, held the arms and pride of Spain at bay, and then capitulated to promises which were made only to be broken.”

CHAPTER VIII.

The Opening of the Final Struggle for Independence—*Personnel* of the Government—Help Given by Cubans in the United States—Severe Fighting in Cuba—Self-sacrifices by the Insurgents.

THE first step in the last struggle for the independence of Cuba was taken February 24, 1895, when the Cubans declared themselves independent of Spain. Taking a lesson from their previous failure, they effected their organization with skill and careful deliberation. The insurgents who flocked to the standard of revolt were drilled and disciplined, and efforts were devoted to keeping open communication among themselves in all parts of the island, gradually working their way toward Havana, the metropolis.

Since Spain had a powerful navy, she was able to retain the seaports, the insurgents gaining control over three-fourths of the interior. There was still a woeful lack of arms and military supplies, though no inconsiderable help was obtained from the daring

filibuster expeditions fitted out in the United States, despite the watchfulness of our authorities, who occasionally caught one of the vessels and imprisoned the men that were violating our neutrality laws.

The first uprising was in the province of Santiago de Cuba. On March 31, General Antonio Maceo, his brother José, Crombet, and Cebreco, all veterans of the 'Ten Years' War, with more than twenty patriots as ardent as themselves, landed at Duaba, near Baracoa, and joined the other insurgents. This act gave an impetus to the revolt, which spread and grew rapidly.

General Maximo Gomez and José Marti, with six companions, on the 11th of April landed at the southeastern extremity of the island and, meeting Maceo, the party held a long consultation and agreed upon a definite plan of campaign. While General Gomez was to go to Camaguey as general-in-chief of the army, Maceo was to remain in the province of Santiago.

That these men meant business from the first was proven by the fact that fighting began almost immediately. Although fierce in its nature, it was from the force of circum-

stances indecisive, for the Cubans were too few in number and too poorly armed to expel the greatly superior forces of the enemy. In a severe skirmish at Boa de los Rios, on the 19th of May, Marti was killed.

By the close of the rainy season, the revolutionists had thirty thousand men in the field, the eastern division being in charge of General Maceo, while the western division, occupying the province of Puerto Principe, was commanded by General Gomez. Campos was still in command of the Spanish forces and no officer could have accomplished more than he. His force was about seventy-six thousand, but only one-half was immediately available. His plan of campaign was to advance eastward from Havana, expelling the insurgents as far as the territory of Santiago. This scheme looked hopeful, but there was no possibility of carrying it out. The homes of the insurgents were in the interior; they were thoroughly acquainted with the country; they could waylay, ambush, and fight like American Indians; they could strike effective blows and then easily elude their pursuers. The latter, after driving the Cubans from their front, would

find them soon after on their rear, as eager, as ardent as ever, and under the leadership of brave and skillful officers. A most important advantage lay in the fact that the insurgents were perfectly acclimated. While hundreds and thousands of the Spaniards succumbed to the climate, during the unhealthy rainy season, sickness was almost unknown in the Cuban camp.

The thoroughness with which the island was permeated by the revolutionists is proven by the fact that when the government was organized on the 19th of September, 1895, delegates were present from every one of the provinces. The *personnel* of the new government is thus given by Mr. Fidel G. Pierra:

“President—Salvador Cisneros Betancourt of Puerto Principe; Vice President—Bartolomé Masó of Manzanillo; Secretary of War—Carlos Roloff of Santa Clara; Assistant Secretary of War—Mario Menocal of Matanzas; Secretary of Foreign Affairs—Rafael Portuondo y Tamayo of Santiago de Cuba; Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs—Fermin Valdés Dominigues of Havana; Secretary of the Treasury—Severo

Pina of Sancti Spiritu; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury—Joaquin Castillo Duany of Santiago de Cuba; Secretary of the Interior—Santiago Cañizares of Remedios; Assistant Secretary of the Interior—Carlos Dubois of Baracoa; General in Chief of the Army—Maximo Gomez; Lieutenant General—Antonio Maceo.

“Who are these gentlemen? I will tell you.

“The President is the ex-Marquis of Santa Lucia of Puerto Principe, a member of one of the most distinguished families of the Island for social rank, wealth, and talents. During the last seventy-five years you will find more than one Cisneros and more than one Betancourt who has attained distinction as lawyer, journalist, civil engineer, botanist, and also in other departments of science and art. The ex-Marquis of Santa Lucia, now President of the republic, formally renounced his title of nobility when he joined the revolution in 1868, and lost his estates, which were then confiscated by the Spanish Government. An insignificant part of them was turned over to him after the peace of 1878.

“Bartolomé Masó, the Vice President, a

native of Manzanillo, is a tried patriot, who has rendered valuable services to our cause. A sincere republican, he has always been highly respected and esteemed for his liberal ideas and his sterling character.

“General Carlos Roloff, Secretary of War, was born in Poland, but came to Cuba when a mere youth and established himself at Cienfuegos, where he attained quite a distinguished position for his intelligence, industry, and integrity. In 1869, at the head of quite a number of young men from the most prominent families of the city, he joined the revolution, and until the end of the war in 1878 occupied the first rank, both for his bravery and his military talents.

“The Assistant Secretary of War, Mario Menocal, belongs to one of the best families of Matanzas, and is a relative of one of the members of the Corps of Civil Engineers of the United States whose name is so well known in connection with the Nicaragua Canal.

“Rafael Portuondo y Tamayo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, is a distinguished member of one of the most prominent families of Santiago de Cuba, both for social rank and

wealth, no less than for the talents of some of the individuals belonging to it, who have distinguished themselves in the liberal professions.

“Fermin Valdes Dominguez, Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs, is a well-known physician of Havana, who, when the students of the university of that city, his companions, were butchered by the Volunteers, was sent to the penal colony of Ceuta, and was set at liberty after the peace.

“Severo Pina, Secretary of the Treasury, is a prominent citizen of Sancti Spiritu. He belongs to an old and wealthy family. Joaquin Castillo Duany, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, is a gentleman not unknown in this country, having been one of the physicians who took part in the Jeannette Relief Expedition to the North Pole. No names stand higher in Santiago de Cuba for wealth and respectability than those of Duany and Castillo. Santiago Cañizares, Secretary of the Interior, is as prominent a citizen of Remedios as the others are of those cities which I have mentioned.

“The General in Chief, Maximo Gomez, although born in Santo Domingo, is as

much a Cuban in feelings, ideas, and aspirations as the best of us. As to his military talents, I will say nothing, for they are too well-known.

“Antonio Maceo, the Lieutenant General, is a colored man; a perfect gentleman, and a man of more than common attainments, which he owes to his own efforts. He is in the fullest sense of the term a self-made man of uncommon intellectual powers and a most sterling character. He fought during the Ten Years' War, and was successively promoted for his bravery and remarkable military abilities from a common soldier to a Major General. As a proof of the former he can show in his body twenty-one wounds by bullet and by sword, while in support of the latter he can refer to the many times that he has routed the Spanish troops, even under the command of General Martinez Campos himself, and to the testimony of this latter and of General Mella, who have been compelled to acknowledge the merit of Maceo as a tactician.

“As an indication of the respect and esteem in which he is held by the Cubans I mention the fact that all the members of his

staff are white, and some of them are men of distinction in the various professions and belong to the best families of the island."

Another potent organization in behalf of the struggling Cubans was founded by José Martí, and included the different political clubs in the United States, which elected the delegate and treasurer of the party, while the presidents of all the clubs form a council.

A common mistake of the newspapers and public is to refer to this organization as the Cuban "Junta." There is no Junta in this country. The highest officer is Delegate Tomas Estrada Palma, whose proper title is "Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States and President of the Cuban Revolutionary Party."

The Cubans in the United States contributed liberally to the cause of their countrymen. Some twenty thousand gave ten per cent. of their wages and the entire product of a day's labor each week. In this way one hundred thousand dollars was collected each month.

The fighting in Cuba went on in the usual manner. There was continual skirmishing, the conflicts sometimes rising almost to the

dignity of battles, great cruelty and an appalling destruction of property. Railway operations were brought almost to a standstill; bridges were burned, engines derailed, tracks torn up, and the trains fired upon as soon as they were fairly started from Havana. When necessary to send out cars they were preceded for the distance of half mile by a pilot engine, which had to run the risk of gunpowder and dynamite. The cars themselves were armored with iron sheathing, so that they suggested armored cruisers traveling over the country on wheels.

The Cubans attested their devotion to their cause by a relentless destruction of their own property. The sugar-cane crop was burned, the tobacco uprooted, and where a building promised to give shelter to their enemies, the torch was applied. They steadily gained ground, but, for reasons already given, it was impossible to secure a decisive advantage, since there was no means of operating against the powerful fleet nor of capturing so strongly a fortified city as Havana, the metropolis of the island.

CHAPTER IX.

A Powerful Appeal—Manifesto of the Cuban Revolutionary Party to the People of the United States of America.

THE Cuban struggle for independence now being fairly launched, its friends and supporters were anxious to set themselves right before the world. They knew that no promise or pledge of Spain could be relied upon, for the test had been made many times only to have the fruit turn to ashes before their eyes. Where the substance was promised, they obtained only the shadow; he who leaned upon the most solemn pledge of the mother country found it but a broken reed.

It was idle to appeal to the nations of the Old World. Self-interest forbade them to interfere, and, if they had any help to give, it would be in behalf of the oppressor and not the oppressed.

To whom, then, should the struggling patriots look? What strong hand could help

them, if only the power could be persuaded to stretch forth that hand? There was but one: the United States of America.

Their forefathers had fought, bled, and died that their children might enjoy the blessings of liberty. They had always extended their sympathy to struggling patriots everywhere. Though the Government had not acted officially in behalf of the Cubans, yet the American people had given many proofs of their friendship and good wishes. They had broken their own laws that they might send arms and munitions of war to those in sore need of them. There were many active friends, too, in Congress who plead eloquently for the granting of belligerent rights to the Cubans, even if their independence could not be recognized. To the United States, therefore, the Cubans issued their appeal or manifesto, October 23, 1895, through Enrique José Varona, ex-Deputy to the Spanish Cortes, in the following forceful words:

“War is a dire necessity. But when a people has exhausted all human means of persuasion to obtain from an unjust op-

pressor a remedy for its ills, if it appeals as a last resource to force,—in order to repel the persistent aggression which constitutes tyranny—this people is justified before its own conscience and before the tribunal of nations.

“Such is the case of Cuba in its wars against Spain. No metropolis has ever been harsher or more obstinately harassing; none has ever exploited a colony with more greediness and less foresight than Spain. No colony has ever been more prudent, more long-suffering, more cautious, more persevering than Cuba in its purpose of asking for its rights by appealing to the lessons of experience and political wisdom. Only driven by desperation has the people of Cuba taken up arms, and having done so, it displays as much heroism in the hour of danger as it had shown good judgment in the hour of deliberation.

“The history of Cuba during the present century is a long series of rebellions; but every one of these was preceded by a peaceful struggle for its rights—a fruitless struggle because of the obstinate blindness of Spain.

“There were patriots in Cuba from the beginning of this century, such as Presbyter

Caballero and Don Francisco Arango, who called the metropolitan government's attention to the evils of the colony, and pointed to the remedy by pleading for the commercial franchises required by its economical organization, and for the intervention of the natives in its government, not only as a right but also for political expediency, in view of the long distance between the colony and the home Government, and the grave difficulties with which it had to contend. The requirements of the war with the continental colonies, which were tired of Spanish tyranny, compelled the metropolitan Government to grant a certain measure of commercial liberty to the Island of Cuba; a temporary concession which spread prosperity throughout its territory, but which was not sufficient to open the eyes of the Spanish statesmen. On the contrary, prompted by suspicion and mistrust of the Americans, they began by curtailing, and shortly after abrogated the limited administrative powers then possessed by some of the corporations in Cuba, such as the 'Junta de Fomento'—(a board for the encouragement of internal improvements).

“As if this were not enough, the Cubans were deprived of the little show of political intervention they had in public affairs. By a simple Royal Decree in 1837 the small representation of Cuba in the Spanish Cortes was suppressed, and all the powers of the government were concentrated in the hands of the Capitan General, on whom authority was conferred to act as the governor of a city in a state of siege. This implied that the Capitan General, residing in Havana, was master of the life and property of every inhabitant of the Island of Cuba. This meant that Spain declared a permanent state of war against a peaceful and defenseless people.

“Cuba saw its most illustrious sons, such as Heredia and Saco, wander in exile throughout the free American Continent. Cuba saw as many of the Cubans as dared to love liberty and declare it by act or word, die on the scaffold, such as Joaquin de Agüero and Plácido. Cuba saw the product of its people’s labor confiscated by iniquitous fiscal laws imposed by its masters from afar. Cuba saw the administration of justice in the hands of foreign magistrates, who acted at the will or the whim of its rulers. Cuba

suffered all the outrages that can humiliate a conquered people, in the name and by the work of a government that sarcastically calls itself paternal. Is it to be wondered, then, that an uninterrupted era of conspiracies and uprising should have been inaugurated? Cuba in its despair took up arms in 1850 and 1851, conspired again in 1855, waged war in 1868, in 1879, in 1885, and is fighting now, since the 24th of February of the present year.

“But at the same time Cuba has never ceased to ask for justice and redress. Its people, before shouldering the rifle, pleaded for their rights. Before the pronunciamiento of Agüero and the invasions of López, Saco, in exile, exposed the dangers of Cuba to the Spanish statesmen, and pointed to the remedy. Other far-sighted men seconded him in the colony. They denounced the cancer of slavery, the horrors of the traffic in slaves, the corruption of the office-holders, the abuses of the Government, the discontent of the people with their forced state of political tutelage. No attention was given to them, and this brought on the first armed conflicts.

“Before the formidable insurrection of

1868, which lasted ten years, the reform party, which included the most enlightened, wealthy, and influential Cubans, exhausted all the resources within their reach to induce Spain to initiate a healthy change in her Cuban policy. The party started the publication of periodicals in Madrid and in the Island, addressed petitions, maintained a great agitation throughout the country, and having succeeded in leading the Spanish Government to make an inquiry into the economical, political, and social condition of Cuba, they presented a complete plan of government which satisfied public requirements as well as the aspirations of the people. The Spanish Government disdainfully cast aside the proposition as useless, increased taxation, and proceeded to its exaction with extreme severity.

“It was then that the Ten-Year War broke out. Cuba, almost a pygmy compared with Spain, fought like a giant. Blood ran in torrents. Public wealth disappeared in a bottomless abyss. Spain lost 200,000 men. Whole districts of Cuba were left almost entirely without their male population. Seven hundred millions were spent to feed

that conflagration—a conflagration that tested Cuban heroism, but which could not touch the hardened heart of Spain. The latter could not subdue the bleeding colony, which had no longer strength to prolong the struggle with any prospect of success. Spain proposed a compact, which was a snare and a deceit. She granted to Cuba the liberties of Puerto Rico, which enjoyed none.

“On this deceitful ground was laid the new situation, throughout which has run a current of falsehood and hypocrisy. Spain, whose mind had not changed, hastened to change the name of things. The Capitan General was called Governor General. The royal decrees took the name of authorizations. The commercial monopoly of Spain was named coasting trade. The right of banishment was transformed into the law of vagrancy. The brutal attacks on defenseless citizens were called ‘componte.’ The abolition of constitutional guarantees became the law of public order. Taxation without the consent or knowledge of the Cuban people was changed into the law of estimates (budget) voted by the representatives of Spain, that is, of European Spain.

“The painful lesson of the Ten-Year War had been entirely lost on Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeeming policy that would heal the recent wounds, allay public anxiety, and quench the thirst for justice felt by the people, who were desirous to enjoy their natural rights, the metropolis, while lavish in promises of reform, persisted in carrying on unchanged its old and crafty system, the groundwork of which continues to be the same, namely: To exclude every native Cuban from every office that could give him any effective influence and intervention in public affairs; the ungovernable exploitation of the colonists’ labor for the benefit of Spanish commerce and Spanish bureaucracy, both civil and military. To carry out the latter purpose it was necessary to maintain the former at any cost.

“In order to render the native Cuban powerless in his own country, Spain, legislating for Cuba without restriction, as it does, had only to give him an electoral law so artfully framed as to accomplish two objects: First, to reduce the number of voters; second, to give always a majority to the Spaniards, that is, to the European colonists, notwithstanding

that the latter represent only 9.3 per cent. of the total population of Cuba. To this effect it made the electoral right dependent on the payment of a very high poll tax, which proved the more burdensome as the war had ruined the larger number of Cuban proprietors. In this way it succeeded in restricting the right of suffrage to only 53,000 inhabitants in an island which has a population of 1,600,000; that is to say, to the derisive proportion of 3 per cent. of the total number of inhabitants.

“In order to give a decided preponderance to the Spanish European element, the electoral law has ignored the practice generally observed in those countries where the right to vote depends on the payment of a poll tax, and has afforded all the facilities to acquire the electoral privilege to industry, commerce, and public officials, to the detriment of the territorial property (the ownership of real estate). To accomplish this, while the rate of the territorial tax is reduced to 2 per cent., an indispensable measure, in view of the ruinous condition of the land-owners, the exorbitant contribution of \$25 is required from those who would be electors as

free-holders. The law has, moreover, thrown the doors wide open for the perpetration of fraud by providing that the simple declaration of the head of a commercial house is sufficient to consider all its employees as partners, having, therefore, the right to vote. This has given us firms with thirty or more partners. By this simple scheme almost all the Spaniards residing in Cuba are turned into electors, despite the explicit provisions of the law. Thus it comes to pass that the municipal district of Guines, with a population of 13,000 inhabitants, only 500 of whom are Spaniards and Canary Islanders, shows on its electoral list the names of 32 native Cubans and of 400 Spaniards—only 0.25 per cent. of the Cuban to 80 per cent. of the Spanish population!

“But, as if this were not enough, a so-called Permanent Commission of Provincial Deputations decides every controversy that may arise as to who is to be included in or excluded from the list of electors, and the members of this Commission are appointed by the Governor General. It is unnecessary to say that its majority has always been devoted to the Government. In case any elector con-

siders himself wronged by the decision of the Permanent Commission, he can appeal to the 'Audiencia' (higher court) of the district; but the 'Audiencias' are almost entirely made up of European magistrates; they are subject to the authority of the Governor General, being mere political tools in his hands. As a conclusive instance of the manner in which those tribunals do justice to the claims of the Cuban electors, it will be sufficient to cite a case which occurred in Santa Clara in 1892, where one thousand fully qualified liberal electors were excluded at one time, for the simple omission to state their names at the end of the act presented by the elector who headed the claim. In more than one case has the same 'Audiencia' applied two different criterions to identical cases. The 'Audiencia' of Havana in 1887, ignoring the explicit provisions of the law, excused the employees from the condition of residence, a condition that the same tribunal exacted before. The same 'Audiencia' in 1885 declared that the contributions to the State and to the Municipality were accumulative, and in 1887 decided the opposite. This inconsistency had for its object to expunge from the lists hun-

dreds of Cuban electors. In this way the Spanish Government and tribunals have endeavored to teach respect for the law and for the practice of wholesome electoral customs to the Cuban colonists !

“It will be easily understood now why on some occasions the Cuban representation in the Spanish Parliament has been made up of only three deputies, and in the most favorable epochs the number of Cuban representatives has not exceeded six. Three deputies in a body of four hundred and thirty members ! The genuine representation of Cuba has not reached sometimes 0.96 per cent. of the total number of members of the Spanish Congress. The great majority of the Cuban deputation has always consisted of Spanish Peninsulars. In this manner, the ministers of ‘Ultramar’ (ministers of the colonies), whenever they have thought necessary to give an honest or decent appearance to their legislative acts by an alleged majority of Cuban votes, could always command the latter, that is, the Peninsulars.

“As regards the representation in the Senate, the operation has been more simple

still. The qualifications required to be a Senator have proved to be an almost absolute prohibition to the Cubans. In fact, to take a seat in the higher house, it is necessary to have been president of that body or of Congress, or a minister of the crown, or a bishop, or a grandee of Spain, a lieutenant general, a vice admiral, ambassador, minister plenipotentiary, counselor of State, judge or attorney general of the Supreme Court, of the Court of Accounts, etc. No Cuban has ever filled any of the above positions, and scarcely two or three are grandees. The only natives of Cuba who can be Senators are those who have been deputies in three different Congresses, or who are professors and have held for four years a university chair, provided that they have an income of \$1500; or those who have a title of nobility, or have been deputies, provincial deputies, or mayors in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, if they have in addition an income of \$4000, or pay a direct contribution of \$800 to the Treasury. This will increase in one or two dozen the number of Cubans qualified to be Senators.

“In this manner has legislative work, as

far as Cuba is concerned, turned out to be a farce. The various governments have legislated for the Island as they pleased. The representatives of the Peninsular provinces did not even take the trouble of attending the sessions of the Cortes when Cuban affairs were to be dealt with; and there was an instance when the estimates (budget) for the Great Antille were discussed in the presence of less than thirty deputies, and a single one of the ministers, the minister of 'Ultramar' (session of April 3, 1880).

"Through the contrivance of the law, as well as through the irregularities committed and consented to in its application, have the Cubans been deprived also of representation in the local corporations to which they were entitled, and in many cases they have been entirely excluded from them. When, despite the legalized obstacles and the partiality of those in power, they have obtained some temporary majority, the Government has always endeavored and succeeded in making their triumph null and void. Only once did the home-rule party obtain a majority in the Provincial deputation of Havana, and then

the Governor General appointed from among the Spaniards a majority of the members of the Permanent Commission. Until that time this Commission had been of the same political complexion as the majority of the Deputation. By such proceedings have the Cubans been gradually expelled, even from the municipal bodies. Suffice it to say that the law provided that the *derramas* (assessments) be excluded from the computation of the tributary quotas, notwithstanding that they constitute the heaviest burden upon the municipal tax-payer. And the majorities, consisting of Spaniards, take good care to make this burden fall with heavier weight upon the Cuban proprietor. Thus the latter has to bear a heavier taxation with less representation.

“This is the reason why the scandalous case has occurred lately of not a single Cuban having a seat in the ‘Ayuntamiento’ (Board of Aldermen) of Havana. In 1891 the Spaniards predominated in thirty-one out of thirty-seven ‘Ayuntamientos’ in the province of Havana. In that of Güines, with a population of 12,500 Cuban inhabitants, not a single one of the latter was

found among its councilors. In the same epoch there were only three Cuban deputies in the Provincial Deputation of Havana; two in that of Matanzas, and three in that of Santa Clara. And these are the most populous regions in the Island of Cuba.

“As, on the other hand, the Government of the metropolis appoints the officials of the colony, all the lucrative, influential, and representative offices are secured to the Spaniards from Europe. The Governor General, the regional and provincial governors, the ‘intendentes,’ comptrollers, auditors, treasurers, chiefs of communications, chiefs of the customhouses, chiefs of administration, presidents and vice presidents of the Spanish Bank, secretaries of the Government, presiding judges of the ‘Audiencia,’ presidents of tribunal, magistrates, attorneys general, archbishops, bishops, canons, pastors of rich parishes—all, with very rare exceptions, are Spaniards from Spain. The Cubans are found only as minor clerks in the government offices, doing all the work and receiving the smallest salaries.

“From 1878 to this date there have been twenty governors in the province of Matan-

zas. Eighteen were Spaniards and two Cubans. But one of these, Brigadier General Acosta, was an army officer in the service of Spain, who had fought against his countrymen; and the other, Señor González Muñoz, is a bureaucrat. During the same period there has been only one native Cuban acting as governor in the province of Havana, Señor Rodríguez Batista, who spent all his life in Spain, where he made his administrative career. In the other provinces there has never been a single governor born in the country.

"In 1887 there was created a council or board of Ultramar under the Minister of the Colonies. Not a single Cuban has ever been found among its members. On the other hand, such men as Generals Armiñan and Pando have held positions in it.

"The predominance of the Government goes farther still. It weighs with all its might upon the local corporations. There are deputations in the provinces, and not only are their powers restricted and their resources scanty, but the Governor General appoints their presidents and all the members of the permanent commissions. There are 'Ayunta-

mientos' elected in accordance with the reactionary law of 1877, restricted and curtailed as applied to Cuba by Señor Canovas. But the Governor General appoints the mayors, who may not belong to the corporation, and the governor of the province appoints the secretaries. The Government reserves, moreover, the right to remove the mayors, of replacing them, and of suspending the councilors and the 'Ayuntamientos,' partly or in a body. It has frequently made use of this right, for electoral purposes, to the detriment always of the Cubans.

"As may be seen, the crafty policy of Spain has closed every avenue through which redress might be obtained. All the powers are centered in the Government of Madrid and its delegates in the colony; and, in order to give her despotism a slight varnish of a representative régime, she has contrived with her laws to secure complaisant majorities in the pseudo-elective bodies. To accomplish this purpose she has relied upon the European immigrants, who have always supported the Government of the metropolis, in exchange for lasting privileges. The existence of a Spanish party, as that of an English party at

one time in Canada, has been the foundation of Spanish rule in Cuba. Thus, through the instrumentality of the laws and the Government, a régime of castes has been enthroned there, with its outcome of monopolies, corruption, immorality, and hatred. The political contest there, far from being the fruitful clash of opposite ideas, or the opposition of men representing different tendencies but all seeking a social improvement, has been only a struggle between hostile factions, the conflict between infuriated foes, which precedes an open war. The Spanish resident has always seen a threat in the most timid protest of the Cuban—an attack upon the privileged position on which his fortune, his influence, and his power are grounded; and he is always willing to stifle it with insult and persecution.

“What use the Spanish Government has made of this power is apparent in the three-fold spoliation to which it has submitted the Island of Cuba. Spain has not, in fact, a colonial policy. In the distant lands she has subdued by force Spain has sought nothing but immediate riches, and these she has wrung by might from the compulsory labor of the natives. For this reason Spain to-day in Cuba

is only a parasite. Spain exploits the Island of Cuba through her fiscal régime, through her commercial régime, and through her bureaucratic régime. These are the three forms of official spoliation; but they are not the only forms of spoliation.

“When the war of 1878 came to an end, two-thirds of the Island were completely ruined. The other third, the population of which had remained peaceful, was abundantly productive; but it had to face the great economical change involved in the impending abolition of slavery. Slavery had received its deathblow at the hands of the insurrection, and Cuban insurrectionists succeeded at the close of the war in securing its eventual abolition. Evidently it would have been a wholesome and provident policy to lighten the fiscal burdens of a country in such a condition. Spain was only bent on making Cuba pay the cost of the war. The metropolis overwhelmed the colony with enormous budgets, reaching as high a figure as forty-six million dollars, and this only to cover the obligations of the state; or rather, to fill up the unfathomable gulf left by the wastefulness and plunder of the civil and military admin-

istration during the years of war, and to meet the expenses of the military occupation of the country. Here follow a few figures: The Budget for the fiscal year of 1878 to 1879 amounted to \$46,594,000; that of 1879 to 1880 to an equal sum; that of 1882 to 1883 to \$35,860,000; that of 1883 to 1884 to \$34,180,000; that of 1884 to 1885 to the same sum; that of 1885 to 1886 to \$34,169,000. For the remaining years to the present time, the amount of the budget has been about \$26,000,000, this being the figure for 1893 to 1894, and to be the same by prorogation for the current fiscal year.

“The gradual reduction that may be noted was not the result of a desire to reduce the overwhelming burdens that weigh upon the country; it was imposed by necessity. Cuba was not able by far to meet such a monstrous exaction. It was a continuous and threatening deficit that imposed these reductions. In the first of the above named years the revenue was \$8,000,000 short of the budget or appropriations. In the second year the deficit reached the sum of \$20,000,000. In 1883 it was nearly \$10,000,000. In the following years the deficit averaged nearly

\$4,500,000. At present the accumulated amount of all these deficits reaches the sum of \$100,000,000.

“As a consequence of such a reckless and senseless financial course, the debt of Cuba has been increased to a fabulous sum. In 1868 we owed \$25,000,000. When the present war broke out our debt, it was calculated, reached the net sum of \$190,000,000. On the 31st of July of the current year the Island of Cuba was reckoned to owe \$295,707,264 in bulk. Considering its population, the debt of Cuba exceeds that of all the other American countries, including the United States. The interest on this debt imposes a burden of \$9.79 on each inhabitant. The French people, the most overburdened in this respect, owes only \$6.30 per inhabitant.

“This enormous debt, contracted and saddled upon the country without its knowledge; this heavy load that grinds it and does not permit its people to capitalize their income, to foster its improvements, or even to entertain its industries, constitutes one of the most iniquitous forms of spoliation the Island has to bear. In it are included a

debt of Spain to the United States ; the expenses incurred by Spain when she occupied San Domingo ; those for the invasion of Mexico in alliance with France and England ; the expenditures for her hostilities against Peru ; the money advanced to the Spanish Treasury during its recent Carlist wars ; and all that Spain has spent to uphold its domination in Cuba and to cover the lavish expenditures of its administration since 1868. Not a cent of this enormous sum has been spent in Cuba to advance the work of improvement and civilization. It has not contributed to build a single kilometer of highways or of railroad, or to erect a single lighthouse, or deepen a single port ; it has not built one asylum or opened one public school. Such a heavy burden has been left to the future generations, without a single compensation or benefit.

“But the naked figures of the Cuban budgets and of the Cuban debt tell very little in regard to their true importance and signification as machines to squeeze out the substance of a people’s labor. It is necessary to examine closer the details of these accounts and expenditures.

“Those of Cuba, according to the last budgets or appropriations, amount to \$26,-411,314, distributed as follows :

General obligations,	\$12,884,549.55
Department of Justice (courts, etc.),	1,006,308.51
Department of War,	5,918,598.16
Department of the Treasury,	727,892.45
Department of the Navy,	1,091,969.65
Government, Administration,	4,035,071.43
Interior Improvements (Fomento),	746,925.15

“There are in Cuba 1,631,687 inhabitants, according to the last census, that of 1887. That is to say, that this budget burdens them in the proportion of \$16.18 for each inhabitant. The Spaniards in Spain pay only 42.06 pesetas per head. Reducing the Cuban dollars to pesetas at the exchange rate of 95 dollars for 500 pesetas, there results that the Cubans have to pay a tribute of 85.16 pesetas for each inhabitant; more than double the amount a Spaniard has to pay in his European country.

“As shown above, most of this excessive burden is to cover entirely unproductive expenditures. The debt consumes 40.89 per cent. of the total amount. The defense of the country against its own native inhabit-

ants, the only enemies who threaten Spain, including the cost of the army, the navy, the civil guard, and the guardians of public order, takes 36.59 per cent. There remains for all the other expenditures required by civilized life 22.52 per cent. And of this percentage the State reserves to us—what a liberality—2.75 per cent. to prepare for the future and develop the resources of the country !

“Let us see now what Spain has done to permit at least the development of natural wealth and the industry of a country impoverished by this fiscal régime, the work of cupidity, incompetency, and immorality. Let us see whether that nation has left at least some vitality to Cuba, in order to continue exploiting it with some profit.

“The economical organization of Cuba is of the simplest kind. It produces to export, and imports almost everything it consumes. In view of this, it is evident that all that Cuba required from the state was that it should not hamper its work with excessive burdens, nor hinder its commercial relations; so that she could buy cheap where it suited her, and sell her products with profit. Spain has

done all the contrary. She has treated the tobacco as an enemy; she has loaded the sugar with excessive imposts; she has shackled with excessive and abusive excise duties the cattle-raising industry; and with her legislative doings and undos she has thrown obstacles in the way of the mining industry. And to cap the climax, she has tightly bound Cuba in the network of a monstrous tariff and a commercial legislation which subjects the colony, at the end of the nineteenth century, to the ruinous monopoly of the producers and merchants of certain regions of Spain, as in the halcyon days of the colonial compact.

“The district which produces the best tobacco in the world, the famous Vuelta Abajo, lacks every means of transportation afforded by civilization, to foster and increase the value of its products. No roads, no bridges, or even ports are found there. The state in Cuba collects the taxes, but does not invest them for the benefit of any industry. On the other hand, those foreign countries desirous of acquiring the rich tobacco-raising industry have closed their markets to our privileged product, by im-

posing upon it excessive import duties, while the Spanish Government burdens its exportation from our ports with a duty of \$1.80 on every thousand cigars. Is this not a stroke of actual insanity?

“Everybody is aware of the tremendous crisis through which the sugar industry has been passing for some years, owing to the rapid development of the production of this article everywhere. Every government has hastened to protect its own by more or less empirical measures. This is not the place to judge them. What is important is to recall the fact that they have endeavored to place the threatened industry in the best condition to withstand the competition. What has Spain done in order, if not to maintain the strong position held before by Cuba, at least to enable the colony to carry on the competition with its every day more formidable rivals? Spain pays bounties to the sugar produced within its own territory, and closes its markets to the Cuban sugar, by imposing upon it an import duty of \$6.20 per hundred kilograms. It has been calculated that a hundredweight of Cuban sugar is overburdened, when reaching the Barcelona market,

with 143 per cent. of its value. The Spanish Government oppresses the Cuban producer with every kind of exactions; taxes the introduction of the machinery that is indispensable for the production of sugar, obstructs its transportation by imposing heavy taxes on the railroads, and winds up the work by exacting another contribution called industrial duty, and still another for loading or shipping, which is equivalent to an export duty.

“As a last stroke, Spain has re-enforced the commercial laws of June 30 and July 20, 1882, virtually closing the ports of Cuba to foreign commerce, and establishing the monopoly of the Peninsular producers, without any compensation to the colony. The apparent object of these laws was to establish the ‘cabotaje’ (coasting trade) between Cuba and Spain. By the former all the Cuban products were admitted free of duty in the Spanish Peninsula; excepting, however, the tobacco, rum, sugar, cocoa, and coffee, which remained *temporarily* burdened. By the latter the duties on the importations from Spain in Cuba were to be gradually reduced through a period of ten years, until, in 1892,

they were entirely abolished. The result, however, has been that the *temporary* duties on the principal, almost the only, Cuban products have remained undisturbed until now, and the duties on the Spanish products have disappeared. The 'cabotaje' (coasting trade) is carried on from Spain to Cuba, but not from Cuba to Spain. The Spanish products pay no duties in Cuba; the Cuban products pay heavy duties in Spain. As at the same time the differential tariffs which overburdened with excessive duties the foreign products have been retained, the unavoidable consequence has been to give the Cuban market entirely to the Peninsular producers. In order to have an idea as to how far the monopoly of Spain goes, it will be sufficient to point to the fact that the burdens which many of the foreign articles have to bear exceed 2000 and even 2300 per cent., as compared with those borne by the Spanish products. One hundred kilograms of cotton prints pay a duty, if Spanish, of \$26.65; if foreign, \$47.26. One hundred kilograms of knitted goods pay, if from Spain, \$10.95; if from a foreign country, \$195. One thousand kilograms of bags for sugar, when they are or are represented to be

Spanish, pay \$4.69; if from other country \$82.50. One hundred kilograms of cassimere, if it is a Spanish product, pay \$15.47; if foreign, \$300.

"Still, if Spain was a flourishing industrial country, and produced the principal articles required by Cuba for the consumption of its people, or for developing and fostering its industries, the evil, although always great, would be a lesser one. But everybody knows the backwardness of the Spanish industries and the inability of Spain to supply Cuba with the products she requires for her consumption and industries. The Cubans have to consume or use Spanish articles of inferior quality, or pay exorbitant prices for foreign goods. The Spanish merchants have found, moreover, a new source of fraud in the application of these antiquated and iniquitous laws; it consists in nationalizing foreign products for importation into Cuba.

"As the mainspring of this senseless commercial policy is to support the monopoly of Spanish commerce, when Spain has been compelled to deviate from it to a certain extent by an international treaty, it has done so reluctantly, and in the anxious expectation of

an opportunity to nullify its own promises. This explains the accidental history of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, which was received with joy by Cuba, obstructed by the Spanish administration, and prematurely abolished by the Spanish Government as soon as it saw an opportunity.

“The injury done to Cuba, and the evil effects produced by this commercial legislation, are beyond calculation; its effects have been material losses which engendered profound discontent. The ‘Circulo de Hacendados y Agricultores,’ the wealthiest corporation of the Island, last year passed judgment on these commercial laws in the following severe terms :

“‘It would be impossible to explain, should the attempt be made, what is the signification of the present commercial laws, as regards any economical or political plan or system; because, economically, they aim at the destruction of public wealth, and, politically, they are the cause of *inextinguishable discontent*, and contain *the germs of grave dissensions*.’

“But Spain has not taken heed of this; her only care has been to keep the producers

and merchants of such rebellious provinces as Catalonia contented, and to satisfy its military men and bureaucrats.

“For the latter is reserved the best part of the booty taken from Cuba. High salaries and the power of extortion for the office-holders sent to the colony; regular tributes for the politicians who uphold them in the metropolis. The Governor General is paid a salary of \$50,000, in addition to a palace, a country house as a summer resort, servants, coaches, and a fund for secret expenses at his disposal. The Director General of the Treasury receives a salary of \$18,500. The Archbishop of Santiago and the Bishop of Havana, \$18,000 each. The Commander General of the ‘Apostadero’ (naval station), \$16,392. The General Segundo Cabo (second in command of the Island), and the President of the ‘Audiencia,’ \$15,000 each. The Governor of Havana and the Secretary of the General Government, \$8000 each. The Postmaster General, \$5000. The Collector of the Havana Customhouse, \$4000. The Manager of Lotteries, the same salary. The Chief Clerks of Administration of the first class receive \$5000 each; those of the second class, \$4000, and

those of the third class \$3000 each. The major generals are paid \$7500; the brigadier generals, \$4500, and when in command \$5000; the colonels, \$3450; and this salary is increased when they are in command of a regiment. The captains of 'navío' (the largest men-of-war) receive \$6300; the captains of frigate, \$4560; the lieutenants of 'navío' of the first class, \$3370. All these functionaries are entitled to free lodgings and domestic servants. Then follows the numberless crowd of minor officials, all well provided for, and with great facilities better to provide themselves.

"At the office of the Minister of 'Ultramar' (of the Colonies), who resides in Madrid, and to whom \$96,800 a year are assigned from the treasury of Cuba—at that office begins the saturnalia in which the Spanish bureaucrats indulge with the riches of Cuba. Sometimes through incapacity, but more frequently for plunder, the money exacted from the Cuban taxpayers is unscrupulously and irresponsibly squandered. It has been demonstrated that the debt of Cuba has been increased to \$50,232,500 through Minister Fabié's incapacity. At the time this minis-

ter was in power the Spanish Bank disposed of twenty millions from the Cuban treasury, which were to be carried in account current at the disposal of the Minister for the famous operation of withdrawing the paper currency. Cuba paid the interest on these millions, and continued paying it all the time they were utilized by the bank. Minister Romero Robledo took at one time (in 1892) one million dollars belonging to the treasury of Cuba from the vaults of the Bank of Spain, and lent it to the Transatlantic Company, of which he was a stockholder. This was done in defiance of law, and without any authorization whatever. The Minister was threatened with prosecution; but he haughtily replied that, if prosecuted, all his predecessors, from every political party, would have to accompany him to the court. That threat came to nothing.

“In June of 1890 there was a scandalous debate in the Spanish Cortes, in which some of the frauds committed upon the Cuban treasury were, not for the first time, brought to light. It was then made public that \$6,500,000 had been abstracted from the ‘Caja de Depósitos,’ notwithstanding that

the safe was locked with three keys, and each one was in the possession of a different functionary. Then it was known that, under the pretext of false vouchers for transportation and fictitious bills for provisions, during the previous war, defalcations had been found afterward amounting to \$22,811,516. In the month of March of the same year General Pando affirmed that the robberies committed through the issue of warrants by the 'Junta de la Deuda' (Board of Public Debt) exceeded the sum of \$12,000,000.

"These are only a few of the most salient facts. The large number of millions mentioned above represents only an insignificant part of what a venal administration, sure of impunity, exacts from Cuban labor. The network of artful schemes to cheat the Cuban taxpayer and defraud the state covers everything. Falsification of documents, embezzlement of revenues, bargains with delinquent debtors, exaction of higher dues from inexperienced peasants, delays in the dispatch of judicial proceedings in order to obtain a more or less considerable gratuity; such are the artful means daily employed to empty the purse of the taxpayer and to divert

the public funds into the pockets of the functionaries.

“These disgraceful transactions have more than once been brought out to light; more than once have the prevaricators been pointed out. Is there any record of any of them having ever been punished?

“In August of 1887 General Marin entered the Customhouse of Havana at the head of a military force, besieged and occupied it, investigated the operations carried on there, and discharged every employee. The act caused a great stir, but not a single one of the officials was indicted or suffered a further punishment. There were in 1891 three hundred and fifty officials indicted in Cuba for committing fraud; not one of them was punished.

“But how could they be punished? Every official who comes to Cuba has an influential patron in the Court of Madrid, for whose protection he pays with regularity. This is a public secret. General Salamanca gave it out in plain words, and before and after General Salamanca all Spain knew and knows it. The political leaders are well known who draw the highest income from the office-

holders of Cuba, who are, as a matter of course, the most fervent advocates of the necessity of Spanish rule in Cuba. But Spanish bureaucracy is, moreover, so deep-rooted in Spain, that it has succeeded in shielding itself even against the action of the courts of justice. There is a royal decree (that of 1882) in force in Cuba, which provides that the ordinary courts cannot take cognizance of such offenses as defalcation, abstraction, or malversation of public funds, forgery, etc., committed by officials of the administration, if their guilt is not first established by an administrative investigation. The administration is, therefore, its own judge. What further security does the corrupt office-holder need?


“We have shown that, notwithstanding the promises of Spain and the ostensible changes introduced in the government of Cuba since 1878, the Spaniards from Europe have governed and ruled exclusively in Cuba, and have continued exploiting it until they have ruined the country. Can this tyrannical system be justified by any kind of benefits that might compensate for the deprivation of actual power of which the natives of the

colony complain? More than one despotic government has tried to justify itself with the material prosperity it has fostered, or with the safety it has secured to its citizens, or with the liberty it has given to certain manifestations of civilized life. Let us see whether the Cubans are indebted to the iron government of Spain for any of these compensating blessings.

“Personal safety is a myth among us. Outlaws, as well as men of law, have disposed at will of the property, the peace, and the life of the inhabitants of Cuba. The civil guard (armed police), far from being the guardians, have been the terror of the Cuban peasants. Wherever they pass they cause an alarm by the brutal ill-treatment to which they submit the inhabitants, who, in many cases, fly from their homes at their approach. Under the most trifling pretext they beat unmercifully the defenseless countrymen, and very frequently they have killed those they were conveying under arrest. These outrages became so notorious that the commander-in-chief of the civil guard, Brigadier General Denis, had to issue a circular, in which he declared that his subordinates, ‘under pre-

text of obtaining confidential information, *resorted to violent measures,*' and that 'the cases are very frequent in which individuals arrested by forces of the corps attempt to escape, and the keepers find themselves *in the necessity of making use of their weapons.*' What the above declarations signify is evident, notwithstanding the euphemisms of the official language. The object of this circular was to put a stop to these excesses; it bears the date of 1883. But the state of things continued the same. In 1886 the watering place of Madruga, one of the most frequented summer resorts in the island, witnessed the outrageous attacks of Lieutenant Sainz. In 1887 occurred the stirring trial of the 'com-ponte,' occasioned by the application of torture to the brothers Aruca, and within a few days were recorded in the neighborhood of Havana the cases of Señor Riveron, who was stabbed in Govea by individuals of the public force; of Don Manuel Martinez Moran, and Don Francisco Galañena, who were beaten, the former in Calabazar and the latter in Yaguajay; of Don José Felipé Canosa, who narrowly escaped being murdered in San Nicolas, and of a resident of Ceiba

"VESUVIUS"—SPECIAL CLASS—DYNAMITE CRUISER.



Mocha, whom the civil guard drove from his home.

"This was far from the worst. In the very center of Havana, in the Camp de Marte, a prisoner was killed by his guards, and the shooting at Amarillas and the murders at Puentes Grandes and Alquizar are deeds of woeful fame in the country. The administration of General Prendergast has left a sorrowful recollection of the frequency with which prisoners who *attempted to escape* were shot down.

"While the armed police force were beating and murdering peaceable inhabitants, the highwaymen were allowed to escape unscathed, to devastate the country at their pleasure. Although three millions are assigned in the budget to the service of public safety, there are districts, such as the Province of Puerto Principe, where its inhabitants have had to arm themselves and undertake the pursuit of the bandits. The case has occurred of an army of five or six thousand troops being sent to pursue a handful of highwaymen within a small territory, without succeeding in capturing them. Meanwhile, a special bureau was established in Havana for

the prosecution of highwaymen, and fabulous sums were spent by it. The best the government succeeded in doing was to bargain with a bandit, and deceive and kill him afterward on board the steamer *Baldomero Iglesias* in the bay of Havana.

“Nevertheless, the existence of highwaymen has served as a pretext to curtail the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and submit the Cubans to the jurisdiction of the courts-martial, contrary to the Constitution of the State, which had already been proclaimed. In fact, the Code of Military Laws (*Código de Justicia Militar*) provides that the offenses against persons and the means of transportation, as well as arson, *when committed in the Provinces of Ultramar* (the colonies) and the possessions of Africa and Oceanica, be tried by court-martial.

“It is true, however, that an explicit legal text was not necessary for the Government to nullify the precepts of the Constitution. This was promulgated in Cuba with a preamble providing that the Governor General and his delegates should retain the same powers they had before its promulgation. The banishment of Cubans has continued after as before

said promulgation. In December of 1891 there was a strike of wharf laborers in the Province of Santa Clara. To end it, the Governor captured the strikers and banished them *en masse* to the Island of Pinos.

"The deportations for political offenses have not been discontinued in Cuba, and although it is stated that no executions for political offenses have taken place since 1878, it is because the government has resorted to the more simple expedient of assassination. General Polavieja has declared with utmost coolness that in December of 1880 he had two hundred and sixty-five persons seized in Cuba, Palma, San Luis, Songo, Guantánamo, and Sagua de Tánamo, and transported the same day and at the same hour to the African island of Fernando Po. At the close of the insurrection of 1879-1880 it was a frequent occurrence for the government to send to the penal colonies of Africa the Cubans who had capitulated. The treachery of which General José Maceo was a victim carries us to the darkest times of the War of Flanders and the Conquest of America.

"Cuba recalls with horror the dreadful assassination of Brigadier General Arcadio

Leyte Vidal, perpetrated in the bay of Nipe in September of 1879. War had just broken out anew in the Eastern Department. Brigadier General Leyte Vidal resided in Mayarí, assured by the solemn promise of the Spanish commander-in-chief of that zone that he would not be molested. One month had not elapsed since the uprising, however, when, having gone to Nipe, he was invited by the commander of the gunboat *Alarma* to take dinner on board. Leyte Vidal went on board the gunboat, but never returned. He was strangled in a boat by three sailors, and his corpse was cast into the sea. This villainous deed was committed in compliance with an order from the Spanish General Polavieja. Francisco Leyte Vidal, a cousin to Arcadio, miraculously escaped the same tragic fate.

“The mysterious deaths of Cubans who had capitulated long before have been frequent in Cuba. To one of these deaths was due the uprising of Tunas de Bayamo in 1879.

“If the personal safety of the Cubans, in a period which the Spaniards would depict with brilliant colors, continues at the mercy

of their rulers, who are aliens in the country both by birth and in ideas, have the Cubans' honor and property any better safeguard? Is the administration of justice good, or even endurable? The very idea of a lawsuit frightens every honest Cuban. Nobody trusts the honesty or independence of the judges. Despite the provisions of the Constitution, without warrant and for indefinite time, imprisonments are most common in Cuba. The magistrates can tighten or loosen the elastic meshes of the judicial proceedings. They know well that, if they curry favor with the Government, they can do anything without incurring responsibility. They consider themselves, and without thinking it a disgrace, as mere political tools. The presidents and attorneys general of the 'Audencias' receive their instructions at the Captain General's office. Twice have the governors of Cuba aimed at establishing a special tribunal to deal with the offenses of the press, thereby undermining the Constitution. Twice has this special tribunal been established. More than once has a straightforward and impartial judge been found to try

a case in which the interests of influential people were involved. On such occasions the straightforward judge has been replaced by a special judge.

“In a country where money is wastefully spent to support a civil and military bureaucracy, the appropriation for the administration of justice does not reach \$500,000. On the other hand, the sales of stamped paper constitute a revenue of \$750,000. Thus the State derives a pecuniary profit from its administration of justice.

“Is it, then, a wonder that the reforms that have been attempted by establishing lower and higher courts to take cognizance of criminal cases, and by introducing oral and public trials, should not have contributed in the least to improve the administration of justice? Onerous services have been exacted from people, without proper compensation, as gratuitous services. The Government, so splendidly liberal when its own expenses are in question, haggles for the last cent when dealing with truly useful and reproductive services.

“Is the Cuban compensated for his absolute deprivation of political power, the fiscal

extortions, and the monstrous deficiencies of judicial administration by the material prosperity of his country? No man acquainted with the intimate relations which exist between the fiscal régime of a country and its economical system will believe that Cuba, crushed as it is by unreasonable budgets and an enormous debt, can be rich. The income of Cuba in the most prosperous times has been calculated at \$80,000,000. The State, provincial, and municipal charges take much more than 40 per cent. of this amount. This fact explains itself. We need not draw any inferences therefrom. Let us confine ourselves to casting a glance over the aspect presented by the agricultural, industrial, and real estate interests in Cuba at the beginning of the present year.

“Despite the prodigious efforts made by private individuals to extend the cultivation of the sugar cane and to raise the sugar-making industry to the plane it has reached, both the colonists and the proprietors of the sugar plantations and the sugar mills (‘centrales’) are on the brink of bankruptcy and ruin. In selling the output they knew that they would not get sufficient means to cover

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the cost of keeping and repairing their colonies and sugar mills. There is not a single agricultural bank in Cuba. The 'hacendados' (planters, landowners) had to recur to usurious loans and to pay eighteen and twenty per cent. for the sums which they borrowed. Not long ago there existed in Havana the Spanish Bank, the Bank of Commerce, the Industrial Bank, the Bank of St. Joseph, the Bank of the Alliance, the Bank of Maritime Insurances, and the Savings Bank. Of these there remain to-day only the Spanish Bank, which has been converted into a vast State office, and the Bank of Commerce, which owes its existence to the railways and warehouses it possesses. None of these gives any aid to the sugar industry.

"The cigar-making industry, which was in such flourishing condition a short time ago, has fallen so low that fears are entertained that it may emigrate entirely from Cuba. The weekly *El Tabaco* came to the conclusion that the exportation of cigars from Cuba would cease entirely within six years. From 1889 to 1894 the exportation from the port of Havana had decreased by 116,200,000 cigars.

"City real estate has fallen to one-half and in some cases to one-third the value it had before 1884. A building in Havana which was erected at a cost of \$600,000, was sold in 1893 for \$120,000.

"Stocks and bonds tell the same story. Almost all of them are quoted in Havana with heavy discounts.

"The cause of the ruin of Cuba, despite her sugar output of one million tons and her vast tobacco fields, can be easily explained. Cuba does not capitalize, and it does not capitalize because the fiscal régime imposed upon the country does not permit it. The money derived from its large exportations does not return either in the form of importations of goods or of cash. It remains abroad to pay the interest of its huge debt, to cover the incessant remittances of funds by the Spaniards who hasten to send their earnings out of the country, to pay from our treasury the pensioners who live in Spain, and to meet the drafts forwarded by every mail from Cuba by the Spaniards as a tribute to their political patrons in the metropolis, and to help their families.

"Cuba pays \$2,192,795 in pensions to

those on the retired list and to superannuated officials not in service. Most of this money is exported. The first chapters of the Cuban budget imply the exportation of over \$10,600,000. Cuba pays a subsidy of \$471,836.68 to the Transatlantic Company. It would be impossible to calculate the amount of money taken out of Cuba by private individuals; but this constant exportation of capital signifies that nobody is contented in Cuba, that everybody mistrusts its future. The consequence is that, notwithstanding the apparently favorable commercial balance, exchange is constantly and to a high degree against Cuba.

“On the other hand, if Cuba labors and strives to be on the same plane as its most progressive competitors, this is the work of her own people, who do not mind any sacrifices; but the Government cares little or nothing about securing to the country such means of furthering its development as are consigned in the budget under the head of ‘Fomento.’

“And now, at the outbreak of the present war, Spain finds that, although the appropriations consigned in our budgets since 1878

amount to nearly \$500,000,000, not a single military road has been built, no fortifications, no hospitals, and there is no material of war. The state has not provided even for its own defense. In view of this fact, nobody will be surprised to hear that a country 670 kilometers long, with an area of 118,833 square kilometers, has only 246½ lineal kilometers of highroads, and these almost exclusively in the Province of Havana. In that of Santiago de Cuba there are 9 kilometers; in Puerto Principe and Las Villas not a single one. Cuba has 3506 kilometers of sea-shore and fifty-four ports; only fifteen of those are open to commerce. In the labyrinth of keys, sand-banks and breakers adjacent to our coasts there are only nineteen lighthouses of all classes. Many of our ports, some of the best among them, are filling up. The coasting steamers can hardly pass the bars at the entrance of the ports of Nuevitas, Gibara, Baracoa, and Santiago de Cuba. Private parties have sometimes been willing to remedy these evils; but then the central administration has interfered, and after years of red tape, things have remained worse than before. In the course of twenty-

eight years only 139 kilometers of highroads were built in Cuba; two first-class light-houses were erected, three second-class, one of the fourth class, three beacon lights, and two port lights; 246 meters of wharf were built, and a few ports were superficially cleaned and their shoals marked. This was all. On the other hand the department of public works consumes unlimited millions in salaries and in repairs.

“The neglect of public hygiene in Cuba is proverbial. The technical commission sent by the United States to Havana, to study the yellow fever, declared that the port of the capital of Cuba, owing to its inconceivable filth, is a permanent source of infection, against which it is necessary to take precautions. There is in Havana, however, a ‘Junta de Puerto’ (Board of Portwardens) which collects dues and spends them with the same munificence as the other bureaucratic centers.

“Does the Government favor us more in the matter of education? It will suffice to state that only \$182,000 are assigned to public instruction in our splendid budget. And it may be proved that the University

of Havana is a source of pecuniary profit to the state. On the other hand, this institution is without laboratories, instruments, and even without water to carry on experiments. All the countries of America, excepting Bolivia—all of them, including Hayti, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guadalupe, where the colored race predominates—spend a great deal more than the Cuban Government for the education of the people. On the other hand, only Chili spends as much as Cuba for the support of an army. In view of this, it is easily explained why seventy-six per cent. of such an intelligent and wide-awake people as that of Cuba cannot read and write. The most necessary instruction among us, the technical and industrial, does not exist. The careers and professions most needed by modern civilization are not cultivated in Cuba. In order to become a topographer, a scientific agriculturist, an electrician, an industrial or mechanical engineer, a railroad or mining engineer, the Cuban has to go to a foreign country. The state in Cuba does not support a single public library.

“Are the deficiencies of the Spanish régime compensated by the wisdom of its adminis-

tration? Every time the Spanish Government has undertaken the solution of any of the great problems pending in Cuba, it has only confused and made it worse. It has solved it blindly or yielded to the influence of those who were to profit by the change. It will be sufficient to recall the withdrawal from circulation of the banknotes, which proved to be a highly lucrative transaction for a few persons, but which only embarrassed and impaired the monetary circulation of the Island. From one day to another the cost of living became forty per cent. dearer. The depreciated Spanish silver entered in circulation to drive out, as was natural, the 'centen' (five-dollar gold coin), and make small transactions difficult. To reach these results the Spanish Government had transformed a debt on which it had no interest to pay into a debt bearing a high rate of interest. It is true that, in exchange, all the retail dealers, whose votes it was desirable to keep, derived very large profits from the operations. These dealers are, of course, Spaniards.

"In exchange for all that Spain withholds from us, they say that it has given us liber-

ties. This is a mockery. The liberties are written in the Consitution, but obliterated in its practical application. Before and after its promulgation the public press has been rigorously persecuted in Cuba. Many journalists, such as Señores Cepeda and López Briñas, have been banished from the country without the formality of a trial. In November of 1891 the writer Don Manuel A. Balmaseda was tried by *court-martial* for having published an editorial paragraph in *El Criterio Popular* of Remedios relative to the shooting of the medical students. The newspapers have been allowed to discuss public affairs theoretically; but the moment they denounce any abuse or the conduct of official they feel the hand of their rulers laid upon them. The official organ of the home-rule party, *El Pais*, named before *El Triunfo*, has undergone more than one trial for having pointed in measured terms to some infractions of the law on the part of officials, naming the transgressors. In 1887 that periodical was subjected to criminal proceedings simply because it had stated that a son of the president of the Havana 'Audiencia' was holding a certain office contrary to law.

“They say that in Cuba the people are at liberty to hold public meetings, but every time the inhabitants assemble, previous notification must be given to the authorities, and a functionary is appointed to be present, with power to suspend the meeting whenever he deems such a measure advisable. The meetings of the ‘Círculo de Trabajadores’ (an association of workingmen) were forbidden by the authorities under the pretext that the building where they were to be held was not sufficiently safe. Last year the members of the ‘Círculo de Hacendados’ (association of planters) invited their fellow members throughout the country to get up a great demonstration to demand a remedy which the critical state of their affairs required. The Government found means to prevent their meeting. One of the most significant events that have occurred in Cuba, and one which throws a flood of light upon its political régime, was the failure of the ‘Junta Magna’ (an extraordinary meeting) projected by the ‘Círculo de Hacendados.’ This corporation solicited the co-operation of the ‘Sociedad Económica’ and of the ‘Junta General de Comercio’ to hold a meeting for the purpose

of sending to the metropolis the complaints which the precarious situation of the country inspired. The work of preparation was already far advanced, when a friend of the government, Señor Rodriguez Correa, stated that the Governor General looked *with displeasure* upon and *forbade* the holding of the great meeting. This was sufficient to frighten the 'Círculo' and to secure the failure of the project. It is then evident that the inhabitants of Cuba can have meetings only when the Government thinks it advisable to permit them.

"Against this political régime, which is a sarcasm, and in which deception is added to the most absolute contempt for right, the Cubans have unceasingly protested since it was implanted in 1878. It would be difficult to enumerate the representations made in Spain, the protests voiced by the representatives of Cuba, the commissions that have crossed the ocean to try to impress upon the exploiters of Cuba what the fatal consequences of their obstinacy would be. The exasperation prevailing in the country was such that the 'Junta Central' of the home-rule party issued in 1892 a manifesto in

which it foreshadowed that the moment might shortly arrive when the country would resort to 'extreme measures, the responsibility of which would fall on those who, led by arrogance and priding themselves on their power, hold prudence in contempt, worship force, and shield themselves with their impunity.'

"This manifesto, which foreboded the mournful hours of the present war, was unheeded by Spain, and not until a division took place in the Spanish party, which threatened to turn into an armed struggle, did the statesmen of Spain think that the moment had arrived to try a new farce, and to make a false show of reform in the administrative régime of Cuba. Then was Minister Maura's plan broached, to be modified before its birth by Minister Abarzuas.

"This project, to which the Spaniards have endeavored to give capital importance in order to condemn the revolution as the work of impatience and anarchism, leaves intact the political régime of Cuba. It does not alter the electoral law. It does not curtail the power of the bureaucracy. It increases the power of the General Government. It leaves the same burdens upon the Cuban tax-

payer, and does not give him the right to participate in the formation of the budgets. The reform is confined to the changing of the Council of Administration (now in existence in the Island, and the members of which are appointed by the Government) into a partially elective body. One half of its members are to be appointed by the Government, and the other half to be elected by the qualified electors, that is, those who are assessed and pay a certain amount of taxes. The Governor General has the right to veto all its resolutions, and to suspend at will the elective members. This Council is to make up a kind of special budget embracing the items included now in the general budget of Cuba under the head of 'Fomento.' The state reserves for itself all the rest. Thus the Council can dispose of 2.75 per cent. of the revenues of Cuba, while the Government distributes, as at present, 97.25 per cent. for its expenses, in the form we have explained. The general budget will, as heretofore, be made up in Spain; the tariff laws will be enacted by Spain. The debt, militarism, and bureaucracy will continue to devour Cuba, and the Cubans will continue to be treated

as a subjugated people. All power is to continue in the hands of the Spanish Government and its delegates in Cuba, and all the influence with the Spanish residents. This is the *self-government* which Spain has promised to Cuba, and which it is announcing to the world, in exchange for its colonial system. A far better form of government is enjoyed by the Bahamas or Turk's Island.

"The Cubans would have been wanting not only in self-respect, but even in the instincts of self-preservation, if they could have endured such a degrading and destructive régime. Their grievances are of such a nature that no people, no human community capable of valuing its honor and of aspiring to better its condition, could bear them without degrading and condemning itself to utter nullity and annihilation.

"Spain denies to the Cubans all effective powers in their own country.

"Spain condemns the Cubans to a political inferiority in the land where they are born.

"Spain confiscates the product of the Cubans' labor, without giving them in return either safety, prosperity, or education.

"Spain has shown itself utterly incapable of governing Cuba.

"Spain exploits, impoverishes, and demoralizes Cuba.

"To maintain by force of arms this monstrous régime, which brings ruin on a country rich by nature and degrades a vigorous and intelligent population—a population filled with noble aspirations—is what Spain calls to defend its honor and to preserve the prestige of its social functions as a civilizing power of America.

"The Cubans, not in anger but in despair, have appealed to arms in order to defend their rights and to vindicate an eternal principle, a principle without which every community, however robust in appearance, is in danger—the principle of justice. Nobody has the right of oppression. Spain oppresses us. In rebelling against oppression, we defend a right. In serving our own cause we serve the cause of mankind.

"We have not counted the number of our enemies; we have not measured their strength. We have cast up the account of our grievances; we have weighed the mass of injustice that crushes us, and with up-

lifted hearts we have risen to seek redress and to uphold our rights. We may find ruin and death a few steps ahead. So be it. We do our duty. If the world is indifferent to our cause, so much the worse for all. A new iniquity shall have been consummated. The principle of human solidarity shall have suffered a defeat. The sum of good existing in the world, and which the world needs to purify its moral atmosphere, shall have been lessened.

“The people of Cuba require only liberty and independence to become a factor of prosperity and progress in the community of civilized nations. At present Cuba is a factor of intranquillity, disturbance, and ruin. The fault lies entirely with Spain. Cuba is not the offender; it is the defender of its rights. Let America, let the world, decide where rest justice and right.”

CHAPTER X.

General Weyler—His Execrable Character—His Doings—
Severe Fighting—Death of General Maceo—Gomez, the
Military Leader of the Revolution.

MARTINEZ DE CAMPOS, as Captain General of Cuba, was in charge of the military operations against the insurgents. From the first he advocated conciliatory measures, in the hope of winning them back to their allegiance, but the home authorities were too incensed by his failure to permit him to continue at the head of affairs, so he was recalled January 17, 1896.

His successor was General Valeriano Weyler, who arrived in Havana, February 10, following. This man, born in 1836, has proven himself to be one of the most ferocious miscreants that even Spain has produced. He is utterly without mercy, devoid of all sense of honor, unspeakably corrupt, cowardly and rapacious to the last degree. His main purpose in seeking command of the royal troops was to enrich himself, and during

his comparatively brief sway he acquired millions of dollars by robbing not only his enemies, but the starving soldiers in his command. His hideous atrocities quickly won him the title of "Butcher Weyler," by which name he will figure on the pages of history.

Weyler lost no time in reorganizing the military departments, his plan of campaign being to begin operations at the extreme west in the province of Pinar del Rio, and subduing the provinces, one after the other, finally sweep the insurgents off the eastern end of the island into the sea. A grand scheme indeed, if the Cubans would permit him to carry it out.

The skirmishing and guerrilla fighting went on as before. The regular troops so preponderated in numbers that the insurgents wisely avoided open battle, and pursued the tactics of Francis Marion, the "Swamp Fox" of the Carolinas, during the Revolution. Like that famous partisan the patriots were able to strike many telling and effective blows; the skirmishes, as has been stated, sometimes deserving the name of battles.

The most important of these was fought, April 14, 1896, at La Chuza, in Pinar del

Rio, some fifteen miles west of the "trocha," or fortified line of twenty-two miles, crossing the island near Havana. The fighting was of a desperate character, but the Spaniards finally, after severe loss, made a headlong retreat to the coast, where they were saved from extermination by a warship that opened fire on Maceo and compelled him to withdraw.

In all reports of battles the Spaniards invariably claimed victories, while it is to be supposed that the accounts by the insurgents were also colored in their own favor. It is impossible to give a connected record of the scores of engagements, all closely resembling one another. They may be summed up in the statement that the insurgents more than held their own, retained control of three-fourths of the island, and set at naught every effort to subdue them.

Weyler took good care not to expose himself to the machetes of the Cubans, any one of whom would have been glad to give all he possessed in the world for a chance to rid the world of the blight of the "Butcher's" presence in it. He regularly sent announcements to Madrid that he had "pacified"

large districts, and very soon would have the entire island subdued. Meanwhile, the fighting went on more fiercely than before.

The cause of Cuban independence received a startling blow on December 7, 1896, when General Antonio Maceo, second in command of the insurgent army, was killed. He was led into ambush and shot, the young son of Gomez, the commander-in-chief, being slain at his side. Maceo was accompanied by Dr. Zertucha, his trusted friend and physician, who was not harmed, but allowed to surrender. He received considerate treatment, and shocking as is the charge, those best acquainted with the circumstances are positive that Dr. Zertucha betrayed his friend to his death.

General Maceo, who has already been referred to, was an admirable character. His father, himself and nine brothers were all killed, one after the other, while fighting for the independence of Cuba. He defeated Weyler so brilliantly at Guimaro in 1873, and displayed on other occasions such military ability, that he was made major general.

It is said he never tasted wine or played cards. He was exquisitely neat in dress

when living in Havana, but shared all the hardships and sufferings of his men, by whom he was greatly beloved. His loss was a sore one, but it did not weaken the patriotism of the insurgents, whose war cry was "Independence or death."

General Gomez is the hero of the last revolution, as he was of the Ten Years' War. We have given a paragraph concerning him in the statement of the *personnel* of the Cuban leaders as made by Mr. Pierra.

Gomez is a thorough soldier and patriot; a small, wiry old man, gray and wrinkled, whose clothes are ill-fitting, but whose face would attract attention in any assemblage. His eyes are keen and piercing, and his expression alert, stern, and penetrating. He is brusque in manner, plain in speaking; a man of few words, but a whirlwind in action, and with so fine a sense of honor that it controls his every act, word, and thought.

He served as a lieutenant in the Spanish army in the San Domingo revolution, but ere long became convinced that Cuba should be free. True to his nature, he expressed that belief so strongly that his captain's commission was taken from him. Upon the break-

ing out of the Ten Years' War, he and several officers who had served in the Spanish army were the first to offer their swords to the insurgents. He was working at the plow, and, like Cincinnatus, left it to enlist as a private.

The following story is told by Mr. Grover Flint in his "Marching with Gomez," as illustrative of the daring of the Cuban leaders :

At the beginning of the war, when the insurgents besieged Bayamo, a Spanish column of 700 men, under Colonel Campillo, hurried from Manzanillo to raise the siege. Had they been allowed to reach the place the rebels must have suffered so disastrous a defeat that the insurrection probably would have been crushed in its infancy. Modesto Diaz, with a dozen armed peasants who had never heard a shot fired, and two hundred slaves carrying machetes, hastened to the ford at the River Babatuaba and awaited the coming of the regulars.

The advance guard soon reached the ford and attempted to cross, when Diaz, who was an excellent shot, opened fire upon them from behind a tree. The twelve peasants lay in

the brush where they could not be seen, and employed themselves in loading their guns and passing them to Diaz, who was thus able to keep up a continuous and effective fire. Believing themselves confronted by a strong, well-armed force, the advance guard fell back; then the cane-cutters rushed crashing through the bush, and the regulars, believing themselves attacked by the entire wing of the Cuban army, fled in confusion. Bayamo surrendered the next day.

Gomez's ability was so marked that he was given command of the Central Department on the death of General Agramonte, but was greatly hindered by the divided opinions of the Cabinet Council that was trying to conduct the war. Gomez favored an invasion, with a view of carrying the rebellion to the gates of Havana, but he was forbidden, fighting the regulars at Les Guasimas, where he won a brilliant and decisive victory. Gomez with the other patriots accepted the promises at Zanjón, and was among those who surrendered.

Diaz died soon afterward, and, enraged by the faithless conduct of Spain, Gomez entered heart and soul into the last war. Re-

membering how he had been hampered and frustrated, he made the condition, when offered his commission, that he should have supreme control of military matters, and it was granted. He prepared at once to carry out his old plan of the invasion of the entire island. His assistants were Maceo, the veteran Lacret, and Quintin Bandera with his negro infantry. The ammunition in the army amounted hardly to four rounds apiece, but the dauntless leader and his faithful Maceo led their thin skirmish line into the Havana Provinces, in the face of a hundred thousand regulars, captured small towns and forts on the way, gathered recruits, and, by the opening of 1896, had the fires of insurrection gleaming throughout the entire island.

This accomplished, Gomez carried out the second fearful step in his programme. The proprietors of plantations were forbidden to grind cane under penalty of having their crops destroyed. Many showed their friendship for the insurrection by burning their own plantations, while others left the cane un-gathered. Learning of this, Weyler ordered the planters to resume grinding throughout the island. They had no choice but to obey,

whereupon all the canefields were burned. Since that sufficed for only a season, the planters began grinding the scorched cane, as ordered by Weyler; but the insurgents ended this by burning not only the cane, but the sugar mills, thus destroying millions of dollars' worth of property. The aim of this relentless destruction was to deprive Spain of all revenue from the island. Such a blow was sure to be felt by her more than the loss of thousands of soldiers.

As an evidence of the patriotism and honor of Gomez, let us slightly anticipate events. Knowing how potent bribes are with Spaniards, Ramon Blanco, the new Captain General, sent to the Cuban commander an offer to grant his own terms if he would desert the cause of which he was the most prominent leader. Gomez thus replied to the infamous proposal:

"I have received your strange intimation of the desire to meet me for the purpose of personally notifying me of the following offer: 'That you are ready to place a steamer at my disposal at any coast I should deem best to transport me to any port outside of

Cuba, to which I may desire to go, and, at the same time, you offer me all the monetary resources I may ask for the expenses of my trip and the maintenance of myself and family in a foreign land.'

"I have felt so much astounded when I learned of this; I felt so ashamed—more for you, General Blanco, than for myself—that in the first moments I was benumbed, knowing not whether such heinous proposals could be a reality or nightmare.

"Have I reached my present age—fighting, as I have done for thirteen years, for the independence of Cuba, only that you should believe at the end of my journey I should cover myself with ignominy by accepting the base reward of money from a Spanish Captain General for the cowardly abandonment of my army? Are you sane, General Blanco? Do you remember that blow of the machete which the hand of a Spanish assassin inflicted at Punta Brava, near the spot where Maceo died, upon that soul of my soul, young and brave Francisco Gomez? Do you think I can forgive that? Have you ever been a father?

"I am not in the position, General Blanco,

which requires that I should be looking for a steamer to take me from the island. You had better look for the steamer yourself, for of the two you need it more. Up to the present day I am on the winner's side. I represent a revolution stronger than ever, after three years of war."

CHAPTER XI.

Weyler's Barbarities—Recalled by Spain in Compliance with our Request—Spanish Diplomacy—Failure of the Promised Reforms—Sufferings of the Reconcentrados—Delay in Recognizing the Belligerency of Cuba—The Faithful Services of Consul General Lee.

MATTERS in Cuba went from bad to worse. Spain poured her armed forces into the island, only to have them die of disease or fall before the bitter and determined attacks of the insurgents, who roamed at will through the country, scorning the trochas, which the brutal Weyler was foolish enough to believe were able to confine them within certain defined limits. At intervals, he proclaimed the great deeds that were to be carried through by himself and which he promised should utterly stamp out the rebellion. Then he discounted his heroic performances by sending dispatches as before to the home government, announcing the "pacification" of many of the disaffected districts, to be followed by the subjection of

the entire country. All the same, the insurrection spread and the insurgents became more daring and defiant. The skirmishes and conflicts continued, and in most of them the regulars suffered defeat.

In the following chapter will be found the particulars of the infamous concentration order which was issued by Weyler, February 16, 1896. Referring to this in his message to Congress, President McKinley said :

“The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896. The productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their lands laid waste, and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late Cabinet of Spain justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermination !”

The moral sense of our country revolted at the infamies of Weyler, and in response to the protest of the President, he was recalled

and succeeded by General Ramon Blanco. At the same time, Spanish diplomacy began its cunning effort to deceive the United States and the civilized world as to the real purpose of Spain toward Cuba.

The principal reforms promised by the Sagasta ministry were: First, autonomy or self-government for Cuba; second, to extend the zone of cultivation, or in other words to make longer the dead lines that environed the starving women and children known as reconcentrados. That Spain succeeded in this cunning design of deceiving our government is proven by the following extract from the President's message to Congress:

"It is honestly due to Spain and our friendly relations to Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed. She has recalled the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized world. She has modified the horrible order of concentration, and has undertaken to care for the helpless and per-

mit those who desire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so, and assures them of the protection of the Spanish Government in their lawful occupations."

Autonomy proved a dismal failure. It may be doubted whether its projectors ever believed it could be anything else. The insurgents, understanding better than we the treachery of the whole business, refused even to consider the proposal. Their motto was "Independence or death," and they showed their earnestness by warning their enemies that anyone approaching them with an offer of bribery or persuasion would be killed. This warning, fearful as it was, was executed to the letter upon more than one who chose to disregard it.

The sufferings of the reconcentrados became so horrible that the whole country was thrilled with pity. The appalling truth could not be questioned that thousands upon thousands of men, women, and children were literally starving to death, as may be said, at our very doors. It has been established beyond all doubt that fully a quarter of a million have thus undergone the most cruel

of deaths. The dead lay in the streets and by the roadside, and in districts where the rate diminished it was because there were fewer or none to die.

We had joined with the civilized world in expressing our horror over the Armenian massacres and felt the appropriateness of the title of the "Great Assassin" bestowed by Gladstone upon the Turkish Sultan; but here were fully as great, if not greater, atrocities close to our own shores, where the helpless ones were the victims of the "Assassin among nations." Should the smitten ones call to us in vain?

The appeal could not be resisted. Immense stores of provisions and medicines were sent to the sufferers by our own Government and by thousands of kind-hearted people in all parts of the country. A competent committee superintended their distribution; Clara Barton, the head of the Red Cross society, one of the most beneficent and truly Christian organizations ever known, gave her time and matchless ability to the work. In this manner, countless lives and much suffering were saved, though of necessity the relief could be only partial.

Spain was chagrined at the thought of seeing the victims of her own perfidy thus succored, and, for very shame's sake, she appropriated a large amount of money ostensibly for the same purpose. When Consul General Lee was asked by the Congressional Committee what proportion of this sum would be expended for the dying ones, he promptly answered:

"Not a single dollar; the officials will steal every cent of it," and that gallant soldier and faithful official knew what he was saying.

Meanwhile, the friends of Cuban independence were at work in Congress. They plead with passionate eloquence for the recognition either of the independence or the granting of belligerent rights to the struggling patriots, fighting against such fearful odds. It may possibly surprise the reader to learn the following facts, which are taken from the official record.

When Grover Cleveland was President this joint resolution appeared in the Senate:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring therein), that, in

the opinion of Congress a condition of public war exists between the government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba; that the United States of America should maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States. Resolved, further, That the friendly offices of the United States should be offered by the President to the Spanish Government for the recognition of the independence of Cuba."

The surprising fact is that after this resolution passed the Senate by the overwhelming vote of 64 to 6 and the House by the equally pronounced vote of 247 to 27, President Cleveland disregarded these virtual instructions, and the insurgents were considered officially by our Government as simply rebellious subjects against Spain.

The President of the United States would not be true to his oath if he were not careful, deliberate, and well-advised in his policy. A hot-headed Executive could easily embroil us in trouble that might end in incalculable

injury. No matter how strong his personal sympathies (and no one will deny that President McKinley fervently sympathized with the Cubans), he must restrain them and take no step until fully convinced it is the right one to take.

The opponents of recognition of the belligerent rights or the independence of Cuba claimed with some reason that the revolutionary government had not established its legal right to such recognition. They had their President and heads of departments, it is true, but they did not hold a single seaport, and of the Government it might be said with some truth that it existed only on paper.

The United States was fortunate in being represented at Havana by Consul General Fitzhugh Lee. He is a nephew of General R. E. Lee, the military Chieftain of the Southern Confederacy, and was one of the most brilliant and dashing cavalry leaders on the side of the Lost Cause. His chivalrous daring, his ability, his tact, and his fearless patriotism won the admiration of the whole country.

General Lee was an appointee of Presi-

dent Cleveland, who formed a strong personal admiration for him. As the successor of Hon. Ramon O. Williams, he entered upon his official duties June 3, 1896. He was fearless and outspoken from the first. But for these qualities more than one hapless American would have perished within the gloomy walls of Morro Castle or been given short shrift by the Spanish authorities. Despite his utmost efforts, the outrages were so horrifying that General Lee was at variance more than once with the State Department, and Secretary Olney was inclined to replace him with a man not quite so honest and direct in the expression of his opinions. Fortunately this wish was not carried out, and General Lee was at his post when President McKinley was inducted into office.

Being an appointee of the opposite political party, he promptly laid his resignation before the Executive. But he, too, had been a brave soldier and he knew the value of General Lee's services as consul. He asked him to remain in Havana and he did so.

It did not take General Lee long to make himself a *persona non grata* to the Spanish Government. He was too clear-brained to

be deceived ; he persisted in seeing things as they were, and in his dispatches to his home government he had a most unpleasant habit of telling the truth. Truth is what Spain dreads more than anything, unless possibly it may be an official whom she cannot bribe or corrupt, and General Lee was that sort of a man.

Spain had requested his recall. She had recalled Weyler in answer to our protest and why shouldn't we reciprocate? The difference, however, was important: Weyler is a brutal miscreant, and Lee is a gallant and accomplished gentleman. The request of the Spanish Government was refused so promptly that she pretended it was based upon mistaken information and accordingly withdrew it.

And now let us give brief attention to the grounds upon which intervention in Cuba was demanded in the interests of humanity.

CHAPTER XII.

What Senator Proctor Saw during his Visit to Cuba—A Graphic Portrayal of the Sufferings of the Reconcentrados, the Failure of Autonomy, and Fearful Barbarity of Spanish Rule in the Island.

THE testimony of disinterested witnesses must always be conclusive. The accounts of the sufferings of the non-combatants (reconcentrados) in Cuba seemed too incredible for belief, but the evidence accumulated and became so positive that it was impossible to deny it. Many Americans went thither to investigate for themselves, and the stories they brought back sent a shiver of horror throughout the country.

Among these visitors to Cuba, who sought only to learn the simple truth, was United States Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont. There was much curiosity to know what he saw and, in order to gratify this wish, Mr. Proctor delivered a temperate and carefully prepared speech in the Senate, of which the following are the material portions;

“There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception of Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and having about an equal sea front on the north and south borders. Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its southwest corner, being separated from it elsewhere by the narrow peninsula of Santa Clara Province. The provinces are named, beginning at the west, Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. My observations were confined to the four western provinces, which constitute about one-half of the island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the few fortified towns. These two large provinces are spoken of to-day as ‘Cuba Libre.’

“Havana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes of the Spaniards and Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is France. But having visited it in more peaceful times and seen its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts—Cabaña and Morro Castle, etc.—I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the country. Everything seems to go on much as usual in Havana. Quiet prevails,

and except for the frequent squads of soldiers marching to guard and police duty and their abounding presence in all public places, one sees little signs of war.

“Outside Havana all is changed. It is not peace, nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a ‘trocha’ (trench), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed wire fence on the outer side of the trench. These trochas have at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called forts, but which are really small blockhouses, many of them more like large sentry boxes, loop-holed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each.

“The purpose of these trochas is to keep the reconcentrados in, as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people have been driven in to these fortified towns and held there to subsist as they can. They are virtually prison yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except that the walls are not so high and strong; but they suffice, where every

point is in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children.

"Every railroad station is within one of these trochas and has an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight car, loop-holed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, as I observed usually, and was informed is always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent blockhouses inclosed by a trocha, and with a guard along the railroad track. With this exception there is no human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among the hills where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings, I saw no house or hut in the 400 miles of railroad ride from Pinar del Rio Province in the west across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua La Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas.

"There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures, except such as

are under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four western provinces just what their army sits on. Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns have reached, is under guard and within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and desolation. This is the 'pacified' condition of the four western provinces.

"West of Havana is mainly the rich tobacco country: east, so far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills are destroyed between Havana and Sagua. Two or three were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, surrounded, as are the villages, by trochas and 'forts' or palisades of the royal palm, and fully guarded. Toward and near Cienfuegos there were more mills running, but all with the same protection. It is said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos have been able to obtain special favors of the Spanish Government in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all the

railroads, pay taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I had no means of verifying this. It is the common talk among those who have better means of knowledge.

"All the country people in the four western provinces, about four hundred thousand in number, remaining outside the fortified towns when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some land-owners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family.

"It but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from what prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity was not high, measured by ours. But, according to their standards and requirements, their conditions of life were satisfactory.

"They lived mostly in cabins made of palms or in wooden houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show the country was ever inhabited.

“The first clause of Weyler’s order reads as follows:

“‘First. All inhabitants of the country or outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.’

“The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without the permission of the military authority; direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns; prescribe that the eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal district; and state that, if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of, it will serve as a ‘recommendation.’

“Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerrillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases the torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might

have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they reached the towns they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live, if they could.

“ Their huts are about 10 by 15 feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a year's wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize; and with large families, or more than one, in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved? A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chest terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless.

“ Deaths in the streets have not been un-

common. I was told by one of our consuls that they have been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters; and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market, surrounded by food. These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They are not beggars even now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words.

"Of the hospitals I need not speak. Others have described their condition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents, and that they had given free play to a strong, natural, and highly cultivated imagination.

"Before starting I received through the

mail a leaflet published by the *Christian Herald*, with cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these must be rare specimens, got up to make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad and worse; many that should not be photographed and shown.

"I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000, 200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past from actual starvation and diseases caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be seen with one's own eyes to be realized.

"The Los Fosas Hospital, in Havana, has been recently described by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even

his fertile pen could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss Barton's very able and efficient assistants, had renovated it and put in cots. I saw it when four hundred women and children were lying on the stone floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags—and such rags! sick children, naked as they came into the world; and the conditions in the other cities are even worse.

“Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated her capability and devotion to her work. I specially looked into her business methods, fearing that here would be the greatest danger of mistake, that there might be want of system and waste and extravagance, but found she could teach me on these points. I visited the warehouse where the supplies are received and distributed; saw the methods of checking; visited the hospitals established or organized and supplied by her; saw the food distributions in several cities and towns, and everything seems to me to be conducted in the best manner possible,

The ample, fine warehouse in Havana, owned by a Cuban firm, is given, with a gang of laborers, free of charge, to unload and reship supplies.

“The Children’s Hospital in Havana, a very large, fine private residence, is hired at a cost of less than \$100 per month, not a fifth of what it would command in this city. It is under the admirable management of Mrs. Dr. Lesser of New York, a German lady and trained nurse. I saw the rapid improvement of the first children taken there. All Miss Barton’s assistants seem excellently fitted for their duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticise, but everything to commend. The American people may be assured that their bounty will reach the sufferers with the least possible cost and in the best manner in every respect. And if our people could see a small fraction of the need, they would pour more ‘freely from their liberal stores’ than ever before for any cause.

“When will the need for this help end? Not until peace comes and the reconcentrados can go back to the country, rebuild their homes, reclaim their tillage plots, which quickly run up to brush in that wonderful

soil and clime, and until they can be free from danger of molestation in so doing. Until then the American people must in the main care for them. It is true that the *alcaldes*, other local authorities, and the relief committees are now trying to do something, and desire, I believe, to do the best they can. But the problem is beyond their means and capacity, and the work is one to which they are not accustomed.

“General Blanco’s order of November 13 last somewhat modifies the Weyler order, but is of little or no practical benefit. Its application is limited to farms ‘properly defended,’ and the owners are obliged to build ‘centers of defense.’ Its execution is completely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and they know the terrible military efficiency of Weyler’s order in stripping the country of all possible shelter, food, or source of information for an insurgent, and will be slow to surrender this advantage. In fact, though the order was issued four months ago, I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning.

“I do not impugn General Blanco’s motives, and believe him to be an amiable gentleman,

and that he would be glad to relieve the condition of the reconcentrados if he could do so without loss of any military advantage; but he knows that all Cubans are insurgents at heart, and none now under military control will be allowed to go out from under it.

"I wish I might speak of the country—of its surpassing richness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this point I agree with Columbus, and believe everyone between his time and mine must be of the same opinion. It is indeed a land

" 'Where every prospect pleases,
And only man is vile.' "

"I had little time to study the race question, and have read nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that there are nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total population of 1,600,000. They live principally in the towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns, and their clerks, are mostly Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, is in their hands. They have an eye to thrift, and as everything possible in the way of

trade and legalized monopolies in which the country abounds is given to them by the Government, many of them acquire property. I did not learn that the Spanish residents of the island had contributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insurrection.

“There are, or were before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), and less than half a million of negroes and mixed bloods. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood and, like the Spaniards, dark in complexion, but oftener light or blond, so far as I noticed. The percentage of colored to white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is not now over twenty-five per cent. of the total. In fact, the number of colored people has been actually diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer are by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, lighted-hearted, and improvident.

“There is a proverb among the Cubans that ‘Spanish bulls cannot be bred in Cuba’—that is, that the Cubans, though they are of Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter temperament. Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms against the bull

fight; that it was a brutal institution, introduced and mainly patronized by the Spaniards. One thing that was new to me was to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances there can be no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the reason of it is easy to see. They have been educated in England, France, or this country, while the Spaniard has such education as his own country furnishes.

“The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal, mentally and physically, of the race in this country. Certainly physically they are by far the largest and strongest race on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there were one-half as many free negroes as slaves, and this proportion slowly increased until emancipation.

“It is said that there are about 60,000 Spanish soldiers now in Cuba fit for duty out of 200,000 that have been sent there. The rest have died, have been sent home sick, or are in hospitals, and some have been killed, not-

withstanding the official reports. They are conscripts, many of them very young, and generally small men. One hundred and thirty pounds is a fair estimate of their average weight. They are quiet and obedient, and if well drilled and led, I believe would fight fairly well, but not at all equal to our men. Much more would depend on the leadership than with us. The officer must lead well and be one in whom they have confidence, and this applies to both sides alike. As I saw no drills or regular formation, I inquired about them of many persons, and was informed that they had never seen a drill. I saw perhaps 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece of artillery or a tent. They live in barracks in the towns, and are seldom out for more than the day, returning to town at night.

"They have little or no equipment for supply trains, or for a field campaign, such as we have. Their cavalry horses are scrubby little native ponies, weighing not over eight hundred pounds, tough and hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition, reminding one of the mounts of Don Quixote and his squire. Some of the officers, how-

ever, have good horses, mostly American, I think. On both sides cavalry is considered the favorite and the dangerous fighting arm. The tactics of the Spanish, as described to me by eye-witnesses and participants in some of their battles, is for the infantry, when threatened by insurgent cavalry, to form a hollow square and fire away *ad libitum*, and without ceasing until time to march back to town.

"It does not seem to have entered the minds of either side that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse anywhere an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there are everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage.

"Having called on Governor and Captain General Blanco and received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of offers of safe conduct to Gomez's camp, and was told that if I would write him, an answer would be returned safely, within ten days at most.

"I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the

best information received as to the insurgent force. His statements were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about thirty thousand men now in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. They have a force all the time in Havana Province itself, organized in four small brigades and operating in small bands. Ruiz was taken, tried, and shot within about a mile and a half of the railroad and about fifteen miles out of Havana on the road to Matanzas, a road more traveled than any other, and which I went over four times.

“Aranguren was killed about 3 miles the other side of the road and about the same distance, 15 or 20 miles, from Havana. They were well armed, but very poorly supplied with ammunition. They are not allowed to carry many cartridges; sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry, especially, are poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I saw, however, one of half a dozen in the streets of Havana,

and one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average Spanish soldier.

"Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban army are colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry furnished their own horses.

"This field officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored soldiers; that they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the whites; could keep up with the cavalry on a long march and come in fresh at night."

CHAPTER XIII.

The Court of Last Resort—Our Ultimatum to Spain—Consul General Lee—Characteristic Spanish Trickery—Minister Woodford's Experience at Valladolid—The Call for Volunteers—The Spanish Proclamation—A Patriotic Outburst throughout the Union.

THE relations between Spain and the United States steadily approached an acute phase after the blowing up of the *Maine* in Havana harbor. The expressions of impatience with the slowness of President McKinley became pronounced after he had sent to Congress the report of the Board of Inquiry, which established the fact that the destruction of the battleship was due to outside causes; but, with that commendable self-restraint to which reference has been made, the American people awaited the completion of diplomatic negotiations between the two governments.

War should be the court of last resort on the part of nations. The President was sincerely hopeful that peace might be preserved, and was unwilling to abandon that

hope until impossible to hold it any longer. He went as far as honor would permit and many thought he showed too much consideration to an unworthy government; but he never lost the confidence of the nation. Finally the point was reached when he turned over the whole matter to Congress, declaring himself ready to obey with all the promptness and vigor possible whatever instructions that body gave him.

There was considerable discussion in both branches. Some favored an immediate declaration of war upon the refusal of Spain to withdraw from Cuba; some believed recognition should follow before intervention; other that armed intervention should take place at once. Finally, on April 13, the House adopted a resolution authorizing and directing the President to stop the war in Cuba, with the purpose of securing peace and order there, and establishing by the concerted action of the inhabitants a stable and independent government. He was also "authorized and directed" to employ all the resources of the army and navy to bring about such a result.

The minor differences in the views be-

tween the two branches of Congress made several conferences necessary, but agreement was reached without difficulty.

Minister Woodford at Madrid was kept informed of the critical condition of matters and warned to be ready to leave the country on an hour's notice. He was instructed to notify the other consuls in Spain, with permission for them to leave at any moment they chose, if they believed themselves in danger.

There was much solicitude for Consul General Lee. He was intensely hated by the populace and liable at any moment to become the victim of treachery, as have countless officers who trusted to the honor of Spain. What specially angered the authorities in Havana was the well-founded belief that General Lee was pursuing a quiet investigation of his own regarding the blowing up of the *Maine*. He had his suspicions, and, if he was allowed to prosecute his work through several skilled agents, it was possible, if not probable, that he would elicit the truth, and truth, as we have said, is the one thing which Spain abhors above all things.

War being inevitable, General Lee warned all consuls in Cuba to make their preparations to leave their posts within a few days. At his suggestion, our Government provided transportation for all Americans to quit the country. It would be highly dangerous for them to remain, when war broke between the high-minded Spaniards and the "Yankee pigs."

Hundreds took advantage of the opportunity thus presented, though a few were willing to assume the risk of remaining behind. When everything possible had been done, General Lee boarded the steamer to Key West and thence went by rail to Washington. He was cheered by admiring thousands along the entire route, and when he appeared in the capital of his country, it may safely be said that there was no more popular citizen in the United States, where pluck and true manliness are held in the highest veneration. The testimony which General Lee gave before the congressional committees was of the highest importance and helped to clarify the minds of many Congressmen who were eagerly seeking enlightenment.

The characteristics of Spain are shown in

everything with which she has to do. Even in diplomacy her double-dealing is manifest. In the closing negotiations with our Government, she descended to a trick of which no other nation in Europe would be guilty.

When President McKinley sent his message to Congress recommending the passage of a joint resolution declaring war against Spain, he submitted the correspondence between that government and ours and it forms an interesting record :

“On April 14, at noon, Secretary Sherman telegraphed Minister Woodford of the passage by the House the day before of the resolutions authorizing and directing the President to stop the war in Cuba, with the purpose of securing peace and order there and establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of their own, and empowering the President to use the army and navy to carry it out. He also notified him that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had reported the resolutions they had agreed upon.

“‘The ultimate resolution in conference,’

he adds, 'cannot now be forecast, but will doubtless direct intervention, by force if need be, to secure free Cuba. The situation is critical.'

"On Sunday morning the 17th, Acting Secretary Day notified Mr. Woodford of the passage by the Senate of the resolution amending all of the House resolution after the enacting clause, and informed him that the House had taken a recess until Monday, and that, if it non-concurred, conference would follow. He again announced that the ultimate form of resolution could not be foreseen.

"On Tuesday Acting Secretary Day notified Minister Woodford of the final adoption of the resolution by both Houses. He added: 'An instruction will be telegraphed you later, immediately on the President signing the joint resolution. In the meantime you will prepare for withdrawal from Spain, and notify consuls to be ready for the signal to leave. If any consul is in danger, he may quietly leave at his discretion.'" The following is the reply:

"'MADRID, April 20.—Have received telegram of Tuesday morning. Am pre-

pared to withdraw. Have notified consuls to be ready.'

"On the same date Secretary Sherman telegraphed Mr. Woodford the ultimatum, published here before it was sent, both in plain English and in cipher. He was directed to communicate to the Spanish Government the text of the resolution passed by Congress hertofore cabled, together with the formal demand of this Government. A copy of the joint resolution and a copy of the instructions sent Minister Woodford were furnished Minister Polo. Minister Polo's reply, which was received at the Department of State at 11.35 A. M. of that day, requested the delivery of his passports, as the nature of the joint resolution which had become law rendered his continuance impossible. He also notified the department that the Spanish interests would be intrusted to the representatives of France and Austria-Hungary. Secretary Sherman acknowledged the receipt of this communication and informed the Minister that arrangements had been made to guard his presence in American territory. At the

same time a telegram was sent to Mr. Woodford of the action taken by Señor Polo, and directing him to remain at his post until noon Saturday unless his passports were handed him before that hour. If no reply which he would deem satisfactory to the United States were received from Spain by that hour he was to ask for his passports. At 9.02 the next morning this reply was received from Mr. Woodford :

“‘MADRID, April 21.—Early this (Thursday) morning, immediately after the receipt of your open telegram, and before I had communicated same to Spanish Government, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs notified me that diplomatic relations are broken between the two countries and that all official communication between their representatives has ceased. I accordingly asked for safe passports. Turn legation over to British Embassy and leave for Paris this afternoon. Have notified consuls.’

“Later in the day he telegraphed the text of the official note which he had received at 7.30 that morning. It read :

“In compliance with a painful duty I have

the honor to inform your Excellency that the President having approved a resolution of the chambers of the United States, which, in denying the legitimate sovereignty of Spain and in threatening the immediate armed intervention in Cuba, is equivalent to an evident declaration of war, the Government of her Majesty has ordered its Minister in Washington to withdraw without loss of time from the North American territory, with all the personnel of the legation. By this act the diplomatic relations which previously existed between the two countries are broken off and official communication between their representatives ceases, and I hasten to communicate this to your Excellency in order that, on your part, you may make such dispositions as seem suitable. I beg your Excellency to kindly acknowledge the receipt of this note.'

"At 3.10 p. m. from Minister Woodford was received the text of his reply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, acknowledging the receipt of the note, and notifying him that the American interests would be in charge of the British Ambassador."

No stronger proof was needed to show that the telegram sent to Minister Woodford was held until a copy could be made and discussed by the authorities. They sent a note to our representative notifying him that all diplomatic relations between the countries were at an end. This action of course also ended the official career of Minister Woodford in Spain and made it impossible for him to deliver the ultimatum of our government. It only remained for him to ask for his passports to leave the country, which, as is well known, he proceeded to do.

Meanwhile, the Spanish minister at Washington was treated with the utmost courtesy. Before leaving the country, he authorized a published interview in which he made insulting reference to the United States, but his car was carefully guarded by detectives detailed for that purpose, and throughout his entire journey to Canada he suffered not the slightest annoyance. He showed his appreciation by continuing his insulting expressions after passing out of our territory, and seemed anxious to keep it up as long as the newspapers would publish his utterances.

General Woodford left Madrid for Paris,

At Valladolid a mob surrounded the train with shouts of "Death to the Yankees!" The windows were broken, and the life of the minister was in danger, when the guard by desperate exertions forced the rioters back, after several of the passengers had been injured by the flying missiles.

General Woodford was peacefully sleeping in his berth when, as the cars reached Tolosa, his valet awoke him with word that more trouble had come. Hurrying forth, the ex-minister found that a sergeant of the civil guard and a private detective had boarded the train with the expressed determination to arrest Woodford's private secretary on the ground that he was a Spanish subject. Woodford declared he was a British citizen, but the officers would not admit the fact, and were about to remove the secretary from the car, when the minister placed himself in front of the gentleman's doorway, and declared he would resist the outrage to the last. At the same time one of the passengers, at Woodford's request, notified the officers in Spanish that the minister had placed his secretary under the protection of the British flag. Great Britain permits no nonsense with any

of her subjects, and the officers made no further trouble.

At noon, April 23, President McKinley signed the proclamation calling for volunteer troops. The document was then carried to the Secretary of State for his signature, and was soon afterward issued by the President. It reads as follows :

“BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

A PROCLAMATION.

“WHEREAS, By a joint resolution of Congress approved on the twentieth day of April, 1898, entitled ‘Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry this resolution into effect,’ and

“WHEREAS, By an act of Congress entitled ‘An act to temporarily provide for increasing the military establishment of the United

States in time of war and for other purposes,' approved April 22, 1898, the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States :

"Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the purpose of the said resolution; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities through the War Department.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington this twenty-third day of April, A. D. 1898, and

of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

“WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

“By the President:

“JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State.”

It is proper to follow the foregoing with Spain's proclamation, which appeared in the *Gaceta Oficial*, April 24, declaring that a state of war exists between Spain and the United States, and announcing that the treaty of 1795 and the protocol of 1877 are null and void.

The decree is as follows:

“Diplomatic relations are broken off between Spain and the United States, and, the state of war being begun between the two countries, numerous questions of international law arise, which must be precisely defined, chiefly because the injustice and provocation come from our adversaries, and it is they who, by their detestable conduct, have caused this grave conflict.

“We have observed with the strictest fidelity the principles of international law, and have shown the most scrupulous respect

for morality and the right of government. The Government is of the opinion that the fact of not having adhered to the Declaration of Paris does not exempt us from the duty of respecting the principles therein enunciated. The principle Spain unquestionably refused to admit then was the abolition of privateering. The Government now considers it most indispensable to make absolute reserves on this point, in order to maintain our liberty of action and uncontested right to have recourse to privateering when we consider it expedient; first, by organizing immediately a force of cruisers, auxiliary to the navy, which will be composed of vessels of our mercantile marine and with equal distinction in the work of our navy.

“Clause 1. The state of war existing between Spain and the United States annuls the treaty of peace and amity of October 27, 1795, and the protocol of January 12, 1877, and all other agreements, treaties, or conventions in force between the two countries.

“Clause 2. From the publication of these presents, thirty days are granted to all ships of the United States anchored in our harbors to take their departure free of hindrance.

"Clause 3. Notwithstanding that Spain has not adhered to the Declaration of Paris, the Government, respecting the principles of the law of nations, proposes to observe, and hereby orders to be observed, the following regulations of maritime law :

"First—Neutral flags cover the enemy's merchandise, except contraband of war.

"Second—Neutral merchandise, except contraband of war, is not seizable under the enemy's flag.

"Third—A blockade to be obligatory must be effective, viz., it must be maintained with sufficient force to prevent access to the enemy's littoral.

"Fourth—The Spanish Government, upholding its right to grant letters of marque, will at present confine itself to organizing, with the vessels of the mercantile marine, a force of auxiliary cruisers, which will co-operate with the new navy, according to the needs of the campaign, and will be under naval control.

"Fifth—In order to capture the enemy's ships and confiscate the enemy's merchandise and contraband of war under whatever form, the auxiliary cruisers will exercise the right

of search on the high seas and in the waters under the enemy's jurisdiction, in accordance with international law and the regulations, which will be published.

"Sixth—Included in contraband of war are weapons, ammunition, equipments, engines, and 'in general all the appliances used in war.'

"Seventh—To be regarded and judged as pirates, with all the rigor of the law, are captains, masters, officers, and two-thirds of the crew of vessels which, not being American, shall commit acts of war against Spain, even if provided with letters of marque issued by the United States."

The fourth is the most important clause, in which Spain maintains the right to grant letters of marque, which right she reserved to herself in her note of May 16, 1857, contained in her reply to France.

Spain defines contraband of war as "cannon, quick-firing guns, shells, rifles, all patterns of cutting and thrusting weapons and arms of precision, bullets, bombs, grenades, fulminates, capsules, fuses, powder, sulphur, dynamite, and explosives of all kinds, as well as uniforms, straps, pack saddles, and



"OREGON"—FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP.

equipment for artillery and cavalry, marine engines, and in general all appliances used in war."

The Government reserves liberty of action relative to the question of coal being contraband of war.

The response to the President's call for volunteers was one of the most magnificent outbursts of patriotism ever seen anywhere. From the furthest corners of the land came the eager responses; hundreds of college students flung aside their books and demanded a chance to serve their country; ministers urged their congregations to enlist, and set the example; thousands of young men threw up their situations and ran races to the recruiting stations; the cowboys of the West claimed a chance, and Assistant Secretary of War Theodore Roosevelt resigned in order to become an officer of the "Rough Riders," or, as they were dubbed, "Teddy's Terrors"; old Confederates and Boys in Blue wouldn't admit they were more than twenty years old, for fear it would keep them out of the ranks; Fitzhugh Lee and Congressman Wheeler of Alabama, who were two of the most dashing

of Confederate cavalrymen, were appointed Major Generals; even the Sioux Indians, the most warlike tribe on the Continent, expressed the hope that they would be allowed to send a good representation of their warriors to uphold the flag of the common country. Had the President asked for a million volunteers, they would have responded with the same enthusiasm.

CHAPTER XIV.

The First Shot and Capture of the War—Declaration of War by Spain and the United States—England's Friendship—Bombardment of Matanzas—American and Spanish Gunnery—Commodore Dewey's Brilliant Victory at Manila—The *Winslow* Affair.

WAR with Spain being inevitable, everything possible was done by our Government to push it vigorously to a conclusion. Although the formal declaration had not yet been made, the entire North Atlantic squadron, with the exception of the monitors *Terror* and *Puritan* and a number of smaller vessels, left Key West April 22, for the purpose of blockading Havana, Admiral Sampson's flagship being the magnificent *New York*. On either side of her were the *Indiana* and *Iowa*, with the cruisers *Cincinnati*, *Detroit*, and *Nashville* following at regulation intervals, and accompanied by the gunboats *Wilmington*, *Machias*, *Castine*, and *Newport*, the monitor *Amphitrite*, the lighthouse tender *Mangrove*, the converted yacht *Mayflower*, and the torpedo boat *Foote*.

This formidable squadron was hardly under way when a Spanish ship was sighted, and the *Nashville* gave chase. At the second shot across the enemy's bow she hove to, and proved to be the steamer *Buena Ventura*, plying between New York and Havana. A crew was put on board and the prize taken to Key West. Thus the *Nashville* fired the first shot of the war and took the first prize. Others rapidly followed.

It was on the succeeding day (April 23), that the President issued his call for 125,000 volunteers. On the 24th, as has been stated, Spain declared war against the United States, and on the 25th Congress declared that war began on the 21st by the action of Spain. The various States were called upon for their quota of troops. A war revenue bill was reported in the House, and England published her neutrality proclamation, dated April 23. Justice demands that it should be stated that England proved herself the best of friends all through the war, which had hardly opened when France, seconded by Germany and Austria, proposed a coalition, with a view of intervening in behalf of Spain. They were confident that

England would join the conspiracy, but to their astonishment she firmly declined. She was then asked to hold a neutral position while the other powers forcibly intervened. She refused to promise even that, the inference being clear that she meant to array her invincible navy on our side. No combination of nations would dare fight England and the United States, with the probabilities that Japan would also join us. The grave peril, therefore, which threatened us was thus turned aside by the friendship of our "kin across the water."

Meanwhile, Admiral Sampson proceeded with his work of blockading Havana. He instructed the ships not to fire upon the enemy unless it became necessary or they were first fired upon. Morro Castle repeatedly sent shells at the blockading fleet, but the distance was too great to do harm and no attention was paid to them.

The flagship *New York*, the *Cincinnati*, and the *Puritan* were making a reconnoissance of the forts guarding Matanzas, a number of miles to the eastward of Havana, when, April 27, fire was opened upon the ships at a distance of five miles. The challenge was too

tempting to be ignored, and Admiral Sampson immediately steamed in closer and opened his terrific broadsides with such effect that in about a quarter of an hour every Spanish gun was silenced. The gunnery of the Americans was excellent and inflicted considerable loss of life, while the poor work of the Spaniards did no damage whatever. It may be said that all through the war the skill of our "men behind the guns" approached the marvelous and excited the wonder of the world, while that of the Spaniards was so bad that it caused ridicule. The bombardment completed, the ships returned to their blockading positions off Havana.

At the very time the incidents just described were reoccurring, history was being made at a wonderful rate on the other side of the globe. Commodore George Dewey of Vermont, who had done valiant service during the Civil War, was in command of our Asiatic Naval Squadron. He was lying at Mirs Bay, a short distance to the north of Hong-Kong, his bunkers filled with coal and on the alert for the first opportunity to strike an effective blow against the enemy. Since China, in accordance with international law,

was obliged to notify him that he must leave within forty-eight hours, the gallant officer steamed toward Manila, the capital of the immense group of islands known as the Philippines, which form the most valuable possession of Spain. A powerful fleet had gathered there to defend the port, one of the most important in the far east. Admiral Montojo, the commander, had expressed the hope that the "Yankee pigs" would show themselves within reach of his guns, in order that he might teach them a well-needed lesson, and he issued a proclamation so bombastic that it caused smiles wherever read.

On the evening of April 30 Dewey's squadron, consisting of the flagship *Olympia*, the cruisers *Baltimore*, *Boston*, and *Raleigh*, the gunboats *Concord* and *Petrel*, the revenue-cutter *McCulloch*, and two transports arrived at Subig Bay, north of Manila, where it was expected the Spanish fleet would be found, but it had fled to Manila and Dewey ordered his vessels to clear for action and follow. Passing the headland, the forts defending the entrance to Manila Bay were seen. All lights were extinguished on the American ships, which slipped down the coast at night and

silently entered the harbor like so many phantoms. It was known that the waters had been mined, but Dewey cared no more for the torpedoes than did Admiral Farragut when he steamed over them in Mobile Bay and destroyed the Confederate fleet in the summer of 1863.

The grim squadron advanced steadily and the flagship was well beyond Corregidor Island, where the principal fortifications were placed, when the sparks from the funnel of the *McCulloch* warned the Spaniards of their danger. Several shells were fired, to which no replies were made, when the fleet slowed down and the men slept on their guns till daylight, at which time our ships were within five miles of Manila, with the Spanish fleet lying under the formidable batteries of Cavité, the main land defense of the city. This fleet consisted of the protected cruiser and flagship *Reina Cristina*, the cruisers *Castilla*, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Velasco*, *Isla de Mindanao*, *General Lezo*, and a number of smaller craft.

Full of ardor and self-confidence, and with flags flying, the American fleet steamed past

Manila itself, drawing the fire from the powerful batteries on shore. The only reply was two shots from the *Concord*. Commodore Dewey saw that it would endanger the town to engage these batteries, and he gave them no further heed, but with the grim majesty of fate itself moved past and headed for the formidable defenses at Cavité. Two mines were exploded in front of the flagship, but no damage was done, and then the guns of Cavité opened; but, in accordance with the rule among the Spaniards, the firing was wild and no response was made.

Dewey had his eye upon the enemy's fleet, which was confidently awaiting his approach. When within fifty-five hundred yards, he quietly said to his captain: "You may begin firing, Gridley, as soon as you are ready." Gridley was ready and impatiently awaiting the order. He opened business by firing his starboard 8-inch gun in the forward turret. The *Baltimore* and *Boston* quickly followed, and the remarkable battle was soon raging in dead earnest. The Americans were compelled to keep in deep water, while the enemy remained in that which was shallow. Dewey's ships, therefore, passed in front, following a

parallel line, and when the starboard batteries were brought to bear the word was given, "Open with all guns!" The command was enthusiastically obeyed and then, turning about and coming back over their elliptical course, the Americans brought their heavy port guns into action. This movement was repeated four times, when Captain Gridley succeeded in getting the fleet within two thousand yards of the enemy. This gave an opportunity for the 6-pounders, which did terrific work. Thus matters stood when Commodore Dewey gave orders to draw off and allow the men to eat breakfast.

"To —— with breakfast!" growled one of the gunners; "we can wipe out the whole fleet before breakfast."

Nevertheless, the commander knew how much better men fight when not hungry, and he lay beyond range for nearly three hours, during which the very few who had been slightly wounded received attention, and a few trifling repairs were made on one or two of the ships.

At eleven o'clock the squadron returned to close action, the *Baltimore* in advance, and never was work more crushing and over-

whelming. In a short time not a Spanish flag was afloat. Admiral Montojo's flagship was wrapped in flames and he was rowed to the *Isla de Cuba*. The last Spanish ship abandoned was the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, which made one tremendous lurch and sank. A few minutes later a white flag fluttered above Cavité as a sign of surrender. Dewey anchored his fleet off Manila, and notified the governor that if a single shot was fired from the town he would lay it in ashes.

Thus within the space of six hours was begun and ended one of the most wonderful and decisive naval victories in history. Not an American was killed, and only half a dozen wounded, none seriously. The Spanish loss was fully two hundred slain, with a still larger number wounded. Captain Charles V. Gridley of the *Olympia* was suffering from illness, when he went into battle, and sad to say, he died while on his return home.

The news of Dewey's superb victory caused great rejoicing throughout the United States and excited the admiration of Europe. How it was that such a magnificent victory was gained without the loss of a single life on the part of the victors was a mystery, which even

at this day it is hard to understand; for, as has been remarked, it would seem as if the Spanish gunners must have hit something, even if they all fired with their eyes closed. Congress tendered a vote of thanks to Commodore Dewey and his officers and men, an exquisite and costly sword was ordered for him, and on the 11th of May he was made a rear admiral in the navy.

In the order of time, the next naval engagement took place in Cuban waters, and the story is a widely different one from that just told. While engaged in blockade duty on the north of the island, Admiral Sampson left as blockaders off Cardenas Bay the gunboats *Machias* and *Wilmington*, the torpedo boat *Winslow*, and the converted revenue cutter *Hudson*. Learning that three Spanish gunboats were in the harbor, it was determined to destroy them. In this attempt the *Winslow* was set on fire and her engine disabled. While her consorts were struggling to help the craft out of danger an exploding shell instantly killed Ensign Worth Bagley and another, and mortally wounded three men. Bagley was the only American naval officer killed during the war.

CHAPTER XV.

The Spanish Fleets—The Cape Verde Squadron—Bottled up in Santiago Harbor—Daring Exploit of R. P. Hobson—Attempt of the Spanish Fleet to Escape—Destruction of Admiral Cervera's Fleet.

THERE was more uneasiness throughout the United States over the expected meeting between the respective navies in the impending war than is generally supposed. It was not because of any doubt of the skill of our officers or the heroism of the men, but it was known that we had been unprepared for war, while Spain had three formidable fleets, with more ships in reserve. All of these vessels were of modern make, were heavily armed, and commanded by experienced officers, with full crews that would fight to the death.

Furthermore, the Spanish navy had a number of torpedo-boat destroyers. They possessed extraordinary speed, and, if given the opportunity, could blow up the mightiest battleship that ever floated. They formed

the "uncertain quantity" in the impending hostilities, and their worth or worthlessness remained to be demonstrated.

Admiral Montojo's fleet had been destroyed at Manila, but there remained two more. One was under the command of Admiral Camara and was in home waters. A move was made to send this fleet through the Suez Canal to attack Admiral Dewey and recover Manila; but the effort was never made, the fleet being recalled when hardly through the canal. This was due to the fact that our Government began serious preparations to send a resistless fleet into the Mediterranean to desolate the coasts of Spain. Camara's fleet, therefore, cut no figure in the war.

The squadron known as the "Cape Verde fleet" was the one that caused concern. It was reported at widely separated points, and Admiral Sampson had his vessels hunting in a dozen different places for it. Admiral Cervera was in command, and he was known to be a skilled and brave officer. On May 12 Sampson bombarded San Juan, Porto Rico, suspecting Cervera might be in the harbor and hoping to draw him out; but he was not there, and, after doing much damage to the

fortifications, Sampson withdrew and continued his search for the elusive fleet, regarding which all manner of reports filled the air. Finally, it was discovered that the vessels had entered Santiago harbor, a spacious sheet of water approached by a narrow channel. The American fleet immediately took position off the entrance, and, to use a common expression, Admiral Cervera was "bottled up."

But there was danger that on some dark night, or during a storm, he would slip out of the harbor and dart off, with the possibility of inflicting vast damage elsewhere. To prevent this was the problem that confronted the American admiral. While turning over the question in his mind, Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson proposed to steam into the narrowest part of the channel with the collier *Merrimac* and sink her across the entrance. If this could be done in the right spot and in the exact position, the Spanish squadron would be inextricably imprisoned.

The scheme was a most dangerous one, for the approach of the collier was sure to be discovered by the enemy, who would

pour in a terrific fire from their batteries on both shores. The chances were a hundred to one that the *Merrimac* would be riddled before she could reach the right place, and everyone on board killed. Nevertheless, Hobson, by his eloquent pleadings, won the consent of Admiral Sampson, and half the crews of the vessels were eager to take part in the perilous enterprise. The seven companions of Hobson were:

Osborn Deignan, a coxswain of the *Merrimac*; George F. Phillips, a machinist of the *Merrimac*; John Kelly, a water tender of the *Merrimac*; George Charette, a gunner's mate of the flagship *New York*; Daniel Montague, a seaman of the cruiser *Brooklyn*; J. C. Murphy, a coxswain of the *Iowa*; Randolph Clausen, a coxswain of the *New York*.

It was past two o'clock on the morning of June 3, with the moon partly hidden by clouds, when the *Merrimac*, which had been carefully prepared for the attempt, steamed toward the harbor entrance, with the launch of the *New York*, under command of Naval Cadet Joseph Wright Powell, closely following in order to pick up Hobson and his companions, whose only hope was that

they might be given a chance to swim for their lives.

The great fear was that the *Merrimac* would be sunk by the enemy before she could reach the right point. Hobson's plan was to guide her to this point, drop anchor, and as the bulky craft swung around with the current, cause her to sink by exploding the charges of dynamite he had taken with him. The shot and shell rained upon the *Merrimac* with a fury and rapidity that it seemed must riddle her. The steering apparatus was so injured that complete success was not possible, but the hulk was sunk very nearly in the right position. Hobson and his companions escaped by clinging all night to an old catamaran with which they had provided themselves. They were finally discovered by the enemy, picked up, and carried as prisoners to Santiago.

Admiral Cervera could not repress his admiration of the American heroes. He informed Admiral Sampson of their safety, but several weeks passed before an exchange could be effected, during which the prisoners were treated kindly. So chivalrous, indeed, was the Spanish admiral to the Americans,

that, when the fortunes of war made Cervera himself a captive in our hands, he was treated like an honored guest. The whole country was thrilled with admiration of Hobson's exploit, and, when he visited the North some months later on official business, he received ovations everywhere, and was hailed with wild demonstrations of delight.

Meanwhile, operations were pushed in every direction. One of the most remarkable exploits of the war was the run of the *Oregon*, from San Francisco to Key West. This battleship, one of the most magnificent ever built, was too valuable to be left idle on the Pacific coast, where there could be no fighting, and orders were sent to Captain Charles E. Clark, her commander, to make all haste to join Admiral Sampson's squadron. He left San Francisco March 19, and steamed more than three thousand miles to Callao before making his first stop. Onward the noble craft sped, and, safely rounding Cape Horn, started up the eastern coast of South America on the home stretch.

It will be remembered that the whereabouts of Admiral Cervera's fleet was unknown at that time, and it was believed that

he would lie in wait for the *Oregon* off the easternmost point of Brazil; but nothing was seen of him, and the *Oregon* completed her voyage of more than fourteen thousand nautical miles in sixty-eight days, without the slightest mishap. Her record is the most wonderful ever made.

The sinking of the *Merrimac* had failed effectually to close the entrance to Santiago Harbor, and the belief was general that Cervera would make a dash on the first favorable opportunity, with a good chance of several of his vessels escaping. Close watch, therefore, was kept of the harbor and the search lights were always in operation throughout the night.

Between nine and ten o'clock on Sunday morning, July 3, while the crews of the American warships were at quarters for general inspection, black smoke was seen ascending beyond the hills that hid Santiago Bay from sight, and a few minutes later the *Iowa* flashed the signal:

"The enemy is coming out!"

It so happened that at that time Admiral Sampson was absent, having gone some six miles eastward with his flagship, for the pur-

pose of holding a consultation with General Shafter. The ships that lay outside in a deadly crescent were the *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Brooklyn*, the arc reaching for eight miles in the order named. Against this formidable squadron steamed the Spanish fleet, emerging from the harbor with the speed of ten knots an hour, which rapidly increased, since the vessels crowded on every ounce of steam and builded their hope of escape almost wholly upon their superior fleetness.

Admiral Cervera's flagship, the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, was the first to thrust her nose into view, followed at a distance of eight hundred yards by the *Vizcaya*, *Cristobal Colon*, and *Almirante Oquendo*. Some twelve hundred yards to the rear of these puffed the torpedo-boat destroyer *Furor*, followed by the *Pluton*.

As soon as the Spanish vessels were clear of the harbor, they turned to the westward and steamed at the highest speed possible. This exceeded that of which the American ships were capable, but it obliged the Spanish vessels to pass in front of the blockaders, who strained every nerve to intercept them,

and delivered their terrific broadsides with such effect that the Spanish gunners, who were viciously firing, were driven from their guns, and all hope of escape, with one exception, was cut off. That exception was the swift *Cristobal Colon*, which had drawn ahead of her companions and was steaming westward, parallel with the coast, at a tremendous rate.

The line of battle placed the *Brooklyn* and *Texas* furthest to the westward, and they devoted all their energies to capturing or destroying the *Colon*, leaving the others to be attended to by the ships at the rear. This was done with the effectiveness of Dewey at Manila. Within a half hour after the battle opened, the *Oquendo* and *Furor* were on fire, and they plunged for the beach to save their crews; the *Vizcaya* and *Colon* were steaming desperately to the westward, but the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* pumped their fearful shells into the fugitives with relentless accuracy. Soon the *Vizcaya* broke into flames and headed for land, striking at a point fifteen miles to the westward of Santiago Harbor. Meanwhile, the *Maria Teresa* had been set on fire and beached

eight miles further back, while the converted yacht *Gloucester*, under Lieut. Commander Richard Wainright, attacked the torpedo destroyer *Pluton* with such impetuosity that she was sunk, many of her crew being saved by the *Gloucester*.

All but one of the Spanish vessels were either destroyed or had surrendered, while the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, far to the westward, were closing in on the *Cristobal Colon*, which, in despair, dived her nose into the sand on the beach and hauled down her flag. Another amazing victory had been won by American arms. Nearly 500 Spaniards were killed and wounded and 1800 were taken prisoners, including Admiral Cervera and Captain Eulate of the *Vizcaya*, while the captain of the *Oquendo* committed suicide. Our loss was one killed and one wounded, both on the *Brooklyn*. The news of this gallant achievement, reaching the United States on the 4th of July, made that anniversary one of the most memorable in our history.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Invasion of Cuba—The Severe Fighting at La Quasina—Dash and Bravery of the Americans—Distribution of Our Troops—Their Repeated Successes—Demand for the Surrender of Santiago—General Toral's Offer and Its Rejection.

WHILE these stirring events were under way, and, indeed, previous to their occurrence, important military operations were set on foot. Cuba could not be conquered by the navy alone. It was necessary to land an army on the island and subdue the armed forces of the enemy. Havana was blockaded, but no attack was made upon it from the opening to the close of the war. American skill and bravery were sufficient to force its downfall, but it would have been at the cost of many valuable lives. The wise general secures the greatest results with as little loss as possible of his men.

Major General William R. Shafter, of the regular army, was placed in command of the first army mobilized for the invasion

of Cuba, which numbered 13,500 men. They embarked from Tampa June 14, and arrived at Santiago June 20. The purpose was to form a junction with the Cuban army under General Garcia, who was to co-operate with Shafter and Admiral Sampson. Protected by the guns of the fleet, General Shafter landed his troops June 22, at Baiquiri, a few miles to the east of Santiago Harbor, and the next day the advance began against the city. No opposition was offered to the landing of the American troops, who moved along the line of the railroad leading to Santiago.

On the second day, while nearing the town of Sevilla and when at La Quasina, they encountered the enemy in force. The weather was intensely hot, the country was filled with dense undergrowth and matted vines, and the Spaniards, who fired with deadly accuracy, used smokeless gunpowder, which made it almost impossible to discern where they were concealed in the brush. Not only did they use Mauser rifles, but they had the fearful advantage of two machine guns, probably taken from Admiral Cervera's ships. They numbered fully 1500, while our force was about 900, under the command of

Colonel Young, and consisting of parts of the Twenty-third United States Infantry, of the First and Tenth United States Cavalry, and the First Volunteer Cavalry, known as "Roosevelt's Rough Riders."

Nothing could surpass the impetuous dash and daring of the Americans. In the face of a withering fire, which the Spaniards did not doubt would send them fleeing in a panic, they pressed on and drove the enemy scurrying toward the city. Many were killed, but the loss of our troops was severe, including 16 killed and 52 wounded, 42 of the casualties occurring among the Rough Riders. Two of these were Captain Allyn Capron and Sergeant Hamilton Fish, Jr., whose bodies were buried where they fell and their graves lined with leaves and branches of the palm trees. This battle, one of the severest of the war, is known as that of Siboney or La Quasina.

The advance of our forces was pushed carefully, the lines being gradually extended until, by the 1st of July, they reached from the coast on the left, where General Wheeler was stationed, around Santiago and some three miles to the east of the city, where a strong body of Cubans was stationed to cut off the

retreat of the garrison. Colonel John A. Church gives the distribution of our troops as follows:

The army of invasion comprised the Fifth Army Corps under Major General William R. Shafter, and was composed of two divisions of infantry, two brigades of cavalry, and two brigades of light and four batteries of heavy artillery. General Lawton commanded the Second Division, operating on the right, where the capture of El Caney was his principal task, and had the brigades of General Chaffee, the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry; General Ludlow, Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and Second Massachusetts Volunteers; and Colonel Miles, First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry. In the center, General Kent commanded the First Division, consisting of General Hawkins' brigade, the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, and Seventy-first New York Volunteers; Colonel Pearson's brigade, the Second, Tenth, and Twenty-first Infantry. General Wheeler's cavalry division contained two brigades, Colonel Sumner's, the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Cavalry; and Colonel Young's, the First and Tenth Cavalry and

First Volunteer Cavalry. The cavalry operated at both the two principal points of attack, but fought dismounted, no horses having been shipped. At the end of the first day's fighting, General Kent was re-enforced by General Bates with the Third and Twentieth Infantry, coming up from the coast. On the left, General Duffield engaged Aguadores with the Thirty-third and part of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, and a force of about 2000 Cubans. Grimes' and Best's batteries of artillery were with the center, and Capron's and Parkhouse's were with General Lawton on the right. General Shafter, General Joseph Wheeler, and General Young were all too ill to be in the field, though General Wheeler did go out in an ambulance. The headquarters were at Sevilla.

The entire American line was involved in the attack which opened on the 1st of July, the sharpest fighting taking place at El Caney, a suburb of Santiago opposite our right, and at San Juan, which was an intrenched position opposite our center. In both instances the attack was begun in the morning, Grimes' battery opening that on San Juan. The cavalry (dismounted) moved up the valley, sup-

ported by Hawkins' brigade and all the time under a galling fire from the long-range Mausers of the Spaniards. Noon came and passed before our troops were in position to charge. When they did so they swept everything before them, driving the enemy in disorder toward Santiago and planting their flags on the heights of San Juan.

The fight over El Caney was equally hot and deadly, lasting from six o'clock in the morning until late in the afternoon, before General Lawton was able to capture the little town. The Spanish defenses consisted mainly of blockhouses, of which there was a large number all along the line. They were powerful, being flanked by earthworks, while around all was stretched a network of barbed-wire fences. The purpose of the latter, which were placed in the level openings and cultivated fields, was to hold our men in check long enough for the Mausers to decimate their ranks; but these checks were only momentary, for the Americans carried instruments with which to cut the wire, when they dashed forward with irrestrainable daring.

The fighting demonstrated one inspiring truth: the Spaniards were afraid of the

Americans. Whenever the latter discovered them and made a charge, the enemy broke and fled. They dreaded a hand-to-hand encounter above everything. Their most effective work was when they fought in guerrilla style, which was their favorite method. Their marksmanship was in deadly contrast to that of the gunners aboard ship.

Besides the two successes named, a third was gained on the extreme left, where General Duffield's brigade carried the Spanish position. All of these, however, were not sufficient to force the enemy into Santiago. They fell back just as far, and no farther, than they were driven by the charges of the Americans. Fighting was renewed on the 2d of July, and pressed with the most determined bravery amid the smothering heat, which prostrated many of the assailants. Indeed, fiercely as the Spaniards fought, the climate was rapidly growing more dangerous than they. The nights were chilly, and our men, being obliged to sleep on the ground, which exhaled poison, sickness increased, and it was apparent to everyone that the campaign must be vigorously pushed or it would be defeated by the frightful weather. The

rainy season had fully come, and the torrents drenched the soldiers every day. This made the steaming heat more intolerable and added, if possible, to the discomforts of the troops.

Determined to force matters, the fighting continued on the 2d until at night our troops were within easy range of the city. The heights secured placed Santiago at our mercy as soon as the artillery, which was then on the road, should arrive. The mule paths which answered for highways were in such wretched condition that passage was slow and of the most laborious nature. Confident that General Shafter would not attack until the arrival of his heavy guns, which would require several days, the Spaniards rested on their arms and gave their attention to strengthening their position.

They soon learned, however, of their mistake, for our troops kept edging forward until the defenders were forced into the intrenchments immediately surrounding the city. All the while Admiral Sampson was hurling his prodigious shells over the hills and dropping them into the doomed city. It was an astonishing distance to fire the huge missiles—fully eight miles—but with that

skill which has made our gunners the superior of all others, the range was obtained and great damage inflicted. This was supplemented by the capture of El Caney and San Juan, which fully commanded the city.

These decisive successes pointed unerringly to the only conclusion possible: Santiago must fall before the attack of the Americans. Furthermore, Admiral Cervera and his fleet lying in the broad harbor would be shut off from all escape. Governor General Blanco at Havana, being informed of the alarming situation, sent peremptory orders for the Admiral to steam out of the harbor and do all he could to save his noble vessels. On the morning succeeding the incidents just narrated he made the attempt, with the result that has already been made known to the reader.

On the day that Admiral Cervera's fleet was destroyed, General Shafter sent a flag of truce into Santiago with notice that, if the city was not surrendered by noon of July 5, he would bombard it. General Toral, the Spanish commander, replied that it was necessary for him to communicate with Madrid, and asked General Shafter to loan him a few

telegraphers, since his own had fled. He pledged himself to send only such message as bore on the question involved, and promised further to give the operators safe escort back to the American lines. This singular request was granted, and General Toral (whose chief, General Linares, had been incapacitated by a wound) carried out his part of the agreement.

His reply to General Shafter's demand was an offer to evacuate the city without harming it, provided his men were allowed to do so with their arms. This in effect would have been simply a change of base on the part of the enemy, since they would have all their weapons at command and be free to renew the fighting under more favorable conditions. The proposal was referred to Washington, and in reply General Shafter was instructed to accept no surrender other than an unconditional one.

CHAPTER XVII.

Surrender of Santiago—The Terms—The Decisive Victory and Its Fruits—Commodore Watson's Formidable Fleet—The Invasion of Porto Rico—An Unexpected Reception—Advance upon San Juan—Abrupt Termination of the Campaign.

CONSIDERABLE telegraphing took place between Washington and General Shafter. The latter was so ambiguous in some of his messages that it required several sharp reproofs before he made clear what he was doing. There were fears that he would be led into some indiscretion by the adroit Toral, who secured a postponement of the date when a final answer must be given, by claiming that the time was too short to permit a removal of the non-combatants. Prodded from Washington and advised by General Miles, who had arrived on the spot, Shafter pressed his adversary, who finally agreed, July 14, to surrender unconditionally. The capitulation embraced, besides the city of Santiago, about one-third of the province of

Santiago, including all the armed forces within that area. The only condition was that our Government should transport those who surrendered, to Spain, free of expense to themselves. This was an act of courtesy and generosity on the part of the United States, which thereby saved the greater expense of taking care of them as prisoners of war, until such times as their own Government chose to remove them.

The formal surrender took place on the 17th, when the Spanish army marched out of Santiago and laid down their arms, and the Stars and Stripes was raised at noon over the city. It is worth giving the dispatch of General Shafter sent the same day to Washington, it being the first of the kind received by our Government from a foreign country for more than half a century:

“I have the honor to announce that the American flag has been this instant, twelve noon, hoisted over the house of the civil government in the city of Santiago. An immense concourse of people were present, a squadron of cavalry, and a regiment of infantry presenting arms and a band playing

national airs. A light battery fired a salute of twenty-one guns.

"Perfect order is being maintained by the municipal government. The distress is very great, but there is little sickness in town and scarcely any yellow fever.

"A small gunboat and about 200 seamen left by Cervera have surrendered to me. Obstructions are being removed from the mouth of the harbor.

"Upon coming into the city I discovered a perfect entanglement of defenses. Fighting as did the Spaniards the first day, it would have cost five thousand lives to have taken it.

"Battalions of Spanish troops have been depositing arms since daylight in the armory, over which I have a guard. General Toral formally surrendered the plaza and all stores at 9 A. M."

This victory was decisive and its fruits most important. It was gained within twenty days after the first landing of American troops, who numbered barely one-half the force that surrendered; we secured one-tenth of the island of Cuba, with two fine harbors, about 7000 rifles, 600,000 cartridges, and a

great many excellent modern guns. The captured troops numbered some 25,000. Our losses in killed, wounded, and missing were less than 1600, many of the missing afterward joining their commands.

But beyond all this was the moral effect of the victory. The two principal fleets of Spain had been destroyed, and now the first of her armies engaged had suffered a crushing defeat. The lesson was so obvious that the Spanish statesmen, as by courtesy they are sometimes called, could no longer fail to read the "handwriting on the wall." The most optimistic of Spaniards saw that the utter defeat and humiliation of his country were at hand. The United States possessed limitless resources, while Spain was hopelessly bankrupt; our country, as we have shown, could readily put a million of men in the field, while Hispania was drained of her soldiers, thousands of whom had perished in Cuba; our already powerful navy was swiftly increasing in strength, and no war in our history was ever supported with such unanimity.

If anything more was needed to bring Spain to her senses, it was furnished by the fact that vigorous measures were on foot to

send to the Mediterranean the most formidable fleet that had ever crossed the Atlantic. It was to be under the command of the gallant Commodore John C. Watson, and should it pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, Spain would be helpless before the devastating armament that would scourge her coasts with fire and sword.

Rumors of proposals for peace became more plentiful, but our Government did not wait for them to materialize. The true course was to press things until Spain was literally driven into a corner and compelled to sue for peace.

While Cuba was virtually conquered, Spain still retained Porto Rico. The feeling was general that no proposals for peace should be listened to which did not include the cession of that island to this country. It was useless to demand an indemnity from Spain, since she never could pay it, but we could accept Porto Rico by way of payment, and steps were taken to secure it.

Furthermore, haste was necessary as a matter of safety for our troops. Fever had appeared among those at Santiago, and despite all the precautions it increased until, in

August, it grew so serious that it became clear that the only means of saving the army from annihilation was to remove it to the more favorable climate of the United States.

Accordingly, General Miles advanced with his usual promptitude and vigor. On the 21st of July he left Guantanamo with transports and a convoy for Porto Rico. On the same day General Calixto Garcia sulked because his Cuban troops were not allowed to have a part in receiving the surrender of Santiago, resigned his commission, and withdrew into the interior.

It is only simple justice to state that the course of the Cuban "patriots" was a grievous disappointment to their friends. In the first place, the number under arms was hardly one-half of what had been represented. While they included many brave officers and men, who underwent all manner of suffering for the cause of liberty, the majority were worthless loafers, with no stomach for fighting, but with infinite capacity in the direction of American rations. They showed no gratitude to the United States, whose soldiers they were very willing to see do all the fighting. There were a good many thousand Cubans in

the United States, but precious few went home to help win the independence of the island.

General Shafter was left at Santiago, over which General Leonard Wood, promoted from the colonelcy of the "Rough Riders," was appointed military governor, and General Miles began landing his troops in Porto Rico, on the 25th of July, at Guanica on the southern side of the island, within a few miles of Ponce, the most important city, from which a fine military road leads across the island to San Juan, the capital, some eighty miles distant.

A surprise indeed awaited the American troops. The natives were heartily tired of Spanish misrule, and instead of fighting the invaders, they received them with open arms. The bands played American national airs, and the officer and his escort who came ashore to demand the surrender of the city were greeted with childish effusion. Cigars and fruit were pressed upon them, and cries of "Vivan los Americanos!" filled the air, while the American flag seemed to be waving everywhere. The Spanish garrison paused long enough to loot a number of stores and

shops, and, stuffing the plunder up their backs to shield them from American bullets, scurried out of the city. Nothing can show the spirit of the people better than the following official address, which was issued by the Alcalde or chief magistrate of the city :

“Citizens: God, who rules the destinies of nations, has decreed that the Eagle of the North, coming from the waters of a land where liberty first sprang forth to life, should extend to us his protecting wings. Under his plumage, sweetly reposing, the Pearl of the Antilles, called Porto Rico, will remain from July 25.

“The Starry Banner has floated gayly in the valleys of Guanica, the most beautiful port of this down-trodden land. This city was selected by General Miles as the place in which to officially plant his flag in the name of his Government, the United States of America. It is the ensign of grandeur and the guarantee of order, morality, and justice. Let us join together to strengthen, to support, and to further a great work. Let us clasp to our bosoms the great treasure which is generously offered to us, while salut-

ing with all our hearts the name of the great Washington."

While the welcome extended to the Americans was universal, so far as civilians were concerned, it was not so as regards the military. The Spaniards fell back in the direction of San Juan, but prepared to dispute the advance of the invaders northward across the island. A number of skirmishes took place, but without serious loss on either side, and, on July 27, the Americans advanced to Yauco. On the same day, the port of Ponce surrendered to Captain C. H. Davis of the *Dixie*, and on the following day the city of Ponce surrendered to General Miles' soldiers. Moving with great caution, the Americans on the 7th of August advanced from Ponce to Juan Diaz, in the direction of San Juan and also westward from Yauco.

General Brooke marched northward from Arroyo on the southeastern coast at day-break on the morning of August 12, and at noon passed Guayma and advanced three miles to a point where a brisk fight had occurred with the Spanish troops several days before. The enemy were still in-

trenched in the same position, and the Americans made ready to attack them.

One of the batteries was sighting its guns, when Lieutenant McLaughlin of the Signal Corps dashed up, his horse panting and covered with sweat, and handed a dispatch to General Brooke from General Miles. General Brooke read the paper, and his face clouded. Glancing at the steaming flanks of the lieutenant's horse, he said :

"You have ridden too hard ; you should have had more consideration for your faithful animal."

"But, general," replied the lieutenant with a smile, "the importance of the message warranted it."

"Possibly, but you arrived fifteen minutes too soon ; this will be a great disappointment to the soldiers."

And indeed it was a sore disappointment, for the message meant PEACE !

CHAPTER XVIII.

Spanish Overtures for Peace—Our Terms Accepted by Spain
—Signing of the Protocol—Ravages of Sickness among
Our Troops—Fighting in the Philippines—Capture of
Manila—The Results of our War with Spain.

SPAIN, having awakened at last to the fact that the only way in which she could save herself from ruin was to make peace with the United States on the best terms attainable, was confronted by the delicate question of the right method of making the first advance. Since the French representatives had been intrusted with her interests in this country during the continuance of the war, she empowered M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, to ask our Government upon what conditions it would grant peace.

This request was made on July 26, and President McKinley promptly replied that he could not consent to an armistice except upon the agreement that Spain should immediately withdraw from Cuba, cede Porto Rico to us, give up one of the Ladrone

Islands, and agree to the appointment of a joint commission to decide upon the disposition of the Philippines and other matters that would be brought before it.

M. Cambon communicated these terms to the Spanish Government, which after some haggling accepted them. The Queen Regent, who had been opposed to the war from the beginning, consulted the leaders of the different political parties and sanctioned the Cabinet's reply to the demands of our Government. The Spanish reply reached M. Cambon at Washington on the 8th of August. Two days later he was authorized by Spain to sign the protocol providing for a cessation of hostilities.

The interesting ceremonies which brought the war to a close, after it had continued 114 days, took place at the White House on the afternoon of August 12. This was in deference to the wishes of President McKinley, who desired to witness them.

A number of distinguished visitors were present in addition to the persons chiefly concerned, when at 4.23 in the afternoon, Secretary of State Day for the United States, and M. Cambon for Spain, signed the important

paper in duplicate, in order that each government might retain possession of a copy.

The signing of the protocol was not an official ending of the war, but merely an agreement by which the two nations pledged themselves to stop fighting and discuss the question; but since Spain had pledged herself to the conditions named by our Government, the war was unquestionably ended and was so regarded by both countries. A notification was sent to the blockading fleets, to all naval forces, and to the military commanders in the Philippines, Cuba, and Porto Rico, ordering them to cease hostilities immediately. We have shown how the command reached General Brooke in Porto Rico, while his gunners were sighting their cannon at the enemy. He and his soldiers were keenly disappointed, but no choice was left them except to obey.

Sickness was making such ravages among the brave soldiers in Cuba that they were hastily shipped north in transports, Generals Shafter and Miles themselves arriving early in September. It is a sad fact that fever, illness, starvation, and in some cases the criminal neglect and incompetence of those in authority were the direct cause of five

times as many deaths as the Mauser rifles of the enemy. Great indignation was roused throughout the country by the shameful treatment of our brave boys, who had risked their lives in a pestilential climate, and exposed to the treacherous ferocity of men who hardly knew the meaning of the word mercy. It was an outrage that made the blood of men, women, and children tingle with an anger that could not be repressed.

The soldiers were gradually mustered out of service, but disease and death followed many a gallant patriot to his home, and snatched him from the embrace of his loved ones. The full cost of the war for the liberation of Cuba probably will never be known with exactness, but the deaths must have numbered several thousands.

It was so easy to reach the military and naval authorities in the West Indian waters that all fighting promptly stopped, but Manila was halfway round the world, and there was sharp fighting there after the signing of the protocol.

Two weeks previous the Spaniards took the offensive, and on the night of July 31 assaulted our lines around Manila. This was

done with so much spirit that at first our troops were threatened with disaster. The enemy made a sortie from Malate, a suburb of Manila, and striking a weak place in our line, caused by an advance under way and by the failure of the insurgents to hold a swampy place on the right, the Spaniards got on our right flank and secured a cross fire, but the trenches were held until re-enforcements arrived, when the enemy were driven back.

Several expeditions had been sent from San Francisco to the Philippines, of which General Wesley Merritt was appointed military governor. He arrived in the latter part of July, and soon had more than 12,000 troops under his command. Since this force was considered strong enough to occupy Manila after capturing it, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt determined to assume the offensive without delay.

On August 14 Admiral Dewey demanded the surrender of the city. No reply was made, whereupon the squadron formed in line of battle and the *Olympia*, the admiral's flagship, fired the first shot. General Merritt made an advance at the same time along shore and desperate fighting followed; but

the Americans could not be stayed. The Spaniards were driven within the walled city, and, shortly, after the white flag was raised and the surrender made. Eight of the Americans had been killed and 40 wounded. General Merritt marched in and took possession. The Stars and Stripes was raised, but there was no disorder, a general feeling of relief existing because of the fear of the savage horde under Aguinaldo, the insurgent leader.

Shortly after the surrender a dispatch from Washington, announcing the signing of the protocol, reached Admiral Dewey and General Merritt. At first it was believed that all the Philippines had been surrendered, but it proved to be only the city of Manila.

There are some facts connected with Admiral Dewey's operations which approach the marvelous. It fell to him to open and close the war, each with a victory that was of the most brilliant and decisive character. But the incomprehensible part of it all is that he inflicted prodigious damage and loss of life without having a single man killed. We repeat that nothing of the kind is recorded on the pages of history.

No defeat could have been more overwhelming than that of Spain in this "short, sharp, and decisive" war. Even that proud nation was compelled to admit the folly of trying to measure strength with us. Although there was much wrangling when the Cortes assembled in Madrid in September, the consensus of opinion was the same. The assassin among nations, who blighted whatever she touched, whose path of empire was crimsoned with the blood of innocent thousands, whose presence on our continent had been a curse from the very first—this hideous power was driven forever from its last foothold in the Western Hemisphere. The iron heel that had crushed so long was at last thrust aside by the righteous war waged by the United States in behalf of suffering and dying humanity.

The near future must decide the full meaning of the victories which crowned our arms. During the progress of the war Hawaii was annexed, and Porto Rico is so near that it seems the most natural thing in the world for it to become a part of our possessions; but it is otherwise with the Philippines. They are on the other side of the world and

form a part of the Asiatic continent. The momentous question is—Shall we retain them, or arrange a temporary protectorate, with the purpose of turning them over again to Spain or possibly to some friendly power?

The majority of our citizens adhere to the policy of never lowering our flag from where it has been once raised, and insist that we shall keep everything won by the bravery of our sailors and soldiers. If this policy is pursued, the United States will enter upon a career of colonial expansion and growth that will mark a new era in her history, and whose future promises to surpass the wildest vision of the dreamers of the past.

On the other hand, there are not wanting able and patriotic men who believe that such a career is fraught with danger to us, and that true wisdom demands that we shall confine ourselves to the continent itself, where, when our population shall have increased a hundred-fold, it will not be as dense as that of some of the countries of Europe to-day.

But the commission appointed to meet that of Spain and to decide all these important questions is composed of brilliant minds, whose integrity, honesty, sincerity, and pa-

triotism can never be impugned. The interests of our great and loved country are safe in their hands, for they and we are ruled by the God of nations, as we have been in the past, and we have only to follow His guidance to attain still grander heights of prosperity, power, might, and happiness that shall make us the most potent factors in civilization and Christianity that the world has ever known.

THE END.

